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Usos del Suelo y Configuration 
de la Estructura Urbana en 
Ciudad Juarez, Chih., (1960-1990) 
Cesar M. Fuentes* 
Summary 
This study analyzes land use patterns in Ciudad Juarez, 
Chihuahua, 1960-1990. Since its founding and into the twentieth 
century, the city has had a dynamic history. But under the period of 
study, massive migration to Cd. Juarez has fostered important 
changes in urban patterns. The maquila industry, for example, has 
directly and indirectly created a large number of jobs. This growth 
has revolutionalized industrial, commercial, agricultural, and habi­
tation patterns of the city. The impact of this recent development is 
the topic of this work. 
*Cesar M. Fuentes, investigador de El Colegio de la Frontera Norte 
en Ciudad Juarez 
Introduccion. 
Desde su fundacion y a lo largo del siglo XX, Ciudad Juarez 
ha sido uno de los centros poblaeionales con mayor dinamica 
demografica del pais, lacual se ha visto incrernentada o disminui'da 
por fenomenos sociales, politicos y economicos por los que ha 
atravesado e! pais. 
Este gran crecimiento poblacional responde prineipalmente 
a su localizacion geografica respecto a los Estados Unidos, que han 
convertido a Ciudad Juarez en puente de llegada y paso de una gran 
cantidad de migrantes en busca de mejores condiciones de vida. 
De 1940 a 1950 la poblacionde la ciudad tuvo el crecimiento 
relativo mas alto de su historia. A partir de 1950 la tasa de 
crecimiento poblacional disminuyo, pero siempre se mantuvo por 
encima de la nacional. 
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Durante las decadas de Ios cincuenta y sesenta el gran 
crecimiento por migration, aunado al creeirniento natural fueron 
configurando la estructura urbana de la ciudad. 
Un acontecimiento que marco un cambio importante en la 
estructura urbana de Ciudad Juarez fue la cancelation del Programa 
Braceros que condujo a la implementation del Programa de 
Industrialization Fronteriza, que se inicio a mediados de la decada 
de los sesenta el cual reoriento la principal actividad economica de 
la ciudad, ya que de tener una marcada presencia del subsector 
turismo y agrfcola se transformo en una ciudad con una fuerte 
estructura industrial especializada en procesos intensivos en mano 
de obra. 
La industria maquiladora creo un importante numero de 
empleos directos e indirectos, incrementando la atraccion de la 
poblacion de otras partes del estado y del pais para establecerse en 
la ciudad. 
Durante las decadas de 1970 y 1980 la tasa de crecimiento 
poblacional continuo siendo aha, aunque en menor medida que en 
las decadas anteriores. 
El crecimiento economico y poblacional que experimento la 
ciudad durante la decada de los setentas y ochentas transformo la 
estructura del uso del suelo en Ciudad Juarez. 
De 1960 a 1980 la superficie ocupada por la mancha urbana 
casi se cuadruplico y de 1980 a 1990 se incremento en 715 hectareas. 
Historicumente el crecimiento urbano se dirigio del centro 
de la ciudad hacia el oeste de la misma. A partir de la decada de los 
setenta y ochenta el crecimiento se oriento principalmente hacia el 
este y sureste de la ciudad. 
El orientede laciudad con un marcado uso agrfcola comenzo 
a ser ocupado por parques industriales y zonas habitacionales de 
mediano y alto ingreso. En la parte suroriente se localize un 
importante porcentaje de las nuevas zonas habitacionales para 
poblacion de bajos ingresos y la instalacion de algunas industrias. 
Asimismo las areas comerciales crecieron sobre las principals vfas 
de acceso a estos nuevos asentamientos de poblacion. 
El objetivo del estudio es analizar los cambios en el uso del suelo en 
Ciudad Juarez, Chih. durante el periodo 1960-1990. 
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Metodologfa 
El estudio requirio de analisis cspacial, asf como longitudi­
nal con cuatro puntos en el tiempo. 
Las variables que se usaron son superficies ocupadas por 
cada uso del suelo (habitacional, comercial, industrial, agricola y 
tiempo (1960, 1970, 1980 y 1990). 
En base a lo antes expuesto el estudio requirio de la siguiente 
metodologfa. 
Para la realization del analisis espacial, se utilizo el Sistema 
de Information Geografica Computarizada (IDIRISI)1 que tiene 
como objetivo el manejo y distribution de objetos y atributos en un 
contexto espacial y socioeconomico. Lo anterior con el objetivo de 
elaborar pianos cartograficos en diferentes puntos en el tiempo y 
usos del suelo, a fin de determinar como se ha ido configurando la 
estructura urbana de Ciudad Juarez en los ultimos 30 ahos. 
Por lo que se requerio de la revision de los siguientes 
documentos: El Plan Regulador Urbanode Ciudad Juarez de 1971, 
El Plan de Desarrollo Urbano de 1979, 1984 y 1989. 
El primer paso fue buscar las principals fuentes de 
informacion, en este caso se visito la Direction de Desarrollo 
Urbano del Municipio, en busca de los planes reguladores del 
desarrollo urbano antes mencionados. 
Asimistno, se adquirieron pianos de la ciudad que tenfan una 
escala de 1: 10,000 y tambien se recopilaron documentos e 
investigaciones relacionados con el tema. 
Una vez hecho lo anterior, se procedio a marcar en pianos de 
la ciudad las areas ocupadas por cada uso del suelo (habitacional, 
industrial, comercial y agricola) en cada una de las siguientes 
decadas 1960, 1970, 1980 y 1990. 
A los pianos que se les habfa marcado el area ocupada por 
cada uso del suelo, se procedio a cuadricular y cada cuadro midio 1 
centimetre cuadrado. El numero total de cuadros del piano fue de 
4,067 que representan el total del area estudiada. 
Posteriormente se procedio a darle un valor numerico a cada 
uso del suelo al momento de capturar la matriz de datos. 
A1 finalizar lo anterior se procedio a filtrar las imagenes 
resultando una estratificacion de los usos del suelo. 
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Lo anterior se realize para cada uno de los siguientes anos; 
1960, 1970, 1980 y 1990. 
Cuando se obtuvieron las imagenes de los pianos se procedio 
a calcular las areas ocupadas por cada uso del suelo, ya que el 
programa de computacion nos presenta un histograma en el cual nos 
indica el numero de celdas que ocupa cada uso del suelo. 
I.-Orfgenes del Patron de Urbanizacion en Ciudad Juarez. 
En 1659 una vez que se fundo la mision de Nuestra Sefiora 
de Guadalupe se dio la primer forma de urbanizacion en Ciudad 
Juarez, la cual se localizo en una planicie al sur del Ri'o Grande. 
Este surgio como un importante pueblo de paso para 
caravanas de comerciantes y migrantes que se dirigian hacia el oeste 
de los Estados Unidos. 
Esta primer forma de urbanizacion se dio con las 
caracterfsticas de una mision, la cual consistio en la construccion de 
la plaza e iglesia cerca de la parte sur del Rfo Grande como ocurrio 
en la mayor parte de las ciudades latinoamericanas. 
Su localizacion inicial ha persistido como la principal 
caracterfstica del desarrollo urbano de la ciudad. Su estrategica 
localizacion como punto de paso hacia el oeste y el floreeimiento de 
actividades productivas como la agricultura, condujo a una 
concentracion de poblacion y actividades alrededor de la mision que 
fue uno de los asentamientos poblacionales mas importantes en el 
siglo XVII.2 
Durante el siglo XVIII la estructura geografica del 
asentamiento incluyo la localizacion del centro alrededor de la 
mision, presidio, las extensas tierras irrigadas y la conttnua 
orientacion del asentamiento a! corredor historico de transportacion 
norte-sur.3 
Como ya se menciono, el crecimiento poblacional con el 
paso del tiempo transformo su estructura urbana debido a la 
importanciaadquiridapor su localizacion geograficay lariquezade 
sus suelos, lo que determine la instalacion del cuartel militar cerca 
de la ya existente plaza e iglesia, aunado a la importancia que tenia 
laproduccionagricolaquecadavezincorporabaunamayorcantidad 
de tierras y poblacion a esta actividad. 
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Habra que recordar que El Paso del Norte fue fundado en 
territorio de Nuevo Mexico, posteriormente con la independencia 
de Mexico de Espana, El Paso del Norte paso a formar parte del 
naciente estado de Chihuahua en 1824. 
El patron de urbanizacion de El Paso del Norte fue 
dramaticamente alterado por el establecimiento del Rfo Grande 
como frontera internacional entre Mexico y Estado Unidos, aunado 
al descubrimiento de oro en California durante 1840.4 Lo anterior 
atrajo a grandes cantidades de poblacion, los que encontraron en la 
poblacion un punto de provisiones y descanso aunado a un nuevo 
intercambio eomercial internacional. 
Los impactos inmediatos se dieron de manera directa al 
dividir polfticamente a El Paso del Norte en dos comunidades, una 
en el estado de Chihuahua en Mexico y la otra en el estado de Texas 
en los Estados Unidos, las cuales mantenfan en ese momento las 
mismas caracterfsticas culturales, etnicas y sociales 
El centra historic© del pueblo quedo en el lado sur del rfo, y 
el lado estadounidense localizo su centra en la orilla norte del Rfo 
Grande, debido a las necesidades de mantener intercambio eomercial 
con la parte mexicana donde se localizaba la mayor parte de la 
poblacion, ya que mientras que en el lado mexicano vivfan varios 
miles de personas en la parte norteamericana solo vivfan 50 
personas.5 
Una vez dividido el asentamiento y el valle en dos pafses, el 
rfo influyo significativamente en el patron espacial de urbanizacion, 
ya que la region durante muchos ahos se vio afectada por inundaciones 
que con cierta regularidad en epocas de lluvia se presentaban, lo que 
ocasiono que los asentamientos humanos se localizaran en las partes 
mas altas del valle, y no mantuviera un patron de crecimiento 
regular. 
En 18 82 se inaguraron las lfneas del ferrocarril entre El Paso 
del Norte y la Ciudad de Mexico, lo anterior impacto de manera 
sobresaliente el patron de urbanizacion. 
Al revisar los pianos de la epoca observamos que la lfnea del 
ferrocaril se vuelve el cordon umbilical de la poblacion, ya que los 
nuevos asentamientos humanos se comenzaron a localizar a lo largo 
de esta via de comunicacion, ademas de poder aprovechar su 
localizacion geografica para el traslado de mercancfas. El anterior 
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acontecimiento convirtio a El Paso del Norte en un irnportante 
centra de exportation e importation, asi como un irnportante 
rnercado de productos agncolas y ganaderos. 
En 1885 despues de largas discusiones en el Congreso 
Mexicano se extendio a lo largo de toda la Frontera Norte la zona 
libre, que logro cierto auge economico en Ciudad Juarez. Lo que 
ocasiono que en esa epoca el movimiento de poblacion en busea de 
trabajo e inversiones se dirigiera hacia el sur del Rio Bravo.6 
El impaeto inicial de lo anterior fue el incremento de la 
poblacion que aicanzo aproximadamente 12,000 habitantes en 
1887. 
En 1888, la poblacion de El Paso del Noite fue clasificado 
como ciudad y su nombre fue cambiado a Ciudad Juarez en honor 
a Don Benito Juarez. 
En 1895 Ciudad Juarez era una ciudad compacta de 
aproximadamente 6,900 personas ocupando un area 
aproximadamente de 65 hectareas. La anterior disminueion en el 
numero de habitantes estuvo influfdo por una crisis economica que 
vivio la ciudad, lo que provoco una gran migracion hacia los Estados 
Unidos. 
AI revisar un mapa realizado por Salvador Arellano en 1894 
y presentado por Valencia en 1969, se observo que la actual 
estructura geograhca de Ciudad Juarez surgio desde finales del 
siglo XIX. 
Como resultado de su relativa incomunicacion con el resto 
del pais, Juarez inicialmente crecio con un patron irregular, ya que 
como mencionamos las principales vi'as de acceso de la poblacion 
lueron establecidas para comunicar a los agricultores con la iglesia 
y la plaza, y las calles fueron trazadas en forma perpendicular al 
cauce del Rio Bravo. Adicionaimente vinieron canales, drenes que 
despues del ferroearil se agregaron a este irregular patron urbano. 
La falta de un ordenamiento en el sistema de calles en las 
prin iei as etapas del crecimiento, sobre todo hacia la parte izquierda 
del centra de Ciudad Juarez, que crecio con un in usual tipode diseno 
geografico con calles es tree has, lo cual condujo a la formacion de 
cuellos de bote1 a en la mayor parte del centra historico de la 
ciudad.1' 
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Durante la segunda decada del siglo XX, acontecimientos 
corno Guerras, Revolucion y cambio social produjeron impactos 
directos e indirectos en la urbanizaeion de Ciudad Juarez.8 
La Revolucion Mexicana incremento la migracion hacia la 
ciudad, debido a su localization geografica con respecto a los 
campos de combate, lo que permitio que importantes cantidades de 
poblacion buscaran ponerse a salvo del conflicto y algunas familias 
ricas del norte del pais "salvaran sus fortunas" al cambiar su 
residencia a El Paso Texas. Ademas de que la ciudad fue el punto 
de paso para el contrabando de importantes cantidades de arm as 
para la revolucion. 
La poblacion de Ciudad Juarez se incremento de 10,621 
habitantesen 1910 a 19,457 en 1920. Esta fue probablemente lamas 
grande tasa de crecimiento desde el siglo XVII.9 
Otro evento que tuvo influencia en el crecimiento de la 
ciudad y en los nuevos usos del suelo fue la Primera Guerra 
Mundial, ya que se incremento el numero de tropas estadounidenses 
en el Fuerte de Fort Bliss en El Paso Texas, los cuales demandaban 
una serie de servicios entre los que se encontraban principalmente 
los turisticos. El area dedicada a actividades comerciales crecio con 
el numero de bares, clubes nocturnos y salones de juego. Estas 
actividades se localizaron en el primer cuadro de la ciudad junto al 
puente internacional, para facilitar el acceso del turismo. 
En 1930 la poblacion de la ciudad alcanzo cerca de 40,000 
habitantes, un incremento de un 100% respecto a la decada anterior 
y el area urbanizada en 1934 fue de 471 hectareas.10 Aunque 
virtualmente la poblacion total de esta compacta ciudad, vivia 
dentro de un area de un kilometro a partir de la plaza central, 
presentando un patron concentrico. 
Un estrecho corredor del asentamiento empezo a crecer 
hacia el lado izquierdo del centro, a lo largo de la parte este de la 
montana, extendiendose hacia abajo de la Sierra de Juarez. 
En esta misma decada la actividad industrial era casi 
inexistente, pero debido al gran crecimiento poblacional la demanda 
de terrenos para uso urbano y agrfcola se incremento. 
Durante la decada de los cuarenta, la poblacion de Ciudad 
Juarez experimento un crecimiento inusitado. La migracion interna 
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contribuyo con el 78.1 % de la poblacion y el crecimiento natural con 
el 21.9%.11 Lo anterior estuvo fuertemente influfdo por la 
instauracion en 1942 de El Programa Braceros acordado entre 
Mexico y los Estados Unidos, as! como por el exodo de miles de 
trabajadores no documentados. Este acontecimiento atrajo una gran 
cantidad de familias que se establecieron en la ciudad, ante la 
imposibilidad legal de poder migrar toda la familia completa hacia 
los Estados Unidos, estas encontraron en las ciudades fronterizas 
una relativa cercanfa geografica con sus seres queridos ademas del 
acceso a ciertos bienes y servicios. 
Los efectos en el proceso de urbanizacion de Ciudad Juarez 
fueron inmediatos. 
Asimismo, a principios de la decada de los cuarenta estalla 
la Segunda Guerra Mundial, que como la Primera Guerra Mundial 
tendrfa influencia en la ciudad. 
En el cuadro I observarnos el incremento de la poblacion 
economicamente activa y la relativa expansion de los diferentes 
sectores de la economfa, sobre todo del sector terciario que se 
extiende con mayor rapidez, lo cual dio paso a la incorporacion de 
mayores areas de la ciudad dedicadas ai comercio y los servicios. 
La poblacion de la ciudad alcanzo aproximadamente 85,000 
habitantes para finales de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y mas de 
122,000 habitantes para 1950.*" 
Entre 1940 y 1950 Ciudad Juarez se convirtio en la principal 
ciudad de la Frontera Norte.13 
Este gran crecimiento poblacional se reflejo en la alta 
densidad poblacional que alcanzaron mas de 174 personas por 
hectarea en una area urbanizada de 732 ha. 
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Cuadro I. 
Poblacion Economicamente Activa dc Ciudad Juarez 
por Ramas dc Actividad (1940-1960) 
Sectores 1940 % 1950 % 1960 % 
PEA. 13,572 100 38,665 100 73,665 100 
Primario 2,214 16.3 3,652 9.4 5,091 6.9 
Agropecuario 2,132 15.7 3,435 8.9 4,738 6.4 
Extractivas 82 .6 217 .5 353 .5 
Secundario 3,562 26.3 13,654 35.4 24,872 33.7 
Transformacion 2,611 19.3 8,433 21.8 16,385 22.2 
Construccion 908 6.7 4,901 12.8 8,062 10.9 
Elcctricidad 45 .3 320 .8 425 .6 
Terciario 7,794 57.4 21,359 55.2 43,702 59.4 
Comercio 3,107 22.9 7,265 18.8 15,346 20.8 
Comunicaciones 
y Transportes 936 6.9 2,668 6.9 4,388 6.0 
Servicios 3,751 27.6 11,426 29.5 23,968 32,68 
Fuenlc: L. Unikel y F. Torres, "La poblacion economicamente activa en Mexico y sus 
principals ciudades, 1940-1960, Dcmografia y Economi'a, Vol. IV, Num. I. (1970). 
De 1950 a 1960 la tasa anual de crecimiento de la poblacion 
fue tres veces mas alta que la experimentada por el pais y el doble 
de la del resto del estado de Chihuahua. 
En 1961 sepresentaron alteracionesurbanasespectaculares 
con las obras del Programa Nacional Fronterizo (PRONAF), las 
cuales tenfan entre sus principales objetivos fomentar las actividades 
turfsticas en la Frontera Norte. 
En Ciudad Juarez se construyo la escuela Abraham Gonzalez, 
el museo de Arte e Historia, el Centra de Convenciones, hoteles, 
tiendas de artesamas, supermercados y las principales avenidas que 
circundan esta area. Cerca de alii hay un hipodromo, una plaza de 
toros, un club campestre y otros atractivos que complementan los 
proyectos en la zona central del PRONAF.14 
En 1963 despues de ahos de negociaciones entre ambos 
gobiernos, es devuelto el territorio del Chamizal del cual Mexico 
recibio 254 hectareas al sur de El Paso, y los Estados Unidos 77 
hectareas del distrito noreste de Ciudad Juarez.15 
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Ambos acontecimientos marcaron un cambio importante en 
la estructura urbana de la ciudad. 
Durante la primer mitad de la decada de 1960, la ciudad 
continuo creciendo a altas tasas, caracterizada por la decadencia de 
las aetividades turisticas y la cancelacion en forma unilateral de El 
Programa Braceros por parte de los Estados Unidos, por lo que se 
penso que serfan deportados cerca de medio millon de trabajadores 
mexicanos que crearian un grave problema de desempleo 
principalmente en las ciudades de la frontera. Por lo que en 1965 se 
aplico un programa emergente del empleo, el que se denomino 
Programa de Industrializacion Fronteriza, el cual marco 
profundamente la estructura urbana y trajo nuevos usos del suelo 
debido a la aparicion de nuevas aetividades economicas y el 
crecimiento de otras que ya existian. 
II. Impacto de El Programa de Industrializacion Fronteriza en 
la configuracidn de la Estructura Urbana y los nuevos Usos del 
Suelo en Ciudad Juarez. 
1) Crecimiento de la estructura urbana. 
Una vez que se cancelo el Programa de Braceros el nivel de 
desempleo se incremento dramaticamente. Aunado a la elevacion 
de la tasa de crecimiento demografico, ocasionada por la inmigracion 
y la incapacidad de los distintos sectores productivos para absorber 
una gran masade trabajadores que incrementaron la desocupacion.16 
Lo anterior tuvo como resultado un desempleo subito de 
miles de trabajadores, y aunque todavfa no se conocen con precision 
las repercuciones de este suceso que afectd a varias ciudades 
sronterizas, diversos estudios han coincidido en senalar que el 
desempleo alcanzaba entre 40 y 50% de la poblacion,17 
Ante el anterior panorama ymuchas otras razonesse justified 
el estabiecimiento de El Programa Industrial Fronterizo, el cual 
mostraba las ventajas que la region presentaba a el capital 
trasnacional. 
Es asi como a finales de 1966 se l inalizaron las negociaciones 
entre un grupo de empresarios fronterizos y la Sec re tar fa de Industria 
y Comercio, en donde se les permitio la importacidn de maquinaria 
y cquipo, con sidenin dose de hecho la instalacidn de las primeras 
plantas maquiladoras en la Frontera Norte. 
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Las primeras ciudades en donde se puso en marcha el 
programa fueron Matamoros, Nuevo Laredo y Ciudad Juarez,18 
Cuadro II. 
Numero de plarilas y trabajadores en la induslria maquiladora de Ciudad Juarez. (1966— 
1990) 
Aiio Numero de Empresas Numero de Trabajad 
1966 5 760 
1967 9 925 
1968 10 1,502 
1969 17 2,093 
1970 22 3,135 
1971 52 5,617 
1972 N.D N.D 
1973 74 12,058 
1974 85 18,483 
1975 84 19,775 
1976 81 23,580 
1977 80 26,792 
1978 92 30,374 
1979 103 36,206 
1980 121 39,402 
1981 128 43,994 
1982 129 42,695 
1983 135 54,073 
1984 155 72,495 
1985 168 77,592 
1987 199 97,800 
1988 246 107,315 
1990 300 130,000 
Fuenle:Secretariade Industriay Comercio, Datosestadisticossobre la induslria maquiladora 
1966-1974. citado por Carrillo y Hernandez, op. cit. 
Estadi'sticas de la Industria Maquiladora de Exportacion 1975-1985. INEGI. 
Secrelaria de Programacidn y Presupuesto, Mexico, D.F. 1986 
En 1966 se esiablecieron en Ciudad Juarez las primeras 6 
plantas presentando un crecimiento sostenido hasta 1974. 
Como se puede observar en el cuadro II, para 1969 ya 
existfan 17 empresas maquiladoras las que generaron mas de 2000 
empleos. 
En la decada de los setenta continuo el crecimiento de las 
maquiladoras y para 1976existian 81 plantasy se generaron 17,153 
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empleos que correspondio al 31.7% del total de empleos generados 
por la industria maquiladora a nivel nacional. 
A partir de principles de la decada de 1980 el niimero de 
maquiladoras tuvo un crecimiento sostenido generando una gran 
cantidad de empleos. 
Cuadro III. 
Poblacion Economicamcnle Activa de Ciudad Juarez 
por Ramas de Actividad (1970-1990) 
Sectorcs 1970 % 1980 % 1990 % 
PEA 108,070 100 208,868 100 283,182 100 
Psrimario 9,342 8.7 6,366 3.1 3,894 1.3 
Agropecuario 9,342 8.7 6,366 3.1 3,894 1.3 
Secundario 28,888 26.7 59,573 29.0 139,816 49.37 
Extractivas 403 .3 276 .2 462 ,16 
Transformacion 19,215 17.7 44,586 21.6 117,007 41.31 
Construccidn 8,851 8.2 14,218 6.8 20,967 7.9 
Elcctricidad 419 .4 493 .2 1,380 .48 
Tcrciario 57,305 53.0 71,477 34.6 127,272 44.9 
Comcrc io 19,149 17.8 29,455 14.3 41,419 14.6 
Comunicaciones 
y Transportcs 4,532 4.2 10,786 5.2 10,365 3.66 
Scrvicios 3,624 31.1 31,236 15 75,488 26.658 
Fuenle: X Ccnso de Poblacion y Vivienda. Secrelarfade Programacion y Presupuesto. 
Citado por Carrillo y Hernandez op. cit., p. 80 y XI Censo dc Poblacion y Vivienda. 
En 1980 existfan 121 empresas que emplearon a 39,402 
trabajadores y para 1990 existfan 300 empresas y 130,000 empleos. 
Hay que resaltar que en la mayor parte de los aiios del 
periodo 1966-1990, Ciudad Juarez fue la loealidad que tuvo el 
mayor numero de empleos, producidos por la industria maquiladora 
a nivel nacional. 
En el cuadro III observances que a partir de 1970 las 
actividades de transformacion, se perfilan como las actividades que 
emplean la mayor proporcion de la PEA de la ciudad. 
El anterior crecimiento del numero de plantas, y empleos 
aunado a la crisis economical por la que atraviesa el pais, genero una 
fuerte atraccion para la poblacion del resto del pais y estado de 
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Chihuahua, que buscaron en Ciudad Juarez mejores condiciones 
devida. Aunado a los empleos directos que produjo la industria 
maquiladora, tambien genero efectos multiplicadores en otras 
actividades econdmicas como el comercio y los servicios. 
Asimismo hay que mencionar que a partir de 1982 con la 
agudizacion de la crisis economica en el pais, que desempleo a 
grandes masas de la poblacion, y aunado a la cai'da de los salaries 
reales indujo a una mayor migration ademas de la incorporation de 
una mayor proportion de mujeres y jovenes para contribui'r a 
mejorar el ingreso familiar. 
El crecimiento migratorio neto hacia Ciudad Juarez durante 
la decada 1960-1970 fue de 36,623 personas y durante la decada 
1970-1980 la nlisma fue aun mayor representando 47,034 perso-
19 nas. 
AliciaCastellanosmencionalaexistenciadeunacorrelacidn 
entre los perfodos de mayor emigration hacia Ciudad Juarez y los 
periodos de mayor demanda de mano de obra. 
En 1979 se aplico una encuestade hogares en Ciudad Juarez, 
y se encontrd que los migrantes con menos ahos de residencia en la 
ciudad hablan viajado de poblaciones mas cercanas a Juarez, que los 
migrantes con mas ahos de residencia en la ciudad. Y los migrantes 
con menos anos de residencia citaron la posibilidad de emplearse 
como principal motivo para migrar, en comparacion con los migrantes 
con mayor tiempo de residencia. 
El 48% de los entrevistados habian llegado durante los 
ultimos cinco ahos anteriores a la fecha de aplicacidn de la encuesta 
y venfan del interior del estado de Chihuahua y de ellos el 30% 
manifesto la busqueda de empleo como principal motivo para 
migrar.Solo el 16.5% de los individuos encuestados que tem'an mas 
de cinco ahos de residir en Juarez, y vinieron de alguna poblacion 
del interior del estado de Chihuahua, manifesto haber migrado por 
motivos de empleo.20 
Como se observa en el cuadro IV, durante la decada de 1950 
la poblacion crecio a una tasa de 9.1, lo que signified un alto 
crecimiento en relacion a la decada anterior. Tambien podemos ver 
como de la decada de 1950 a 1960 casi se triplico el area urbanizada, 
de 1960-1970 se duplicd y de 1970-1980 se volvio a duplicar. Sin 
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embargo para la decada de 1980-1990 la ciudad ya no crecio en la 
misma proporcion. 
Algo que tambien llama la atencion es la disminucion de la 
densidad de poblacion despues de la decada de 1960, lo anterior es 
resultado de la natural segregacion de la poblacion de medianos y 
altos ingresos de las zonas del centro, hacia las zonas mas alejadas 
del centro de la misma. 
Pero de 1980-1990 la densidad poblacional se incremento, 
ya que la ciudad no crecio en la mismas proporciones que en decadas 
anteriores como se observa en el cuadro IV. Lo anterior se debio a 
que se ocuparon gran parte de los terrenos baldibs y por lo tanto se 
incremento la densidad poblacional. 
Cuadro IV. 
Crccimicnto de Ciudad Juarez (1910-1990) 
Ano Poblacion Tasa do Area Densidad de 
Crecimiento (ha) Pob.(habit/lia) 
(%) 
900 8,218 3.5 
1910 10,621 2.5 
1921 19,457 5.5 
1930 39,669 7.9 
1940 48,881 2.0 
1950 131,308 9.1 732 179 
1960 276,995 7.2 2,230 124 
1970 424,135 5.2 4,580 92 
1980 567,365 4.4 8,290 70 
1990 970,181* 1.8 9,005 108 
* Poblacion cstimada por el COLEF para 1990 
1 Ljcnte. La tasa dc crccimicnto dc la poblacion, el area y la densidad dc poblacion fucron 
calculadas por el autor. VII, VIII, IX y X Censos dc Poblacion y Vivienda de Mexico y 
Encucsta Sociocconomica Anuai dc la Frontera (ESAF-87), EL COLEF. 1987 
a) Decada de los sesenta. 
En 1960 el area urbanizada fue de 2,230 hectareas y la 
ciudad mostro un crecimiento lineal en una superficie irregular en 
direccion oriente y sur-oriente con un escalonamiento marcado 
hacia el poniente, hay que resaltar que durante esta decada el 
crecimiento de las areas habitacionales se dio de dos formas; 1) Por 
la venta de terrenos por pai te del municipio y en algunos casos por 
invasion, esta ultima se realizo hacia el sureste de la ciudad. 
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2) Por la venta de terrenos por fraccionadores privados, ubicados al 
oriente de la ciudad en las areas agncolas principalmente. 
En el cuadro V observamos que en 1960 las areas con uso 
habitacional fueron de 2,040 hectareas. 
Estas siguen siendo las del centro tradicional, en donde la 
densidad de poblacion es la mas aha y son poblados por vivienda 
tipo medio. 
Cuadro V 
Usos del suelo en Cd. Juarez, Chih. (1960-1990). 
Ahos Habitacional 
(has) 
Industrial 
(has) 
Comercial 
(has) 
Agrlcola 
(has) 
1960 2,040 120 70 5,475 
1970 4,025 250 305 4,090 
1980 7,535 380 375 3,400 
1990 8,025 575 405 32,550 
Fuente: Calculos hecho por el aulor en base a informacion proporcionada por El Plan 
Regulador de desarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Juarez 1971 y los Planes Direcrores de 
Desarrollo Urbano del Mumcipio de Juarez 1979, 1984 y 1989. 
Adicionalmente, ahos mas adelante el area habitacional de 
clase media se dirigio hacia el sur-oriente de la ciudad y en algunos 
casos hacia el oriente. La vivienda de tipo alto se ubico en la zona 
oriente, sobre el Valle de Juarez. 
Sin embargo hacia el sur-poniente de la ciudad se localizaron 
las areas de vivienda baja, la cual credo por la venta de terrenos por 
parte del Municipio a bajos precios y tambien por la invasion de 
terrenos. Esta nuevas areas habitacionales alcanzaron una distancia 
de mas de 12 kilometres del centro de la ciudad."1 
Schmidt y Lloyd mencionaron que los limites del area 
urbanizada en 1960 alcanzo como 9 kilomeros del centro historico. 
En lo que toca al uso comercial, esta ocupo 70 hectareas, las 
que se localizaron en el centro y las principales arterias que las unen. 
A lo largo de esta decada, como ya se menciono se incorporo el area 
del PRONAF en el que se construyo principalmente una 
infraestructura para uso turfstico. 
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En 1960 las superficies ocupadas por industria nacional fue 
de 120 hectareas, las cuales se dirigieron en un primer momento 
hacia el sureste de la ciudad, tal es el caso de las Industrias Zaragoza 
que se ubicaron en esta parte de la ciudad. 
Alicia Castellanos menciona que la actividad industrial 
entre 1960-1965, se concentraba en un reducido numero de industrias 
de transformacion de proyectos agropecuarios (productos de cerveza, 
fabricacion de refrescos, industrias alimenticias, matanzade ganado 
y manufactura de productos de molino). 
En 1967 se instalo el primer parque industrial en donde se 
instalaron las primeras empresas maquiladoras, el cual se ubico al 
oriente de la ciudad en areas con uso agrfcola. 
En 1960 del area total de estudio 5,475 hectareas 
correspondieron a usos agricolas, las cuales a lo largo de las 
siguientes decadas disminuyeron. 
bl Decada de los setentas. 
En la decada de los setenta el area urbana de Ciudad Juarez 
ocupo 4,580 hectareas. El crecimiento siguio los principales ejes 
carreteros norte-sur-este sobre terrenes agricolas. 
El area con usos habitacionales fue de 2,040 hectareas, 
como se observa en el cuadro V. Esta continuo creciendo, 
principalmente hacia el sureste con viviendas de tipo bajo y al 
oriente de la ciudad con viviendas de tipo medio y alto. El anterior 
crecimiento habitacional responde a la localizacion del primer 
parque industrial, que como se menciono, se localizo en una area al 
oriente de la ciudad en terrenos para uso agrfcola. Localidades como 
Satelite y Zaragoza22 comenzaron a dedicar mayores areas a la 
construccion de viviendas. 
Como tambien se menciono hasta antes de 1970 solo se 
habfa instalado un parque industrial, el cual ocupo 174.2 hectareas, 
las que se agregaron a las 75 hectareas ocupadas por industria 
nacional. En total para el aho de 1970 existfan 250 hectareas con 
usos industriales como se observa en el cuadro V. 
A lo largo de la decada de los setenta se instalaron 2 nuevos 
parques industriales, que aunado al instalado, a finales de la decada 
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pasada ocuparon casi 300 hectareas, de las cuales 256 has. 
correspondfan al area agrfcola. 
En 1970 el area ocupada con uso comercial fue de 305 
hectareas, las cuales continuaron el mismo patron de las decadas 
anteriores, es decir el area mas importante se localizo en el centro 
de la ciudad y las principals vfas de comunicacion norte-sur-este. 
Lloyd en 1982 rnenciona que la estructura comercial de 
Ciudad Juarez, al igual que el patron de localizacion de las industrias, 
tambien crecio hacia el este de la ciudad. 
Por lo que respecta a las areas con uso agrfcola para este aho 
disminuyeron en 1,385 hectareas representando 4,090 has como se 
observa en el cuadro V, 
Como ya mencionamos antes, durante esta decada el area 
agrfcola adyacente a las orillas de el area urbanizada, cornenzo a ser 
ocupada por industrias, viviendas y comercios, como se observa en 
el piano 2 (pag. 20). 
c) Decada de los ochentas. 
Durante la decada de los ochentas el numero de parques 
industriales se incremento, por lo que este crecimiento tuvo gran 
influencia en la conformacion de la actual estructura urbana. 
Para 1980 la superficie total urbanizadaocupo 8,290 hectareas 
como se observa en el cuadro IV. 
El usohabitacional fue el que mayorespacioconsumioen la 
ciudad, presentando una agrupacion de vivienda media, alrededor 
del centro comercial tradicional cuyas densidades de construccion 
y habitacion son las mas altas de toda el area urbana. 
Asimismo las areas habitacionales de bajo nivel 
socioeconomico, que se localizaron al sureste de la ciudad se 
saturaron, tal es el caso de las siguientes colonias: La Azteca, La 
Cuesta 2, Constitucion, Division del Norte, Ampliation Aeropuerto 
etc. En lo que toca al poniente de la ciudad, este conservo su tamano 
de las decadas anteriores debido al impedimento ffsico para su 
crecimiento/5 
Hacia el sur-oriente no se observan crecimientos notables , 
ni procesos de saturation claros. 
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Por su parte en el oriente de la ciudad con viviendas de tipo 
mediano y alto se observa una mayor saturation del area. 
La ubicacion de estos parques industriales, mas alia de los 
h'mites del area urbanizada existente, fue influenciado por una 
variedad de razones, entre los que se incluyen la disponibilidad y 
posesion de los terrenos y la relativa proximidad con los cruces 
fronterizos de El Chamizal y el puente de Zaragoza.24 Otro de los 
efectos fue el cambio de localization industrial dentro de la ciudad, 
ya que como se comento las primeras industrias que se localizaron 
a inicios de la decada de los sesenta se establecieron cerca de las vfas 
de comunicacion como el ferrocaril, debido a que su principal 
mercado era el regional, a partir de 1965 que se establecieron las 
primeras empresas maquiladoras, estas se localizaron en areas 
donde pudieran tener una facil y rapida comunicacion con el 
mercado externo. 
d) Decada de los noventa. 
En 1990 el area total ocupada por la mancha urbana fue de 
9,005 hectareas como se observa en el cuadro IV. 
En la decada de los noventa el crecimiento de la ciudad 
continuo hacia el sur-este, el oriente y las areas agricolas de 
Salvarcar, Satelite, Zaragoza, etc. 
Como ya se menciono antes, durante la decada de 1980-
1990el crecimientoque experimento la estructura urbana fue menor 
que en las decadas anteriores. Sin embargo durante esta decada la 
ciudad experimento un importante crecimiento interno. 
El area habitacional ocupo 8,025 hectareas y continuo el 
mismo crecimiento que en decadas anteriores, sin embargo pequenas 
poblaciones que se encontraban en las afueras del area urbana de 
Ciudad Juarez crecieron y de hecho se integraron al area urbana, tal 
es el caso de Salvaracar que a principios de esta decada surgieron 
nuevos asentamientos poblacionales. 
Por lo que respecta al area comercial, esta ocupo 405 
hectareas, las cuales crecieron como en decadas anteriores sobre los 
ejes de comunicacion. 
Por su parte las areas industriales crecieron, ya que desde 
mediados de los ochentas y principios de los noventas se abrieron 
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5 nuevos parques industriales, de los cuales la mayor parte de ellos 
se ubicaron al sur—este y oriente de la ciudad como se observa en el 
piano 4. 
Para 1988 existian 7 parques industriales que en conjunto 
para este ano ocupan 431.86 hectareas y para 1990 existian 11 
parques industriales. 
Las areas agricolas seredujeron y oeuparon 3,255 hectareas. 
La mayor parte de la reduccion de la superficie agrfcola, se debio al 
incremento de las areas con uso habitacional e industrial. 
2) Crecimiento interno de la mancha urbana de 1984-1989. 
Como se observa en el cuadro VI el mayor crecimiento 
interno de 1984 a 1988 lo tuvo el uso habitacional que represento el 
59.69% seguido muy de cerca por el uso industrial que fue de 
28.14% 
Por su parte la industria se distribuyo con un uso periferico, 
formando areas concentricas correspondientes a las diferentes etapas 
del crecimiento de la ciudad. 
Esta ha continuado creciendo, pero sigue el patron de 
distribution traditional siguiendo las vfas primarias decomunicacion, 
lo que ha originando que los nuevos asentamientos industriales se 
localicen al orientede la ciudad presionando sobre las areas agricolas 
para su cambio de uso. 
La ocupacion comercial del suelo urbano se dio en zonas 
especfficas, sobre los ejes de comunicacion, la zona central y los 
asentamientos de poblacion del oriente y suroriente. 
Por lo que respecta al area agrfcola esta tuvo una importante 
reduccion. Como se observa en el cuadro VII durante el lapso que 
va de 1984 a 1988 bubo modificaciones important®® en el uso del 
suelo, como fueron 304 hectareas que con un uso ya establecido 
cambio a otro diferente. 
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Cuadro VI. 
Crecimiento interno del uso del suclo (1984-1988). 
Usos y Destinos Superficies Porcentaje de 
(has) distribucion % 
Habitacional 337.49 59.69 
Industrial 159.13 28.14 
Equipamiento 1) 44.46 7,33 
Comercio y oficinas 7.61 1.35 
Alojamiento y turismo 1.33 0.23 
Talleres y servicios 7.42 1.31 
Destinos 4.60 0.8 
Otros Usos 6.35 1.23 
568.39 100.00 
1) Solo incluye los elementos de los subsistemas de cducacion, salud, cultura, asislcncia 
social, abastos, comunicaciones y transporte, administracion publica, servicios publicos, 
parqucs, jardines y dcportc. 
Fuente: Plan Director de Dcsarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Juarez, Cihuahua. Documcnto 
Base, Vol. III.2 Uso del Suelo. Comportamicnto del crecimicnto fi'sico registrado en el 
pertodo 1984-1988. Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, Julio de 1989. 
Las superficies para uso habitacional y agrfcola fueron los 
que representaron un mayor decremento, el primero disminuyo en 
187.99 hectareas y el segundo 110.20 hectareas. 
Por su parte, el crecimiento registrado en las actividades de 
comercio, oficinas y equipamiento elemental fueron los nuevos 
usos que mayor incremento obtuvieron, en los cambios dados en la 
estructura urbana. 
Las areas industriales tambien se incrementaron al instalarse 
dos nuevos parques industriales al sur-este y oriente de la ciudad. 
La industria se distribuyo con un uso periferico fonnando areas 
concentricas correspondientes a las diferentes etapas de crecimiento 
de la ciudad. Esta localizacion correspondio a las vfas de acceso y 
salida de la ciudad. 
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Cuadro VII. 
Cambios de uso del suelo en el area urbana (1984-1988) 
Uso Dccremcnlo Incremento 
has. (-) has. (+) 
Habitacibn -187.99 
Industria 5.14 
Equipamiento -3.08 
Comcrcio y Oficinas 62.58 
Alojamicnto y turismo 13.65 
Tallcrcs y yonqucs 14.47 
Dcstinos 14.37 
Baldms 76.86 
Agricola -110.20 
Vivcros -2.73 
Dcsuso (lcchcria)H 32.84 
-304.00 304.84 
Fucrilc: Plan Director de Desarrollo Urbano de Ciudad Juarez, Chih. 111.2 Usos del Suelo. 
Direccidn de Plancacion del Municipio de Cd. Juarez, Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. Junio 
de 1989. 
Conclusiones 
La configuracion de la estructura urbana de Ciudad Juarez, 
estuvo influfda por diversos acontecimientos dentro de los que 
destacan, su fundacion como mision, el movimiento de la frontera 
norte de Mexico con los Estados Unidos, la instauracion de la zona 
libre etc, que le imprimieron caracteristicas especiales a su proceso 
de urbanizacion. 
Podemos decir que desde la fundacion de Ciudad Juarez, 
hasta la decada de los cincuenta el crecimiento de la ciudad se dio 
en forma concentricarespecto al niicleooriginal, cuyas dimensiones 
respondieron a las actividades comerciales y de servicios. 
La puesta en march a de El Programa de Industrializacion 
bronteriza marco profundamente el crecimiento y los usos del suelo 
en Ciudad Juarez, debido a la aparicion de nuevas actividades 
economicas y el crecimiento de otras que ya existfan. 
Durante el proceso de investigacion cartografica, se 
detectaron importantes modificaciones en el uso del suelo en un 
lapso de 30 afios. 
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En 1960 la ciudad mostro un crecimiento lineal en una 
superficie irregular en direccion sur-oriente y oriente. 
A1 oriente de la ciudad, se establecieron nuevos 
iraccionamientos de medianos y altos ingresos en areas con uso 
agricola del suelo, al sureste se localizaron viviendas de bajos ingresos. 
A las areas con uso comercial, ademas de las ya existentes 
en el centro de la ciudad, se incorporaron las obras del PRONAF las 
cuales dieron otra imagen a Ciudad Juarez. 
Las areas para uso industrial, desde los cincuentas y principios 
de los sesentas se localizaron en al sur-este de la ciudad junto a las 
vi'as del ferrocaril, pero a partir del PIF25 los primeros parques 
industriales se localizaron hacia el oriente en terrenos agrfcolas. 
En resumen en 1960 la estructura urbana muestra una forma 
irregular compacta con protuberancias, hacia el oriente y sur con un 
escalonamiento marcado hacia el poniente. 
En la decada de los setenta, la ciudad siguio los principales 
ejes carreteros norte-sur-este sobre terrenos agricolas. 
Asimismo el crecimiento de areas con uso habitacional 
continuo creciendo principalmente hacia el sureste, con viviendas 
de tipo bajo y al oriente con vivienda de tipo medio y alto. 
Durante esta decada se instalaron dos nuevos parques 
industriales, que aunados al instalado a finales de la decada pasada, 
ocuparon casi 300 hectareas, de las que 256 hectareas fueron 
ocupadas por area agricola. 
En 1970 se producen alteraciones principalmente hacia el 
poniente (carbonera) y hacia el oriente, a lo largo de la carretera el 
Porvenir, condispersiones haciael surenlascercanias del aeropuerto 
y hacia el oriente y la colonia Satelite. La base de contacto con el Rio 
Bravo crece hasta su alcance actual. La zonade Zaragoza y Salvarcar 
cobran cierta importance. 
En 1980 el crecimiento de la ciudad continuo el mismo 
crecimiento hacia el suroriente y oriente. 
Las areas habitacionales crecieron en menor medida que en 
la decada anterior, dandose en esta decada una saturacion de los 
lotes baldios que existian en estas areas de la ciudad. 
Las areas comerciales crecieron hacia las principales vi'as de 
acceso a esta areas habitacionales, las que se agregaron a las ya 
existentes. 
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Por su parte las areas industriales crecieron en forma 
importante, para 1988 ya exist fan 7 parques industriales que en 
conjunto oeupan 431.86 hectareas. La industria se ha distribuido 
eon un uso periferico formando areas concentricas coixespondientes 
a las diferentes etapas de crecimiento de la ciudad. Esta localization 
correspondio a las vfas de acceso y salida de la ciudad. 
Para 1990 la ciudad ha incrementado su crecimiento en un 
15% en relation a la decada anterior. La ciudad continuo el 
crecimiento hacia el sur-este, el oriente y las areas agrfcolas de 
Salvarcar, Satelit e y Zaragoza. 
En esta decada las areas habitacionales, industriales, 
comerciales y agrfcolas continuaron la misma tendencia que en 
decadas anteriores, sin embargo el crecimiento experimentado por 
la estructura urbana fue menor, ya que la mayor parte del crecimiento 
fue interno. 
Estos cambios han respondido basicamente a la dinamica 
misma del crecimiento economico que la ciudad experimenta 
impulsado por agentes de desarrollo economico nacionales y 
extranjeros. 
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Cesar Chavez, the United Farm 
Workers and Mexican Immigration 
Richard Griswold del Castillo* 
Resumen 
E! sindicato de campesinos, United Farm Workers y su lider 
Cesar Chavez, ha luchado por los derechos de los trabajadores mas 
pobres en los Estados Unidos. Tambien tienen una historia acerca 
de la imigracion mexicana y las relaciones con las agencias del 
gobierno mexicano poco conocida. Esta dimension internacional 
del sindicato de campesinos no ha sido investigada en relacion con 
la historia del movimiento campesino del UFW, En los cincuentas, 
su Ifder, Cesar Chavez, se oponia a los abusos del Bracero Program 
y defendia los derechos de los imigrantes, pero, al mismo tiempo, ha 
tratado de prevenir el uso de mexicanos como rompe huelgas. 
Chavez trataba de defender los derechos humanos de los 
indocumentados y el respeto para las leyes de los Estados Unidos. 
A traves de las decadas Chavez estaba mas a favor de 
alianzas con el gobierno mexicano para proteger los derechos de los 
imigrantes. J ambien los mexicanos han tenido un papel mas y mas 
importante en el desarrollo del sindicato. 
* Richard Griswold del Castillo is a professor in the Department of 
Mexican-American Studies, College of Arts and Letters, San Diego 
State University. 
I4 or the past 40 years the United Farm Workers, led by Cesar 
Chavez, has struggled to unionize farm workers of Mexican heri-
tage and nationality in California and the American Southwest. 
Beginning with the grape boycott in 1965, a reoccurring problem 
has been the union s position on Mexican immigration. On one 
hand most of the union s membership has had family ties to Mexico. 
On the other hand, Mexican immigrants were the ones who were 
often recruited to break strikes. 
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This essay explores the recent history of the complex and 
changing relationship between the United Farm Workers Union 
(UFW) and the issue of Mexican immigration. The development of 
UFW strategies that dealt with the problem of government sanc­
tioned strike breakers from Mexico sometimes led to nativist 
rhetoric on the part of the union as it fought the powerful alliance of 
business and government. At the same time, the evolution of closer 
relationships between the UFW Mexican sindicatos (unions) and 
the Mexican government, especially after 1975, shows how, during 
a period of decline in support for the farm worker's union, Chavez 
came to rely more on official Mexican support to sustain his union. 
Generally the historiography surrounding Cesar Chavez has created 
an over-romantic and somewhat stereotypical evaluation of his 
leadership. With a few exceptions no one really has given much 
attention to his changing position on immigration, nor has there 
been a study of the union's relationship with official Mexican 
institutions. This essay appraises the partial historical evidence that 
exists in both of these areas and considers the international dimen­
sions of Chavez's leadership during the 1950-1980 period. 
The key to understanding the evolution of the United Farm 
Worker's policy towards Mexican immigration is the background 
of its leader, Cesar Chavez. His experience as a migrant worker and 
organizer over the years has been the single most important influence in 
shaping the union's policy towards Mexican immigration and Mexico. 
Born on March 31, 1927 in a rural barrio near Yuma, 
Arizona, Chavez's immigrant family suffered the loss of their farm 
in 1939 and moved to California. For the next 10 years Chavez and 
his family moved up and down California's San Joaquin Valley 
following the crops and living for periods of time in Delano and San 
Jose. It was during this period of his life that Chavez encountered 
the conditions that both Mexican immigrants and Mexican-Ameri­
cans shared in the fields. He lived in wretched migrant camps, was 
cheated by corrupt labor contractors, survived on subsistence wages, 
and endured racism and discrimination. This first-hand experience 
as a migrant worker made Chavez different from many organizers 
before him. This hard life gave him a strength of character that 
enabled him to communicate convincingly with the humblest of 
field workers. 
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Cesar Chavez was introduced to the politics of labor orga­
nizing and Mexican immigration in 1952. In that year he met father 
Donald McDonnell, an activist Catholic priest and Fred Ross, an 
organizer with the Community Service Organization. Ross re­
cruited Chavez to join the CSO, a community organization dedi­
cated to political empowerment for Mexican-Americans. It was 
within the CSO that Chavez first fought against the abuse of 
immigration laws, specifically the Bracero Program. 
Begun in 1942, the Bracero Program arranged for the 
importation of Mexican workers under contract to help in the war 
effort. Under heavy lobbying by Southwestern agricultural inter­
ests the United States and Mexican governments renewed the 
Bracero Program until 1965. During the agreement almost five 
million Mexican workers came to the United States. The law 
obligated growers to pay braceros a specified minimum wage, 
provide them with basic amenities, and employ them only in 
agricultural jobs. Braceros complained of wage agreement viola­
tions, substandard living quarters, exorbitant charges for food and 
clothing, and instances of racial discrimination. For economic 
reasons, growers liked the Bracero Program and lobbied for its 
continuance. Growers often preferred bracero labor. They could 
pay them less and not have to worry about unionization. Moreover, 
they often used braceros illegally to break agricultural strikes and to 
lower wages.1 
In 1958, Chavez confronted the bracero issue when the CSO 
sent him to Oxnard to help the lemon workers organize a strike for 
higher wages. Local resident workers, mostly native born Mexican 
Americans, felt cheated when the growers brought in bracero labor. 
They felt that U.S. citizens should be given hiring preference. The 
Bracero Program's regulations stipulated that growers could not use 
them to replace local workers unless the Department of Labor 
certified a labor shortage. When Chavez began working with the 
local residents to resolve the problem, he found the growers in 
league with state and federal officials. Officials falsely certified the 
existence of labor shortages and helped growers exploit braceros by 
recruiting many more than could be employed. This resulted in the 
braceros working part time at lower pay while labor contractors 
charged them inflated prices for room and board.2 
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Chavez organized an attack on many fronts. First, he 
encouraged CSO and community members to apply for work every 
day with the Farm Placement Service and then he compiled records 
of their applications and rejections. Next he organized a boycott of 
local merchants to protest their support of the system and to pressure 
them to change. Chavez organized sit-down strikes in the fields to 
challenge the hiring of braceros. Farm workers picketed a meeting 
of the Secretary of Labor, James Mitchell when he visited Ventura 
for a talk. They marched with a banner depicting Nuestra Senora de 
Guadalupe (the patron saint of Mexico) to protest the lack of jobs for 
local residents and they pressured the Farm Placement Service 
Office with hundreds of complaints. They sent workers to lobby the 
state government offices. The outcome of this intensive campaign 
was a temporary victory. Under pressure, state officials fired the 
Farm Service Placement Director and some of his staff, and started 
hiring hundreds of people who lined up outside the CSO headquar­
ters every day.-5 Unfortunately, after Chavez left Oxnard, the 
situation reverted to growers again working in collusion with the 
government to undercut Mexican-American farm workers. The 
failure to organize a farm worker's union and to secure a contract 
with agribusiness convinced Chavez that unionization was the only 
way to change things in the long run. 
The Oxnard experience was pivotal. Chavez received first­
hand training in the use of tactics such as the boycott, the march, the 
use of religious images, and political lobbying. These strategies 
later became key organizing techniques during the struggles of the 
United Farm Workers Union. He also gained experience in nego­
tiating the troublesome waters created by the illegal recruitment of 
Mexican immigrant labor.4 Tellingly, most of the workers protest­
ing the use of bracero strikebreakers were themselves Mexican 
nationals legally resident in the U. S. Their language of organization 
was Spanish and their cultural values were Mexican. In opposing 
the exploitation of braceros, Chavez was not being anti-Mexican 
and this the rank and file understood. 
A few years after the Oxnard strike, Chavez became the 
CSO's National Director. But in 1962 he resigned this position to 
devote his energies to organizing a union for farm workers. After 
years of sacrifice and hard work, Chavez and a small cadre of 
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volunteers established a fledgling union composed of both native 
born Mexican-Americans and Mexican born workers.5 
The California Grape Strike 
On September 16, 1965 Chavez's Farm Workers Associa­
tion voted to join a strike started by Filipino farm workers in 
Delano's grape fields. Within months the union became nationally 
known. For the next five years the California grape strike and 
boycott became international news. Chavez was dynamic and 
inspiring. His insistence on non-violent means to achieve social 
justice appealed a wide spectrum of American society: progressive 
elements of the Protestant and Catholic Church, middle class 
liberals, and Anglo and Mexican-American students. As a result, 
the UFW attracted hundreds of volunteers from urban universities, 
religious organizations, and labor unions. Chavez's alliance with 
organized labor and his use of mass mobilizing techniques, such as 
a dramatic farm workers march on Sacramento in 1966, made the 
grape strike and boycott part of a growing protest movement in the 
United States.6 
The grape strike and boycott included Mexican immigrants 
from the beginning. In meetings and rallies a Mexican ambience 
pervaded the union with Spanish being a commonly used language 
and many workers joined by common bonds of nationality. Sym­
bolically, the day chosen to join the grape strike was September 16, 
Mexican Independence day. Banners of Nuestra Senora de 
Guadalupe, the Mexican flag and other Mexican symbols became 
an integral part oi La Causa or the farm worker's movement. 
Several or the original members of the Farm Workers Association 
were immigrants of long term residence. An example was Antonio 
Orendain, a young organizer bom in Mexico, who had come to the 
United States as a iarm worker when he was 18. Orendain became 
an important UF W leader organizing along the Texas border during 
the late 1960s. ' 
During the California grape strike, lasting from 1965 to 
1970, Chavez and union supporters often spoke about the cynical 
manipulation and abuse of Mexican immigrant workers by growers 
and the government. From the start, however, Mexican immigrants 
were part of the problem as much as they were part of the solution. 
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As has been well documented in contemporary accounts, agribusiness 
regularly employed Mexican immigrants as strike breakers and 
Chavez and UFW leaders complained about the porous border with 
Mexico. At the same time many UFW supporters and members 
were Mexican nationals. The proportion of undocumented and 
documented immigrants who were active in the early UFW actions 
varied, ranging from more than 70 percent in the Imperial Valley, 
adjacent to Mexico, to less than 30 percent in the labor actions that 
took place in northern California and Florida. According to UFW 
staffers, Mexican immigrants formed an important element within 
the union's organization, especially during the strikes and demon­
strations of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Mexican members and 
supporters were the ones who could most easily convince potential 
strike breakers to respect their picket lines.8 Beginning with the 
grape boycott of 1965 Chavez walked a fine line between champi­
oning the rights of immigrants and advocating stronger police 
measures to enforce labor laws. Thedistinction between advocating 
the rights of Mexican immigrants to fair treatment while being in 
favor of immigration restrictions eventually led, in the 1970s to open 
criticism of Chavez's position by Chicano immigrant right activists. 
Texas and Immigrant Workers 
In 1966, a year after the Delano strike began, Chavez 
expanded his organizational activities to Texas where the UFW 
confronted Mexican immigrants recruited as strike breakers. Along 
with Antonio Orendain, Cesar sent Eugene Nelson, a young volun­
teer who was the son of a wealthy California grower, to lead the 
organizing effort. In the Spring of 1966 they decided to have a 
march to protest the abysmal wages and degraded living conditions 
endured by South Texas farm workers. They earned less than $1.00 
an hour. California workers earned almost twice as much. Patterned 
after the Sacramento march the year before, they went from the 
border town of Rio Grande City to Austin, Texas, the state capitol, 
a distance of 450 miles, 
Mexican-American melon workers in the Rio Grande Val­
ley were crucial to the UFW efforts. They had been on strike tor 
several months but had failed in contract efforts. Ftie ease with 
which growers could enlist Mexican workers from across the border 
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did not help their efforts. In an attempt to take more direct action, 
before the march began, UFW organizers and the lexas melon 
workers (The Independent Workers Association) decided to stop 
Mexican strike breakers from crossing the bridge between Roma, 
Texas and Miguel Aleman, Mexico. On October 24, 1966 a group 
of UFW supporters began stopping buses and cars carrying ftirm 
workers across the international bridge on their way to work in 
Texas. A local sheriff dragged an UFW organizer, over the line into 
Mexico and back into the United States and arrested him. After his 
detention, 10 to 15 UFW supporters lay down on the international 
bridge and stopped all traffic for about an hour until the police 
arrested them for obstructing traffic. Later a State District Judge 
issued temporary restraining orders to prevent future blockage of 
the bridge.9 A few days later, Mexican officials arrested three UFW 
supporters for closing and locking the steel gate that was in the 
center of the international bridge. 
This dramatic action got the attention of the press and helped 
advertise the strike. The UFW also worked with Mexican unions to 
gain support among border crossers. On May 13, 1967 the 
Confederaeion de Trabajadores Mexicanos (CTM) organized a 
picket on the Mexican side of the border opposite Rio Grande City. 
Their intention was to assist the UFW in discouraging Mexican 
green card holders from crossing to work as scabs. UFW organizers 
and members joined the Mexican strikers on the other side of the 
line. Later, five growers from the Rio Grande area sent a telegram 
to Senator John Tower accusing the UFW and CTM of engaging in 
an international conspiracy.10 A Star County grand jury termed the 
strike "un-American." Meanwhile, the Texas Rangers escorted 
immigrant strike breakers to work in the fields. Later, the federal 
court found that the police and county authorities had engaged in 
illegal activities to suppress the strike.11 
The INS and the UFW 
During the early years of the grape strike and boycott the 
UFW organized demonstrations against the Immigration and Natu­
ralization Service (INS) to protest their failure to prevent growers 
from hiring Mexican immigrants during strikes. The UFW con­
tended that the INS was working in cooperation with the larger 
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growers, (he INS claimed that their funding was inadequate to 
allow them to monitor strike breakers. 
During the Gtiimarra grape strike in 1967, Chavez met with 
the regional director of the INS. He charged that the INS was in 
violation of Justice Department regulations prohibiting the use of 
Green »^ard holders in areas where a labor dispute was in progress.®*' 
He told him that Guimarra, in violation of this regulation, was 
recruiting green card workers from the Calexico area and was 
busing them to Delano to break the strike. The director countered 
that the INS had no jurisdiction over the employment of green card 
workers once they had been admitted to the United States. He stated 
that the regulation only required that the INS monitor the place of 
employment at the time of application. He admitted, however, that 
there might be a technical violation of labor laws if growers had 
recruited the commuter workers specifically to break a strike. Not 
satisfied with this evasive response, Chavez subsequently led a 
picket in front of INS headquarters and organized a letter writing 
campaign to put pressure on officials in Washington.13 
This particular controversy over green card abuses lasted 
well into the next year and the Justice Department eventually made 
a ruling that favored the growers. Chavez and the UFW continued 
to protest the government's pro-grower policies. When the Attor­
ney General, Ramsey Clark arrived on May 29,1968 to speak before 
a National Conference of Social Welfare in San Francisco, the UFW 
met him with more than 300 demonstrators who proceeded to 
disrupt his speech.'4 
The problem of government sanctioned strike breakers from 
Mexico was a serious one for the UFW. Chavez consistently argued 
that in order to raise wages and improve the working conditions for 
all farm workers the government needed to enforce existing laws 
and enact more stringent regulations. In his testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare in the late 1960s, Chavez called for employer 
sanctions, fines against growers who employed illegal Mexican 
immigrants and penalties against the green card workers who 
accepted employment on a struck ranch. He told the committee, 
"What we ask is some way to keep the illegal and green 
carders from breaking our strikes; some civil remedy 
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against growers who employ behind our picket lines 
those who have entered the United States illegally, and 
likewise those green carders who have not perma­
nently moved their residence and domicile to the 
United States."1-' 
If Chavez's position sounded like that of a nativist it was 
because there was wide-spread evidence of growers violations of 
immigration laws. In June 1974, at the beginning of the grape 
harvest, Chavez told reporters that the union had "documented 
more than 2,200 illegal aliens working on ranches in the Fresno 
area." Chavez publicly accused the Nixon administration of 
conspiring with agribusiness "to make sure this flood of desperately 
poor workers continued unchecked."16 He again accused the Bor­
der Patrol of working with the growers and demanded that the 
government increase its enforcement efforts.17 Protests against the 
INS and their selective enforcement of the immigration laws went 
on throughout the summer of 1974. In August the UFW sponsored 
a demonstration in front of and inside the United States Federal 
Building in Sacramento where 350 supporters gathered to support 
Assembly Bill 3370 that would provide for state regulation of farm 
worker elections. They also protested the government-grower col­
lusion to violate the immigration laws. 
Chavez and the UFW's support for hard line enforcement 
measures and tough new immigration proposals such as those 
proposed by Peter Rodino in 1973 soon led to conflict with immi­
gration rights activists. In July 1974 the National Coalition for Fair 
Immigration Laws and Practices, an organization of Chicano and 
Mexican-American groups, openly criticized Chavez for his sup­
port of strict policing of the border.18 Later that year when the 
Justice Department announced its intention to begin a massive 
deportation drive of illegal aliens with the apparent blessings of the 
UFW leadership, a broad spectrum of Mexican-American groups 
attacked the government and the UFW's position. Within a few 
weeks Chavez sent an open letter to the San Francisco Examiner, 
expressing the union's position on immigration.19 He denied 
suppoi ling the government s plan to deport millions of immigrants 
and again blamed the INS for allowing growers to import undocu­
mented immigrant strike breakers. He reiterated his concern for the 
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exploitation of undocumented workers and promised to support 
amnesty that would lead to their legalization and right to organize, 
fhis position was consistent with his views five years earlier—that 
the real criminals were growers who were violating immigration 
laws and that immigrants were pawns in their struggle with the 
union. The difference in this 1974 statement was a more public 
announcement of concern for the human rights of undocumented 
immigrants. By June of 1976 the UFW was on record in support of 
undocumented immigrant rights and had made special efforts to 
include them within the union.20 
The UFW and Mexican Workers 
During the 1960s and 1970s, to combat pro-grower policies 
of the Border Patrol and Immigration Service, the UFW evolved 
several strategies. One was to work more closely with Mexican 
sindicatos (unions) to prevent strikebreaking by immigrants. When 
the UFW organized a striker in the Imperial Valley, they inevitably 
came into contact with large numbers of commuter workers who 
daily crossed the border at Mexicali to work in the United States. In 
1968 Chavez asked Burt Corona, a long time activist and labor 
leader, to visit the Imperial Valley and work with Mexican com­
muter workers to convince them not to break the strike. On Cesar's 
recommendation Corona met with the president of the Mexican 
local of the Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos in Mexicali. 
Corona recalled, "He [the Mexican labor leader] introduced me to 
other Mexican labor leaders with whom (sic) we had an opportunity 
to talk and ask for their support." Corona asked for and got 
permission to distribute leaflets on the Mexican side informing 
workers of the existence of the strike. He also obtained permission 
to place adds and stories in the Mexicali newspaper. Corona even 
made public service announcements on the Mexicali radio and 
television stations. Corona recalled, "we were interviewed periodi­
cally and we got the message about the strike through all the 
connections with the unions and in the communications industry. 
They brought pressure and they made it possible for us to carry out 
that work of informing and organizing.""2 
As opposed to this cooperative strategy, the union later tried 
more direct action. By 1974, frustrations over immigrant strike 
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breakers reached a high point and some members of the UFW 
decided to become more involved in enforcing the immigration 
laws along the border. In September, during an UFW strike of citrus 
pickers in Yuma, Arizona, Chavez sent his cousin Manuel Chavez 
to lead the organizational efforts. The growers, as usual, began 
recruiting undocumented Mexican workers from across the border. 
The UFW countered by protesting the inactivity of the INS and then 
began stopping undocumented Mexican workers at the border to 
convince them not to work as strike breakers. A predictable 
scenario followed. The local federal court issued orders restricting 
the number of strikers. Confrontations between union supporters 
and illegal immigrants took place. Complicating the issue, many of 
the UFW members on strike were Mexican immigrants, some of 
them undocumented. In the Yuma strike the struggle was between 
the UFW and the grower, police, judiciary alliance. It also was 
between the followers and members of the union, Mexican immi­
grants and immigrants of Mexico who were not UFW supporters. 
By September the strike had become volatile. On Septem­
ber 16, 1974, the FBI arrested 25 UFW members in Yuma, identi­
fied as Mexican aliens. They were charged with trespassing and 
disturbing the peace during a rock throwing incident at a local labor 
camp. Soon after the FBI arrest, more than 200 UFW followers 
demonstrated in front of the Yuma County Jail. Speakers during the 
demonstration urged the group to proceed to the nearby United States 
Border Patrol offices in Y urria to protest the lack of action by INS agents.2ii 
On September 20,1974, the UFW met with the national park 
officers at the Organ Pipe National Park located on the Arizona-
Sonora border. Convinced that many undocumented immigrants 
were crossing the national park, the UFW notified the officials that 
they were posting a roving patrol within the park to stop the 
undocumented crossings.23 By October the UFW had organized a 
"Wet Line watch along the border with the purpose of dealing 
directly with the problem of undocumented immigrants crossing to 
take jobs as strike breakers. Violent incidents took place. UFW 
patrols beat up several undocumented workers and detained others, 
turning them over to the Border Patrol. The newspapers reported 
that 300 UFW supporters patrolled a 125 mile border between San 
Luis and Lukeviile, Arizona. 1 he union even rented a plane to fly 
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reconnaissance for union pickets in their cars. Often they simply 
stopped border crossing Mexicans and talked to them about the 
strike, convincing many of them not to cross.24 Technically, there 
was nothing illegal in these tactics. William Smitherman, a United 
States District Attorney visited the area to observe the "Wet Line". 
He later issued an advisory that this was not in violation of the 
federal statutes.25 
Back in Yuma, the atmosphere of violence intensified. In 
early October 1974, unknown persons firebombed five cars owned 
by undocumented immigrants and a labor contractor's bus. On 
October 15, the police arrested a UFW member for carrying a 
concealed weapon during a picket in front of the Bow and Arrow 
Motel, a motel the union believed catered to undocumented strike 
breakers and labor contractors.26 Because the violence involved 
Mexican nationals, the Yuma strike raised sensitive international 
issues. On October 21, 1974, President Gerald Ford was to meet 
with President Luis Echeverria to discuss other pressing interna­
tional problems. The Arizona State Attorney General, N. Warner 
Lee, in a letter to President Ford requested that the president discuss 
labor problems in the Yuma area. He was hopeful that the Mexican 
president would agree to joint cooperation in stopping the labor 
violence involving Mexican immigrants.27 There isnorecordthatthis 
topic surfaced during the meeting, or that any such agreement resulted. 
The Yuma strike in 1974 did not signal a fundamental 
change in the UFW tactics of dealing with Mexican immigrants. 
Rather, it seemed that some UFW organizers and supporters had 
strayed from the non-violent philosophy advocated by Chavez. The 
strike itself generated unfavorable publicity for the union and 
embarrassed Chavez. It did not produce any UFW gains and 
probably hurt recruitment efforts among Mexican nationals. By the 
next year the UFW began to de-emphasize strikes as a tactic. The 
emphasis shifted to relying on California's new Agricultural Labor 
Relations Act and its promise to bring peace to the fields. 
The Yuma episode was a hard strategy lesson. In contrast, 
the UFW in the 1970s expanded its mission of more assistance to 
Mexican workers. A new UFW Constitution, enacted in 1973, 
reflected the binational character of the union and provided the 
structure to give direct assistance to Mexican immigrant workers. 
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The Constitution did not distinguish between citizen and non-
citizens, defining the union's purpose, "to unite under its banner all 
individuals employed as agricultural laborers, regardless of race, 
creed, sex or nationality."28 The UFW Constitution provided for a 
Bill of Rights for all members, regardless of citizenship or legal 
status in the United States. All members had the right to participate 
equally in union affairs and to receive their legal entitlement. 
Accordingly the UFW made special efforts to provide union ser­
vices to members residing in Mexico. In the 1980s the UFW opened 
several clinics and information offices across the border to serve its 
members who worked in Southern California but lived in Mexicali 
or Tijuana.29 In addition, the union opened Campesino centers to 
provide a variety of services to farm workers. By 1990 there were 
24 centers in California, two in Arizona and one in Mexico, located 
in Mexicali. The service centers provided assistance to workers 
who were eligible for federal-state benefits such as workmen's 
compensation, unemployment insurance, food stamps, aid to fami­
lies with dependent children and the like. The Service Centers 
assisted Spanish-speaking workers in negotiating the complex 
federal and state bureaucracies, by providing free legal consul and 
help with translations and explanations. 
Mexican immigrants within the union provided some of the 
first UFW martyrs-victims of strife in the fields. In 1973 a Teamster 
strike breaker shot and killed Juan de la Cruz, a 60 year old Mexican 
born UFW veteran. Years later in 1979 a grower killed Rufino 
Contreras, a UFW farm worker from Mexicali. To honor these 
Mexican workers, the union established two funds: the Juan de la 
Cruz Farm Worker's Pension Fund and the Rufino Contreras 
Political Action fund, i hus, by the end of the 1970s there was no 
doubt about Chavez's or the UFW's support for Mexican farm 
workers. But unlike many of the union's critics, Chavez had to live 
in the reai world where actions counted for more than rhetoric and 
where the livelihood of thousands ol farm workers and their 
families stood in the balance. 
Immigration Reform and Internationalization 
During the 1980s Chavez and the UFW came to support 
immigration reform as well as strengthen the union's ties with the 
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Mexican sindicatos and the Mexican government. Along with other 
union officials, Chavez supported measures that ended with the 
U.S. Congress drafting a new immigration law, the Immigration 
Relorm and Control Act of 1986. This law basically incorporated 
some of the proposals that he had been advocating for the past 20 
years. It provided for employer sanctions, a strengthened border 
patrol, a guest worker program and, amnesty for undocumented 
workers who arrived before 1982, 
This law, known as IRCA, was roundly criticized by Chicano 
activists as being discriminatory and creating a militarization of the 
border. Despite criticism from some Chicano activists, Chavez 
supported the immigration reforms arguing that they would ulti­
mately benefit the undocumented immigrant's ability to unionize 
and improve working conditions. He believed that legalized farm 
workers would be more likely to join unions. Along with other 
union leaders he supported the enforcement provisions in the law 
because it committed the government to enforce the labor laws, 
something he had been advocating for years. 
Chavez's evaluation of IRCA in 1989 was that it benefited 
immigrant farm workers who met the amnesty provisions. He 
believed that the law would ultimately benefit the UFW as younger 
legal Mexican immigrant workers grew dissatisfied with pre-IRCA 
wages and working conditions. Over time, a revolution of rising 
expectations would result and the newly legalized farm workers 
would organize to solidify their position within American society. 
He said, "I think they'll always support, if not our union, the idea 
of a union. The better wages they have, the better support we have 
for the union. The worse the wages, the worse conditions, the harder 
it is to get them. When a work force is not afraid, it bargains for 
itself. They have a lot at stake in their families, because they are 
trying to get a house. They're fed up with the camp. They wanttheir 
own home. Their needs are greater."31 
Nevertheless, the new law had the potential of hurting the 
farm workers union. A section of the legislation, opposed by 
Chavez and the UFW, enabled agribusinesses to import contract 
laborers in the event of a certified labor shortage. In essence, this 
provision created a bracero-like program. While the full impact of 
the law has yet to be evaluated, by the end of 1989, it appeared that 
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IRCA made it easier for the UFW to recruit additional members. 
The amnesty provisions of the law, in particular those legalizing 
temporary agricultural workers (SAW 1 and SAW 2 workers), 
increased the mobility and self contidence of a whole segment of 
farm workers. 
A consequence of IRCA was to make it even more important 
for the UFW to establish ties with Mexican organizations. The 
increased number of legal Mexican nationals within the UFW 
created a new dynamic that led to a more formal and public 
international policy on the part of Chavez. Recognizing the impor­
tance of Mexican nationals within the UFW, Chavez traveled to 
Mexico several times to meet with labor officials, including various 
Mexican presidents, to discuss government policies that would 
benefit Mexican UFW members. The union held press conferences 
to protest the mistreatment of Mexican nationals by the INS or the 
United States' police. News about the UFW struggle against the 
growers and the boycott during the 1980s was disseminated in 
Mexico through various Mexican publications. The most outspo­
ken and pro-union of these was Matices published by Demetrio 
Almaguer Torres beginning in 1981 and lasting until 1988.32 
Torres regularly ran articles highlighting Chavez's speeches and 
analyzing farm worker issues advocated by the UFW. In the late 
1980s Chavez publicly complained about the corruption in the 
Mexican postal system that resulted in the theft of remittances of 
UFW members. The UFW then lobbied the Mexican legislature to 
promote postal reform laws that would make the transmittal of 
remittances more secure.33 In 1990 Chavez and UFW representa­
tives successfully lobbied Mexican legislators to pass a bill that 
would allow UFW members resident in the United States to qualify 
their families for Mexican social security benefits. On April 23, 
1990 Chavez met with President Salinas de Gortari in Los Angeles 
and signed an agreement with the Mexican Social Security Admin­
istration (1MSS).34 
I his historic pact between the Mexican government and a 
Mexican-American labor union appeared in most of the major 
newspapers and magazines in Mexico. The compact undoubtedly 
made the union more attractive to Mexican immigrants who wanted 
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to join the UFW. It showed the high regard that the Mexican 
government held for Chavez and the UFW. In 1991 the president 
of Mexico awarded Chavez the prestigious Aguilade Oro, a special 
award of merit given to only a few non-Mexican citizens. This 
honor recognized his contributions to the welfare of hundreds of 
thousands of Mexican workers in the United States. In February 
1992 the National Autonomous University of Mexico awarded 
Chavez el Premio Benito Juarez to recognize his leadership in the 
struggles of millions of farm workers. This award has been given 
annually since 1988 to honor an individual of international impor­
tance who has advanced the cause of justice and peace.35 
Conclusion 
How are we to evaluate the twists and turns in Chavez's and 
the UFW's attitudes towards Mexican immigration? For some 
Chavez has simply responded to political pressures. Chicano histo­
rian David Gutierrez has found that during the mid 1970s Mexican-
American organizations and leaders made a fundamental realign­
ment on the issue of Mexican immigration.36 They united for the 
first time against restrictionist immigration proposals and discov­
ered a common interest between immigrants and native born Mexi­
can-Americans. Gutierrez argues that Chavez was essentially 
pressured by other activists into softening his position on immigra­
tion control. While it was true that the UFW and Chavez joined 
other traditionally anti-immigrant organizations such as the Ameri­
can G.I. Forum and the League of United Latin American Citizens 
to denounce deportation plans of undocumented immigrants, it is 
also true that Chavez has historically supported the rights of 
Mexican immigrants, whether documented or not. The nature of 
this support was mainly to demonstrate against the exploitation and 
manipulation of immigrant workers by growers. Along with other 
activists, Chavez became more outspoken about immigrant rights 
during debates over the Carter immigration proposals during the 
mid 1970s. But The UFW, in joining the debate on the side of the 
immigrants, was not changing its policy or orientation. Chavez 
emphasized his support for the legalization provisions of the pro­
posed immigration bill but also supported strict enforcement mea­
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sures. This is entirely consistent with his previous statements 
accusing the INS and growers of avoiding the laws. 
Mexican immigration has shaped the development of the 
UFVV as one of the few binational unions in the United States?7 The 
hard realities of farm labor organizing compelled Chavez and the 
UFW to support immigration measures that were not popular with 
Chicano activists. At the same time, the increasingly Mexican UFW 
membership has made it important for the union to iorge alliances 
and work cooperatively with Mexican unions and Mexican govern­
ment officials. But Chavez himself has changed. During the thirty 
years of his organizing career, he moved from a nativism stance 
towards Mexican immigration to a more internationalist approach. 
In Mexico, writers and politicians have shown more interest in the 
Chicano political movement and as a result the farm workers union 
and Cesar Chavez have become part of the folklore of the Mexican 
struggle against United States hegemony. President Carlos Salinas 
de Gortari's initiatives to forge links with Mexican-American 
leaders has heightened the importance of Cesar Chavez and the 
UFW in the views of Mexican policy makers. 
A constant through the years has been Cesar Chavez' 
criticism of the United States' government agencies and their 
prejudicial interpretation of immigration and labor laws. The UFW 
has always had a sizable contingent of immigrants both documented 
and undocumented as part of its rank and file. With the amnesty 
provisions of the 1986IRCA law, a larger number of UFW members 
have become legal residents. Indications are that the Mexican 
immigrant flow is not lessening despite new restrictions. The 
failure of the California Agricultural Relations Act to produce 
contracts for the UFW has led Chavez to lessen his reliance on 
agricultural strikes to pressure growers. No longer are Mexican 
immigrant workers a threat to union strikes. Instead, for 10 years 
now, Chavez has relied on an international grape boycott to force the 
growers to sign contracts and include anti-pesticide provisions. It 
may well be that the organizational dilemmas posed by the failure 
of the ALRB and continued Mexican immigration has given addi­
tional urgency to the grape boycott of the 1990s. The proposed Free 
Irade agreements, if enacted, may have a negative effect on the 
UFW since the importation of agricultural goods from Mexico 
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could create additional unemployment of farm workers in the U.S. 
even while not easing the pressure for additional rural migrants to 
come to the United States. This would be the latest in a long history 
of challenges faced by the farm worker's union and its leadership. 
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Texas Higher Education and 
Border Funding Inequities: 
Implications for Border Universities and 
Transborder Cooperation1 
Ellwyn R. Stoddard* 
Resumen 
Casosrecientesen la corte del estado deTexas han conclui'do 
que: a) no se han apoyado equivalentemente los distritos escolares 
mas pobres; b) que a los residentes en las areas fronterizas no se les 
ha dado igualdad de oportunidades para el desarrollo de estudios 
profesionales o de doctorado como en el resto del Estado. Este 
artfculo describe la distribucion asimetrica de los programas 
doctorales dentro del Estado. Las soluciones presupuestarias son 
formuladas considerando los rapidos cambios en la situacion polftica 
y economica en el Estado. Finalmente, el presente trabajorefleja el 
impacto positive que estos programas tendran en los residentes de 
la frontera y en la infraestructura de las ciudades fronterizas. Asi se 
puede promover un mayor intercambio con universidades del norte 
de Mexico. 
*Ellwyn R. Stoddard is a Professor of Sociology & Anthropology, 
University of Texas at El Paso. 
Introduction 
I oday, America is experiencing new political and eco­
nomic realities. Rapidly changing power alignments caused by the 
fragmentation of the USSR are altering traditional relationships 
with our European allies. American-based multinational corpora­
tions are being forced to adopt new global strategies to meet Pacific 
Rim competition; American consumers continue to buy foreign as 
our negative balance-o'-trade mounts. As the world's largest debtor 
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nation-a $4 trillion overdraft (increasing $1 billion per day), we 
struggle with a crippling recession and high unemployment. 
Domestically, our federal fiscal crisis deepens, exacerbated 
by an expensive military buildup, a costly Gulf War and a multibillion 
dollar federal bailout for failing banks and S &L institutions. At the 
same time, presidential campaign rhetoric promises voters more 
federal spending in catchy new programs which we can ill afford. 
The federal government is not ready to furnish financial aid for the 
states' internal economic problems, so troubled state and local 
government must seek financial solutions closer to home. 
Back in the good ol' days, Texas oil created wealth for state 
coffers, but no more. When the oil rigs became silent, the state 
money tree died. Rising costs of governmental services coupled 
with depleted state revenues currently plague the Lone Star State. 
The state budget for 1992-93 contains a $5 billion shortfall just to 
maintain existing services at current levels. Further, recent court-
ordered reforms in public school taxation and funding will require 
additional revenues to stay within the constitutionally-mandated 
balanced budget. State officials can no longer procrastinate their 
fiscal responsibilities. Appropriate economic support for these 
required expenditures must be found for the next biennium. 
Education Funding in Texas 
Texas ranks in the bottom one-third of American states in 
per capita expenditures for public education. This low priority has 
led to major problems in poorer school districts. Its southern 
counties have further depleted their meager budgets with costly 
curricula for non-English speaking students. Recently, some of the 
state's poorest school districts initiated legal action to force a more 
equitable distribution of public monies. The resultant court case 
(Edgewood v. Kirby, 1986) declared that poorer school districts 
within the state have been deprived of equal educational opportuni­
ties and funding equity. Texas currently has a legal mandate to 
provide for equity in future taxation and distributing of public funds 
to school districts. However, with critical legal deadlines again 
approaching, state legislators have been unable to agree on a plan for 
restructuring the tax load and distributing public funds more equitably. 
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Funding Equity: A Legal Challenge 
In Texas, institutions of higher education face a pattern of 
funding inequity similar to that found in its public schools. Whereas 
the children from prosperous families in select communities enjoy 
a plethora of doctoral options similar to those afforded their parents, 
children from less affluent families located in less politically 
powerful regions (such as its southern borderlands) have none. 
These artificially-induced inequities have been legally challenged, 
asking the court to order an end to continued discriminate use of 
public monies. 
In the fall of 1991, the Mexican-American Legal Defense 
Fund (MALDEF) brought a class action suit on behalf of six 
Hispanic students in the lower Rio Grande Valley. It targeted the 
State of Texas, officials and agencies controlling higher education 
and doctoral programs whose policies had led to decades of inequity 
funding. The case of LULAC v. RICHARDS et al., argued in the 
107th District Court (Brownsville, Texas), concluded that inequi­
ties in funding for border graduate programs and institutions indeed 
existed. In January 1992, Judge Benjamin Euresti issued a court 
decree requiring Texas officials, legislators, coordinating board 
members, and system regents to provide equitable funding for 
higher education in Texas' border region by May 1993 or to cease 
funding of all state universities until they had complied. That 
verdict is being challenged on appeal before the Texas Supreme 
Court beginning October 13, 1992. 
If this case unfolds like the six-year-old EDGEWOOD v. 
KIRBY litigation, further delays and public posturing can be 
expected. Politically, after expensive evasive tactics have been 
exhausted, state leaders may well blame the court mandate for 
having to raise additional revenues. 
In a rare departure from legal precedent, the winners of the 
LULAC v. RICHARDS et al. litigation have already initiated a 
settlement proposal for consideration by state political agencies and 
leaders. By meeting with border leaders of business politics and 
education, MALDEF drew up an initial plan for expanded doctoral 
and professional programs (with an implementation cost of $2 
billion overa 10 year period). Forexample, the University of Texas 
at El Paso would receive an additional sum of $26 million annually 
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to initiate a dozen doctoral programs, a broader spectrum of Master's 
degrees, and a Health Science Center as part of its future mission. 
If this legal approach eventually leads to fair budgetary 
allocations of public monies and greater regional equity, it will 
curtail political favoritism in university-linked expenditures, a 
practice which has dominated the Texas landscape for decades. 
This will inevitably translate into painful cutbacks for institutions 
accustomed to operating with inflated budgets. For border commu­
nities it will offer accessible graduate programs for its aspiring 
youth from poverty backgrounds. But none of this will happen if 
legislators do not show the political courage to attack the state's 
economic problems and projected shortfalls by reallocating the tax 
burden for ail to share 
Texas Border Region: A Place, a People 
It is difficult to agree on what constitutes a border region 
inasmuch as each discipline, scholar or researcher delineates it in a 
different manner.2 The LULAC vs RICHARDS et al. suit uses a 
simple demographic-geographic criterion to include all Texas coun­
ties sharing a common border with Mexico plus contiguous counties 
with Hispanic concentrations of 40 percent or more. This border­
lands region of 41 counties is clearly designated on the state map, 
Figure 1. Two-thirds of the residents of these border counties are 
Hispanic, accounting for 54 percent of all Hispanics in the state. 
Because 24 percent of all Texans are Hispanic, their political power 
is limited; moreover, their regional concentration creates an inextri­
cable link between salient border education problems and Hispanic 
opportunities for upward mobility. 
The border region of Texas is a sprawling sparsely popu­
lated expanse. In drawing district lines for political representation, 
such vast territories may encompass only a handful of people and 
with little in common. Recently, state senate district lines were 
redrawn which lumped together citizens of East El Paso with those 
from Laredo and all towns between. (This would be the equivalent 
of designating all coastal counties front northern Florida to Wash­
ington D.C. as part of a single state congressional district.) Due to 
the social cost of space,3 social services in sparsely populated areas 
are extremely costly on a per capita basis. Unlike densely populated 
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Figure 1 
Accessibility to Publicly-Financed Higher Education in Texas: 
Comprehensive Doctorate and Limited Master's Programs (1990) 
Institution Mission 
Level/Type Scope of Program 
I "Flagship" Institution 
II Comprehensive Doctorates 
III Multi-Doctorial Programs 
4a Limited/Single Doctorates 
4b Master's Level 
4c Limited MA, branch campus 
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areas where economies of scale are operative, per capita costs of 
public safety, health, and education must be budgeted at a much 
higher per capita rate to assure any semblance of equity in services 
provided. 
This southern Texas borderlands region contains the great­
est poverty concentrations in America according to the U.S. Depart­
ment of Commerce which monitors per capita income in 319 urban 
centers (SMSAs) throughout the nation. The poorest communities 
in the nation as ranked are: 1) Pharr-McAllen; 2) Laredo; and 3) 
Brownsville-Harlingen-San Benito. El Paso, a city of one-half 
million further upstream is ranked fourth poorest.4 
Inasmuch as any formula for poverty alleviation must focus 
on educational opportunities, the issue of equitable financing of 
public schools and higher education is critical for the residents of 
this region. Not only do doctoral and professional programs of a 
university give career training, but their activities add to the overall 
quality-of-life of the community in which said training is located. 
Local academicians can clarify local problems and possible solu­
tions through research projects; students and community leaders 
may become actively involved together in outreach services; pro­
fessors are models for pupils who interact with them and become 
familiar with pre-requisite academic training for eventual graduate 
degrees. 
Available Doctoral Training in Texas 
On the map of Texas (Figure 1), universities offering 
multidoctoral programs are geographically identified. They are 
almost exclusively concentrated in the central and northern part of 
the state as compared with the absence of doctoral-granting univer­
sities in major border communities. The institutions providing 
master and doctoral level programs are compared by border and 
non-border locations in Table 1. 
The key on the Figure 1 map indicates three major types or 
levels of doctoral programs offered, according to the scope or 
offerings and the mission of the institution itself. First, there are two 
flagship institutions (type I) which are typically found within each 
American state. Its main university (i.e. University of lexas at 
Austin) houses schools of law, medicine and related professionals 
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Table 1 
BACHELOR'S, MASTER'S, AND DOCTORAL/PROFESSIONAL PROGRAMS IN TEXAS 
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION, by Levels 
Non-Border Location Border Location 
Institution BA's MA's PhD1 Institution BA's MA's PhD1 
COMPREHENSIVE DOCTORAL/"FLAGSHIP"INSTITUTIONS 
U T Austin 145 148 123 
Texas A&M2 141 143 105 
COMPREHENSIVE DOCTORATE INSTITUTIONS 
Texas Tech3 144 112 76 
U of Houston4 164 157 50 
MULUDOCTORAL INSTITUTIONS 
U of No Texas 140 262 115 
Texas Womcns U 129 114 39 
U T Dallas5 53 68 54 
U T Arlington 106 82 26 
E Texas State 144 99 25 
U T HSC-Houston 4 49 30 
LIMITED DOCTORAL INSTITUTIONS 
Texas Southern 94 83 8 
Lamar Univ 82 35 6 
U T MB-Galveston 8 26 10 U T San Antonio6 S3 83 11 
S F Austin 102 47 1 U T El Paso 83 79 2 
Sam Houston St 97 71 1 Texas A&I-Kngsvl 61 60 1 
SW Texas State 
West TX State 
Prairie View A&M 
U T Tyler 
Angelo State 
Tarlelon State 
Midwestern Slate 
U T Permian Basn 
E Texas St-TxArfc 
Houston-Victoria 
BACHELOR'S, MASTER'S DEGREE INSTITUTIONS 
108 
102 
55 
43 
48 
72 
52 
26 
17 
18 
70 
62 
61 
33 
23 
19 
18 
19 
15 
25 
Sul Ross State 33 36 
U T Pan AM-Edirtbg 47 
Corpus Christi St 29 14 
Laredo State 18 13 
UTPanAm-Bmsv 15 9 
Sul Ross, Uvalde 8 9 
22 
Source: Coordinating Board Inventory,Academic Degree Programs(4/1990) 
FOOTOOTES IN TABLE 
l=Includes professional programs, 4=Includes three Houston campuses. 
(i.e. law, medicine etc.) 5=Includes U T SW Med Ctr at Dallas 
2=Includes Medicine/Vet Medicine 6=Includcs UTSA Health Sci Ctr. 
3=Includes Tech Health Sci Ctr. 
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as well as other academic Ph.D's. Its land-grant institution (i.e. 
Texas A & M University), a legacy of the Civil War Morrill Act, 
typically concentrates on agricultural and engineering specialties. 
However, over time both of these Texas institutions have expanded 
significantly beyond the narrow mission statement initially given them. 
The second level of public universities are those with 
comprehensive multidoctoral programs (type II) but without the 
traditional flagship mandate found in type I institutions. Two 
universities in Texas are included in this category: Texas Tech 
University (Lubbock) and the University of Houston campuses. 
The third level of doctoral granting institutions within the 
state are multidoctoral universities (type III) usually lacking the 
comprehensiveness of type I and type II institutions. Significantly, 
in Texas, these are all geographically clustered around the city of 
Dallas. These five universities reflect a very broad spectrum of 
training-from medical professions at the University of Texas at 
Dallas to varied academic doctorates issued by the University of 
Texas at Arlington (west side of Dallas). Many academic doctoral 
programs are also offered at East Texas S tate University in the small 
town of Commerce some 50 miles northeast of Dallas. But 40 miles 
north of Dallas, in Denton, (population 66,000), two major univer­
sities offer a combined total of 154 doctoral degrees-30 more than 
the total available at the University of Texas at Austin! 
In addition to local accessibility provided by this regional 
concentration of doctoral programs, potential graduate students of 
Dallas and Houston areas have programs at other nearby institutions 
(within a 70 mile radius) from which to select their graduate 
program (see Table 2). A comparison of the doctoral-rich Dallas 
region with the limited total of three doctoral programs for the entire 
41 county border area clearly reflects a disparity in funding and 
program accessibility. 
In sum, Texas college graduates eager to pursue a doctorate 
should either be bom to a rich family or chose parents living near Dallas! 
Borderlands Doctoral Programs 
Obviously, political considerations rather than criteria of 
population concentrations or planned statewide distribution have 
resulted in vast resource commitments to central and northern parts 
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Table 2 
ACCESSIBILITY TO PUBLICLY-FINANCED HIGHER EDUCATION IN TEXAS: 
LOCATION OF COMPREHENSIVE DOCTORATE & LIMITED MASTER'S PROGRAMS 
(1990) 
City Population Institution(s) Other Access 70 miles 
(•border) (1990) and Type1 Compreh Limited 
Houston(SMSA) 1,630,553 University of Houston (H) I 4a(3) 
Texas Southern Univ (4a) J,n 4a(2) 
Dallas(SMSA) 1,006,877 U T Dallas/SW Med Ctr (HI) m(4> — 
•San Antonio 935,933 U T SA/Health Sci Ctr (4a) — — 
•El Paso 515,342 U T El Paso (4a) — — 
Austin 465,622 U T Austin a ) — — 
Arlington 261,721 U T Arlington (m) 111(3) 4b 
•Corpus Christi 257,453 Corpus Christi State (4b) — 4a,4b 
Lubbock 186,206 Texas Tech U <n) — 4b 
•Laredo 122,899 Laredo Stale (4b) — — 
Beaumont 114,323 Lamar Univ (4a) n 4a(2) 
Bryan/Coll Sta 107,458 Texas A & M a) 4a 
•Brownsville 98,962 Texas Pan Am-Brwnsvl (4c) — 4b 
Wichita Falls 96,259 Midwestern Stale (4b) — — 
Midland 89,443 U T Permian Basin (4c) — — 
San Angelo 84,474 San Angelo State (4b) — — 
Tyler 75,450 U T Tyler (4b) 4a 
Denton 66,270 U of North Texas an) m(4> — 
Texas Woman's Univ (in) ni(4) — 
Galveston 59,070 U T Medical Branch (4a) ii 4a(2) 
Victoria 55,076 U Houston-Victoria (4b) — 4b 
Texarkana 31,656 E TX State-Texarkana (4b) — — 
Nacogdoches 30,872 Stephen F Austin (4a) _ 4b 
•Edinburg 29,885 U T Pan American (4b) — 4c 
San Marcos 28,743 SW Texas Stale (4b) i 4a 
Huntsville 27,925 Sam Houston Stale (4a) 1,0 
•Kingsville 25,276 Texas A & I (4a) — 4b 
•Uvalde 14,729 Sul Ross Study Ctr (4c) 4a 
Stephenville 13,502 Tarlelon State (4b) m 
Canyon 11,365 West Texas Slate (4b) ii 
Commerce 6,825 East Texas Stale (HI) ni(3) 
•Alpine 5,637 Sul Ross (4b) 
Prairie View 4,004 Prairie View A & M (4b) n 4a 
Pop Source: TEXAS: Census of Populaton and Housing, Summary (1990) 
Footnote I - Key to Types of Institutions/Degree Programs 
I - Comprehensive Doctoral Programs, Flagship Institutions 
II - Comprehensive Doctoral Programs 
HI- Mullidoctoral Programs in various fields 
4a - Limited doctoral offerings, or specialty field 
4b - Master's degree offerings, no doctorates. 
4c - Limited Master's offerings/branch campus programs. 
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of the state. At the same time border cities such as Brownsville 
(population 100,000) are left without even a reputable four-year 
college. Currently, residents of Brownsville might not be aware that 
graduate training is offered in their community being that only a 
handful of commuting instructors from the University of Texas-Pan 
American, the University of Houston, or Texas A &M arrive at their 
school. Their building (not buildings) might be confused with a 
small trade school. The frustration of potential college students in 
this border region seems justified indeed. 
For decades, state planning agencies have assigned non-
doctoral missions to border institutions leaving them powerless to 
request programs which might upgrade their offerings. For ex­
ample, the University of Texas at El Paso (UTEP) was the former 
Texas School of Mines. In the mid-1960s its undergraduate curricu­
lum became more diversified. Even though it was academically the 
strongest border institution in the state it was never allowed to 
expand its mission statement until recently. Its former mining 
specialty provided justification for a single doctoral program in 
geology. A second doctorate (electrical engineering) was subse­
quently approved when no additional state monies were required to 
initiate the program. The low priority for subsequent academic 
doctorates has prevented psychology (i.e. initiating their doctoral 
training) from being so designated even though their rigorously-
evaluated application had cleared all approval levels other than the 
final bureaucratic designation. 
The only other doctorate training in this vast border region 
is located in Kingsville more than 1,000 miles east of El Paso. This 
lone doctorate in bilingual Education at Texas A & I University 
(only recently attached to Texas A&M system) will be expanded 
to include a second doctorate in Leadership (an expanded version of 
Education Administration) in the Fall of 1992. Neither of these 
institutions are within commuting distance of most border commu­
nity residents. Other graduate programs need to be made accessible 
to residents of the region. 
Not only is there a paucity of doctoral programs available in 
the border region but funding support for academic infrastructure 
has suffered as well (as revealed in Figures 2 thru 5). Figure 2 
graphically reveals the lack of border-based doctoral programs on 
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Figure 2 
COMPARISON OF DOCTORAL PROGRAMS IN 41 BORDER COUNTIES 
AND OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES OF TEXAS, 1983-1990 
(Ratio per One Million residents) 
. . . .  
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Figure 3 
COMPARISON OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS TO 41 BORDER COUNTIES AND 
OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES OF TEXAS, 1989-1990 ($ Per Capita) 
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Source: LULAC v. RICHARDS el at., trial evidence. 
Texas Coordinating Board for Higher Education 
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Figure 4 
COMPARISON OF STUDENT/FACULTY RATIOS (INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING) 
IN 41 BORDER COUNTIES AND OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES 
OF TEXAS, 1989-1990 (Student Numbers) 
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Figure 5 
COMPARISON OFLIBRARY EXPENDITURES FOR INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER 
LEARNING IN 41 BORDER COUNTIES AND OTHER NON-BORDER COUNTIES 
OF TEXAS, 1989-1990 ($ Per Capita) 
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a per capita basis. The funding inequities of border v. non-bordei 
appropriations in Figure 3 reveal that two and one-half times more 
money is designated for training of a non-border college student 
than is allocated for one attending a border institution. Figure 4 
shows the faculty/student ratios of border and non-border institu­
tions. Whereas the sheer number of faculty and staff required to 
offer 154 academic doctorates in the small city of Denton provides 
adequate manpower and opportunity for professor-student contact, 
border institutions must carry large teaching loads with little oppor­
tunity for research and other community-based activity. Coupled 
with this is a 25 percent lower faculty salary than colleagues with 
lower teaching loads in nonborder institutions. With one-half the 
library appropriations of their non-border institutions (see Figure 
5), border area programs lack equity in resource development. 
While scholars at a border university agonize over which $25-30 per 
year professional or scientific journal subscription to cancel in a 
mandated budget cut, more favored institutions are given supple­
mentary library budgets to order esoteric and costly library re­
sources. Indeed, the preservation of current funding inequity 
procedures condemns future generations of border youth to lan­
guish in poverty while other politically-preferred locations wallow 
in excess. 
It is quite clear that to meet the objectives set forth in the 
court order of J udge Euresti, a fe w spare dollars from the lottery will 
not suffice. Clearly, these changes will require a complete restruc­
turing of the newly defined area missions for select border institu­
tions. Program acceleration to develop new programs at the Masters 
and Doctoral levels will require sizeable start-up funds. Initial start­
up library appropriations must be sizeable; special line items for 
research materials, for equipping laboratories capable of meeting 
the training objectives of the new mission, and the lowering of 
student-teacher ratios will require initial budgetary support. Special 
expanded faculty budgets will be required for seeking out estab­
lished and competent senior scholars while more equitable faculty 
salaries must be offered those in border locations whose profes­
sional qualifications are comparable to non-border colleagues. 
Social scientists agree that education (including graduate 
education) is the single most important key to personal upward 
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mobility. With the upgrading of present and additional institutions 
of higher education in the border region, Texas will discover that it 
is cheaper in the long run to educate all of its people than to maintain 
a chronic underclass of unemployable, uneducated and uninformed 
border residents. The evidence is so compelling as to make the state 
blush for having ignored it for so long or even now avoiding obvious 
changes needed to rectify the problem. 
Increasing Border Opportunity: A Call for Action 
Recent judicial decrees require the state of Texas to 1) 
provide tax equity in funding public education, and 2) provide 
increased doctoral programs in its border region. For state political 
officials, meeting the requirements of Judge Euresti (January 1992) 
to fund border doctoral programs will not be an easy or popular task. 
In such a politically-charged milieu, the tendency is for state 
functionaries to maintain the status quo and pass on the problem to 
subsequent office-holders. However, legislators currently face 
critical time constraints for this mandated improvement in both 
public and higher education of the state. Prolonged legalism and 
evasion tactics may create organized discontent. During a presiden­
tial election year campaign, the newly visible Hispanic voting bloc 
in Texas might be persuaded to rally behind candidates willing to 
give their support to this vital issue. Also, by seizing the initiative, 
state leaders might avoid having to acknowledge the existence of 
past purposeful neglect. But regardless of how this potentially 
explosive issue is handled, it sends an urgent message to state 
officials: 
1) The data showing neglect are so clear that only 
immediate efforts to ameliorate the problem will 
assuage the resentment of border residents who will 
hold all office-holders accountable. 
2) The timing of the legal decision will not permit 
buck passing as a successful avoidance strategy in 
Texas politics. 
3) Organized resistance to funding inequities in 
Texas higher education is solidly entrenched; politi­
cal aspirants and minority organizations are eager to 
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challenge present state leadership. It is a major issue 
waiting to happen. 
4) The growing Hispanic minority is politically 
ready to support programs designed to help them 
escape from poverty. 
5) The Free Trade Agreement and other external 
factors will force this issue into the public forum for 
resolution; a potential embarrassment and deterrent 
for potential investors wishing to select Texas as 
their base of operations. 
Border Higher Education and Transborder Cooperation 
America's Monroe Doctrine declared the Western Hemi­
sphere was to be free of European intrusion. Nevertheless, its own 
position of power allowed a somewhat paternalistic relationship to 
develop between itself and its neighbors. International agreements 
with Mexico, for instance, have often been unilateral declarations 
by the U.S. However, in this modern era of global markets and 
multi-national integration, this archaic mechanism is not viable. 
New political and economic coalitions are forming, reminiscent of 
post-World War II, when enemies were reclassified as allies and 
allies became unfriendly adversaries. The once friendly NATO 
political-military organization is now seen as an economic threat 
(European Community); the dismantled U.S.S.R. is in need of 
economic assistance and no longer provides a bipolar threat for 
military strategists; and the Far East coalition organized to contain 
Russian aggression (SEATO) is now being labeled as an unfair 
trading partner, resulting in Japan bashing and resentment of the 
Pacific Rim's Four Little Dragons.5 
To counter this shift of political and economic power, 
President Bush has pressed for the formation of a North American 
Free Trade zone, a somewhat premature heauristic construct to be 
sure. It would attempt to vulcanize the economies of two G-7 
nations6 (Canada and the U.S.) with a rapidly developing but 
economically troubled Third World nation (Mexico) as a coalition 
against the European and Far East trade blocs. Mexico's President 
Salinas de Gotari has visibly suppressed traditional Mexican na­
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tionalism to embrace this new policy of close ties with America as 
his best option for a troubled Mexican economy.7 
This arrangement could increase U. S.-Mexico coordina­
tion in issues common to the border; border environment, health and 
education. But border residents must be realistic in light of their past 
history of neglect. A mere national proclamation may not translate 
into a positive transborder vehicle if political opposition continues 
to restrict funding for border infrastructure projects. Such as border 
environment, health and education. They must be optimistic but 
also aware of past realities. A mere national proclamation for a new 
age of transborder coordination may not translate into a positive 
border scenario if political opposition to current funding for re­
quired border infrastructure projects continues. 
Incongruities in Regional and Local Policies 
The U.S.-Mexico borderlands serve as a buffer zone be­
tween two vastly different nation-states; the U.S., the mostpowerful 
economic and political entity in the world, and Mexico, a rapidly 
developing Third World nation. Within the United States, its border 
regions are not only peripheral to the rest of America, but are 
peripheral to the governments in each of its four border states. When 
any segment of borderlands society survives, it must do so by 
successfully dealing with a variety of political entities; the mandates 
and restrictions issued by its own federal bureaucracy, policies of its 
own state government, and relations with other local jurisdictions. 
Further, it must somehow be aware of policies of foreign jurisdic­
tions lying across the binational border operating at the local, state 
and federal level.H 
These channels of cooperation and coordination are most 
difficult when they involve transborder relations, inasmuch as any 
formalized alliance would be the diplomatic equivalent of an 
international treaty, a privilege the federal government reserves 
strictly for itself. 
With the southern borderland becoming a more strategic 
area for future maquiladoras (offshore assembly plants) and the 
proposed Free Trade zone, border states may be forced to give 
greater priority to their border regions. Economic development in 
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northern Mexico generates new industries and jobs in the U.S. just 
as Mexico's frontier growth and economic success reflects its 
historical linkage with the U.S. economy.-' However, proposed 
expansion of the current maquiladora industry in northern Mexico 
is an explosive issue for unemployed American workers suffering 
in a dismal domestic economy. 
While national issues are usually broad sweeping ideologi­
cal declarations, most realistic day-to-day issues affecting shared 
transborder problems require a hands-on functional interplay, a 
process prohibited by the nation-state monopoly on treaty-making. 
Walking the tightrope between federal mandates and local tradi­
tions has never been an easy task inasmuch as federal officials 
perceive the border as the divisive limits of territorial sovereignty 
whereas local officials see it as a point of integrating scarce border 
resources and services in a positive symbiotic relationship.10 Caught 
in a milieu of border necessity vs proscriptive rules, border institu­
tions often maintain a complex network of frontier transborder 
relationships which, if discovered, are labeled by centrists as illegal 
behavior. This fortress mentality of federal and state functionaries 
blinds them to the realistic problems faced by local officials who 
must focus on problem-solving,11 
Along the entire border, popular support is increasing for 
transnational programs aimed at improving or stabilizing the qual-
ity-of-life. New environmental agreements have been initiated to 
minimize air and water pollution along the southern U.S. boundary. 
Thus, non-controversial aspects of issues important to the U.S. such 
as environmental pollution of shared air and water resources, health 
and disease problems, drug interdiction and education alliances are 
accorded transborder cooperation. Those dealing with issues in­
volving economic development which may place Mexico at risk 
lace more opposition. Thus, transborder coordination is not a 
universal reaction; it varies from issue to issue. 
Critics are quick to point out infrastructure limitations in 
Mexico's borderareas while they ignore these same deficiencies on 
the Texas side. Prior to launching any new political, economic, or 
higher education projects for the borderlands, the immense task of 
simultaneously upgrading interlocking border infrastructures must 
be planned and funded as a major cost. Similar to the preparation 
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of a dented car body for a paint job, this institutional preparation 
stage is far more costly, less visible and less glamorous than the 
latter stages of program building. Moreover, bolstering the infra­
structure is a long-range project which needs to be commenced 
immediately or it will become a major obstacle toward intra-state 
and transnational development later. 
An expanded role for Texas border universities will favor­
ably alter transborder cooperation and training in both Texas and 
northern Mexico universities. The expansion of doctoral programs 
in borderlands institutions (with concomitant funding for border 
infrastructure) could quickly expand borderlands scholarship and 
expertise. The popular notion of a North American common market 
will require seasoned researchers to study and help ameliorate 
various side effects of Free Trade. When economic opportunities 
expand on the border, both sides benefit. But none will benefit if the 
border region continues to be either ignored or labeled a foreign 
country as it is now. 
Mexico's frontier universities (see Appendix A) are eager to 
establish ties with doctoral level institutions for large joint projects. 
And although Mexican universities and scholars are not the respon­
sibility of Texas taxpayers, mutual cooperation in caring for the 
border will benefit Texans enormously. 
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Notes 
1 This is an expanded and modified version of a paper 
presented to the 4th Annual Texas-Mexico Conference on Higher 
Education, University of Texas-Pan American (March 19, 1992), 
Edinburg, Texas. Appreciation is extended to MALDEF for use of 
selected trial evidence and for Jaime Nunez-Cruz (LACIT, UTEP) 
for construction of Figures 2-5. 
2 These descriptions vary from economic criteria to demo­
graphics; topography to culture area or arbitrary historical usage. 
See discussion in Ellwyn R. Stoddard. "Introduction" in Border­
lands Sourcebookedited by Ellwyn R.Stoddard, Richard L. Nostrand, 
and Jonathan P. West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1983) 3-5. 
3 This valuable concept developed by the late Carl F. 
Kraenzel. The Social Cost of Space for Sparsely Populated Places 
and Regions (El Paso: University of Texas at El Paso, Department 
of Sociology, Unpublished book ms, 1970). 
4 Two additional cities (Lawton, OK and Orem, UT) fit into 
this ranking but are not considered for technical reasons. For a 
comprehensive treatment of border poverty see Ellwyn R. Stoddard 
and John Hedderson, Patterns of Poverty Along the U.S. -Mexico 
Border tLas Cruces: New Mexico State University Border Re­
search Institute, 1987). 
Japan and Ch||a are the BigDragons of the Pacific Rim; Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are called the "Little Dragons." 
The G-7 (Group of 7 most industrialized/wealthiest na­
tions) include Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan 
and the U.S. 
1 • Luis Rubio, "Free Trade: A Mexican Voice" Border Trax 
(December, 1990) 19-20. 
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8 Both Duchacek and House describe the difficulties faced 
in transborder coordination of regional and local entities. Ivo D. 
Duchacek. "Transborder Overlaps between Three Federal Sys­
tems: From Gulf of Mexico to the Arctic Ocean" Paper presented 
to Western Social Science Association (April), San Diego, Califor­
nia, 1985. John House, "The Frontier Zone: A Conceptual Problem 
for Policy Makers" International Political Science Review 1.4 
(1980) 456-477. 
9 Ellwyn R. Stoddard, Maquila: Assembly Plants in North­
ern Mexico (El Paso: Texas Western Press, 1987). 
10 Ellwyn R. Stoddard, "Structural and Functional Ap­
proaches to Policymaking: Viewing the U.S. Mexico Border as 
Divisive Barrier or Integrative System" in One Border. Two Na­
tions: Policy Implications and Problem Resolutions edited by Oscar 
J. Martinez, Albert E. Utton and Mario Miranda Pacheco (Mexico, 
D.F.: ANUIES, 1988) 159-194. 
11 Ellwyn R. Stoddard, "Local and Regional Incongruities in 
Bi-Mational Diplomacy: Policy for the U.S.-Mexico Border" Policy 
Perspectives 2.1 (1982) 222-236. Also, Stoddard, "Frontiers, 
Borders and Border Segmentation: Toward a Conceptual Clarifica­
tion" Journal of Borderlands Studies 5 (Spring, 1991)1-22. 
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APPENDIX A 
MEXICAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN BORDER STATES (ANUIES) 
Public Private 
Institution/Location Rector Univ—Tech Inst Univ/Inst 
CHIHUAHUA 
Colegio de la Frontera 
Norte(COLEF) 
CHIHUAHUA, Chili 
Lie. Eduardo 
Barrera 
Escuela Superior de 
Agricultura "Hermanos 
Escobar" 
CHIHUAHUA, Chih. 
Ing. Marcos Lopez 
Torres 
Inslilulo Tecnoldgico 
de Chihuahua 
CHIHUAHUA, Chih. 
Ing. Horacio 
Nunez Martinez 
Instituto Tecnoldgico 
de Ciudad Juarez 
CD. JUAREZ, Chih. 
Ing. Humbeno 
Morales Moreno 
Instituto Tecnoldgico y de 
Estudios Superiores de Monterrey 
CHIHUAHUA, Chih. (Branch) 
CD. JUAREZ, Chih. (Branch) 
X 
X 
Universidad Auldnoma 
de Chihuahua 
CHIHUAHUA, Chih. 
Dr. Carlos 
Ochoa Ortega 
Universadad Aulrinoma 
de Ciudad Juarez 
CD. JUAREZ, Chih. 
Lie. Wilfrido 
Campbell Saavedra 
COAHUILA 
Instituto Tecnolrigico 
de Saltillo 
SALTILLO, Coah. 
Ing. Jose Claudio 
Tamez Saenz 
Instituto Tecnoldgico 
de La Laguna 
TORREON, Coah. 
Ing. Jose Luis 
Villarreal Cardenas 
Instituto Tecnoldgico y de 
Estudios Superiores de Monterrey 
SALTILLO, Coah. (Branch) 
TORREON, Coah. (Branch) 
X 
X 
Universidad Autonoma 
Agraria "Antonio Narro" 
SALTILLO, Coah. 
Ing. M.S. Reginaldo 
de [.una Villarreal 
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MEXICAN INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION (ANUIES) Cont'd 
Institution/Location Rector 
Public Private 
Univ-Tech Inst Univ/Inst 
COAHUILA (Cont'd) 
Universidad Autonoma 
de Coahila 
SALTILLO, Coah. 
M.C. Remigio 
Vaides Gamez 
NUEVO LEON 
Instituto Tecnologico y Dr. Rafael 
de Estudios Superiores Rangel Sostmann 
de Monteney (ITESM) 
MONTERREY, N.L. 
EUGENIO GRAZA SADA,N.L.(Qranch) 
X 
X 
Universidad Autonoma 
de Nuevo Leon 
MONTERREY, N.L. 
Universidad Regiomontana 
MONTERREY, N.L. 
Universidad de Monterrey 
SAN PEDRO GARZA 
GARCIA, N.L. 
Ing. Gregorio 
Farias Longoria 
Pablo Longoria 
Ing. Jorge 
Santiesteban Pria 
TAMAULIPAS 
Instituto Tecnologico 
de Matamoros 
MATAMOROS, Tamps. 
Instituto Tecnologico 
de Nuevo I^redo 
NUEVO LAREDO, Tamps. 
Instituto Tecnologico 
de Ciudad Madero 
CD. MADERO, Tamps. 
Instituto Tecnologico y de 
Estudios Superiores de Monteney 
TAMPICO, Tamps. (Branch) 
Universidad Aut6noma 
de Tamaulipas 
CD. VICTORIA, Tamps. 
Ing. Rafael 
Rosaldo Cortazar 
Ing. Tomas Garza 
Wong 
Ing. Nicolas 
Echevarria Diaz 
Lie. Jose Adame 
Mier 
Source: Directory, Texas-Mexico Border Higher Education Conference, held April 26-28, 1989 in 
Cd. Juarez—El Paso; Chihuahua updates from CIBS, U. L El Paso (February 1992) 
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Texas Discovers Its Mexican Neighbors: 
Border-State Governmental Relations, 
1978-1991 
E.V. Niemeyer, Jr.* 
Resumcn 
Una epoca nueva y mas prometedora en las relaciones 
gubernamentales entre Texas y Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila 
y Chihuahua haemanado de las administraciones de los Gobernadores 
Clements, White y Richards a causa de sus iniciativas con los 
estados fronterizos. 
*E.V. Niemeyer, Jr., is retired from the Foreign Service of the U.S. 
Information Agency and from a staff position at the University of 
Texas at Austin. 
Studies of the U.S.-Mexico relationship have generally 
focused on the interaction of the governments of both countries 
with little attention being paid to relations between states that face 
each other along a common border. In part this has been due to the 
paucity of these relations. On each side of the border officials were 
so concerned with matters in their own states that they gave scant 
attention to their neighbors and their problems. An air of mutual 
Indifference, even to the point of extending social amenities, pre­
vailed. But with growing industrialization, increased trade across 
the border, population pressures in Mexico, and environmental 
concerns, toe situation has changed. Now the chief executives of 
Texas and the four states that border it-Chihuahua, Coahuila, 
Nuevo Leon, and Iamaulipas—talk to each other, meet to discuss 
problems, seek to promote border development, and work together 
for the welfare of the people of the border area. The change has been 
dramatic. T sxas has at last discovered its Mexican neighbors and 
their response to this attention has been positive. 
I lior to 1979 Texas governors had been most concerned 
with the border states in times of conflict and stress. During the 
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period of conflict of the Mexican Revolution (1910-1925) instabil­
ity in Mexico and border raids of revolutionary and marauding 
bands along the Rfo Grande forced Texas governors and other state 
officials to concentrate on the protection of life and property.1 
During World War II and the years following, the Good Neighbor 
Commission of Texas sought to reduce discrimination against 
Mexican workers in Texas, visitors from Mexico, and Mexican 
Americans as the state struggled to show that it could be a good 
neighbor of Mexico/ 
The first Texas governor to notice his peers, the governors 
of the four border states, was John Connally, who in 1964 took the 
unprecedented step of paying them a courtesy call in their own state 
capitals: Chihuahua, Saltillo, Monterrey, and Ciudad Victoria. He 
was warmly received by state officials in each of those cities, and 
many people turned out to see the Texas governor who had survived 
the Kennedy assassination and who bore visible evidence of that tragedy. 
The next governor to show interest in Mexico was William 
P. Clements who during his first term in office (1979-1983) brought 
about a revolution in Texas border-state relations. How and why did 
this come about? In his campaign for the governorship, Clements 
had made good relations with Mexico a principal issue, had said 
more than once that Mexico was crucial to the future of the United 
States in energy matters. Since this implied increased exploration 
and drilling for oil in Mexico, many believed that he sought greater 
opportunity to drill in Mexico for SEDCO, the Dallas-based oil 
drilling firm he had founded in 1947 that had made him wealthy. He 
was not considered to be particularly knowledgeable about Mexico, 
and there were questions about his attitude towards Mexican Ameri­
cans,-5 While his views of both may have followed stereotyped 
patterns, there is no evidence that Clements held ethnic prejudices 
toward either. The impression that he did arose from his autocratic, 
patriarchal, almost tutorial manner of dealing with others, regard­
less of their racial background or nationality. He was gruff and 
outspoken. A man of candor, he avoided rhetoric and had little 
patience for self-indulgence.4 
In reality Clements was governor at a time in history when 
state executives were beginning to exercise more active roles in 
areas of foreign affairs of vital interest to their states." However 
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serious U.S.-Mexican problems were perceived in Washington and 
Mexico City, they were felt more acutely on the border. Both Texas 
and Mexican state officials, beset with the daily frustrations and 
complexities of the relations between the two countries, were 
becoming more and more aware of the need to deal with each other 
if conditions were to be improved. Clements saw this clearly, and 
while Mexican governors have less freedom than U.S. governors in 
the field of foreign relations, the border governors were willing to 
work with him. 
Unconcerned with the linguistic and cultural differences 
that separated him from his Mexican counterparts, Clements initi­
ated a personal diplomacy that began a long overdue era of good 
neighborliness at the state-government level.6 Counseled by Rich­
ard Roy Rubottom, a retired diplomat of the U.S. Foreign Service, 
he plunged into the unknown waters of foreign relations with a bold 
stroke: a flight to Mexico City right after his inauguration in 
January, 1979, to confer with Mexican President Jose Lopez-
Portillo. He then turned his attention to the border-state governors, 
visiting each of them in their capitols and inviting them to Austin. 
T hey came, flattered to be so honored. During his four years in 
office, he met his Mexican counterparts a total of 20 times as he 
sought to improve Texas' relations with Mexico and to better 
economic conditions along the Texas-Mexico border. 
In regard to the problems of undocumented Mexican work­
ers in Texas, Clements proposed a guest worker program that 
stressed consultation, cooperation, and coordination with Mexico ' 
He also established a task force to determine the number of undocu-
mcnted workers in 1 exasT His administration initiated cooperative 
wild life projects with Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas,9 carried out 
training programs for law enforcement officers10 and implemented 
cultural, technical and student exchange programs with Mexico.11 
In the commercial field, Clements signed enabling legislation to 
establish foreign trade zones in San Antonio and five border cities 
for the purpose of promoting trade and creating jobs in the bonier area12 
To relieve congestion, speed up the flow of goods into and 
from Mexico, and reduce the crossing time for tourists, his admin­
istration obtained approval for an application to build a bridge 
across the Rio Grande at Presidio, rexas and authorized feasibility 
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studies for other bridges at Del Rio, El Paso, and Laredo. Through 
the Governor's efforts, the U.S. Small Business Administration 
allocated $8 million in direct loans for border businesses hurt by the 
peso devaluation of 1982. Finally, under the Development Corpo­
ration Act of 1979, which was signed into law by Clements, $396 
million in industrial revenue bonds set in motion a program that 
created more than 8,600 new jobs in border communities.13 By the 
end of his first term, Clements had made an auspicious start in 
turning the Texas ship of state toward its Mexican neighbors. 
For his part, Governor Mark White (1983-1987) did not 
neglect Mexico, although his program was low profile in compari­
son with that of his predecessor.14 It appears that he concentrated 
on establishing personal relationships with his peers in the Mexican 
bureaucracy. He met with the governors of the four border states, 
some on several occasions, and in early 1986 his Executive Assis­
tant met in Houston with the Governor of Yucatan. At the Fourth 
Border Governors' Conference held in Tucson in 1984, Governor 
White played a role in the planning sessions. His administration 
assisted in organizing and carrying out the First Regional Confer­
ence of the Rio Grande Border States on Parks and Wildlife held 
November 5-6,1985, in Laredo. This conference sought to identify 
issues affecting the management of flora, fauna and recreation along 
the border as well as to develop contacts and establish an informal 
network among resource management agencies. Additionally, it 
sought to increase awareness and appreciation of the complex issues 
facing the border region in the protection of the environment.1-' 
Governor White also encouraged the growing maquiladora 
program, a relatively new economic development concentrated on 
the Mexican side of the U .S .-Mexico border.1 Despite the fact that 
maquiladoras employ about one tenth of the Mexican industrial 
work force and have become the second largest earner of foreign 
exchange, they are criticized by American labor leaders for taking 
jobs away from American workers and by many researchers as 
sweatshop exploitation, for causing pollution and health hazards, 
and for primarily employing young women at low wages who are 
not in the work force. Furthermore, cities along the border in or 
around which maquiladoras are concentrated have become even 
more crowded with the influx of workers; this has strained existing 
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water and sewage systems and exacerbated even further the short­
age of housing, transportation, and medical and educational ser­
vices in these areas. For Texas, however, there has been an increase 
in plants along the border that supply component parts for 
maquiladora production. Aware of the deficiency in child and 
maternal health care along both sides of the border and the need to 
improve this vital service, White also signed an agreement between 
the State of Texas and the Mexican federal government for the 
exchange of public health personnel. 
A major event of White's term was the devastating earth­
quake that struck Mexico City in September 1985. White responded 
immediately, appointing a state-wide task force, the "Texas Re­
sponse-Citizens for Mexican Relief," with Henry Cisneros, then 
Mayor of San Antonio, and Robert Krueger, former ambassador-at-
large to Mexico, as co-chairmen. Response to the task force's 
appeal for help resulted in "an incredible outpouring of assis­
tance."17 Texans sent tons of supplies by plane, rail, and truck. 
These included high priority medicines, vaccines, food, clothing, 
water in paper cartons, rescue equipment, earth moving machines, 
and demolition equipment. Over $8 million in cash was also raised 
to help the suffering and the reconstruction effort. 
During his second term, which began in January 1987, 
Governor Clements demonstrated the same interest and enthusiasm 
for strengthening ties with the Mexican border states that he showed 
during his first term. Most of his effort focused on the promotion of 
economic development of the border area. In early 1988 he met in 
Austin with each of his counterparts (Governors Fernando Baeza 
Melendez of Chihuahua, Eliseo Mendoza Berrueto of Coahuila, 
JorgeTrevinoofNuevo Leon,and Americo VillarrealofTamaulipas) 
and signed with each an agreement to support the continued expan­
sion of the maquiladora industry. The first, titled a "Cooperative 
Agreement" and signed jointly on February 11 by Clements; Trevino; 
Antonio Villarreal, President of the Nuevo Leon Agency for Inter­
national Trade and Industrial Development; and Edward O. Vetter, 
Chairman of the Board, iexas Department of Commerce, commit­
ted the signatories to "promote and facilitate joint economic devel­
opment opportunities" and directed the Agency and the Department 
to develop and execute working agreements between them that 
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would promote and facilitate joint business opportunities and link­
ages between the two states; encourage business associations and 
chambers of commerce to cooperate in establishing stronger private 
sector business linkages; and promote the awareness of maquiladora 
and other production-sharing ventures that would benefit business 
and economic development on both sides of the border. The concept 
of a State of Nuevo Leon office in Texas to foster joint investment 
and industrial and commercial projects was also endorsed, as was a 
"Vacation-in-Two-Nations" program that would promote tourism 
through jointly funded advertising and the sharing of mailing lists 
of names of potential tourists to either state. ' At the signing 
ceremony in Austin, Clements enthusiastically exclaimed that "what 
this is all about is jobs, jobs, jobs, and more jobs for Mexico and 
Texas, and that's exactly what our improved relations can trigger."19 
Under the terms of a separate "Document of Understanding 
in Transportation and Highway Technology" signed the same day, 
the two chief executives agreed that transportation research would 
be exchanged between the University of Texas at Austin Center for 
Transportation Research, the Texas Department of Highways and 
Public Transportation, the Secretariat of Public Works and Trans­
portation of Nuevo Leon, the Autonomous University of Nuevo 
Leon and the Institute Tecnologico; y de Estudios Superiores de 
Monterrey (Monterrey TEC). It was also agreed that annual 
conferences would beheld in Monterrey for the purpose of exchang­
ing technical information, that highway installations would be 
visited to observe current construction techniques, and that the 
parties would participate in an exchange of graduate students. 1 he 
Directors of the Center for Transportation Research and I he Direc­
tor of Major Highways of Nuevo Leon were designated to coordi­
nate the various activities 
The two governors further agreed to promote the construc­
tion of a bridge over the Rio Grande some 16 miles north of Laredo. 
The bridge would link Colombia, Nuevo Leon with the lexas side 
where no town exists but where the township Dolores had during 
World War II. This bridge had long been sought by Monterrey 
industrialists to avoid bottlenecks and other rapid transit impedi­
ments for border traffic at Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas. 1 he City of 
Laredo initially opposed the bridge, but eventually gave its approval 
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after it was agreed that traffic on the Texas side would be routed 
through Laredo to Interstate Highway 35, thus effectively bypass­
ing Nuevo Laredo, Construction of the bridge and port of entry 
began in 1990 at a cost of $10 million to be shared by the City of 
Laredo and Mexican enterprises including a state owned bank, 
private industry, and PEMEX. Completed in the fall of 1991, this 
toll bridge is the twenty-first bridge linking Texas and Mexico and, 
according to Governor Clements, will be used primarily to serve the 
rapidly growing maquiladora industry.2' President Salinas de 
Gortari and Governors Clements and Treviho each made brief 
remarks at the ground-breaking ceremony on the Mexican side on 
March 29, 1990. Ground breaking on the Texas side of the bridge, 
officially called "Puente de Solidaridad (Solidarity Bridge)" by the 
Mexicans but probably just "Columbia Bridge" by the less philo­
sophical Texans, took place five months later on August 22. 
Of potentially greater impact beeau se of Tama u 1 ipas' longer 
border with Texas (300 miles) and the number of twin cities along 
it was the cooperative agreement Clements signed in Austin on 
March 22,1988, with Governor Americo Villarreal. The agreement 
promoted twin-plant development (a plant on the Texas side making 
component parts for a plant on the Mexican side) and expansion 
along the border; established drug prevention programs in the 
border area, provided tor the sharing of computerized vehicle 
registration data to assist in the prosecution of auto thieves; autho­
rized the lexas state office in Mexico City to include a branch in 
Ciudad Victoria, capital of Tamaulipas; created a Tamaulipas state 
office in Dallas; created a Tamaulipas/Texas Commission to seek 
opportunities for the development of industry, business, and tour­
ism, and encouraged cooperation between business associations in 
the two states. 
As in the case of the cooperative agreement with Nuevo 
Leon, job creation was the principal objective of Clements in an area 
of Texas where the economy had been severely depressed since 
1982, where unemployment in the work force at the time of the 
signing was between 16 and 20 percent, and where per capita 
income was only 62 percent of the state level. At the time of the 
signing of this agreement, Clements stated that "Tamaulipas and 
fexas need each other, are cooperating with each other and are 
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moving forward on several initiatives to enhance the job climate in 
both states for all our people."22 
The governors also committed themselves to the building of 
a new bridge at Los Indios near San Benito, first proposed in 1968, 
linking the north end of Cameron County to Tamaulipas. Construc­
tion began in November 1990. In addition they announced their 
support for a new sewage treatment plant at Nuevo Laredo. The city 
at that time was pumping some 25 million gallons of raw sewage 
into the Rio Grande daily. Joint financing of the cost of this plant 
was agreed to by the U.S. and Mexican governments in August 
1989.23 This agreement was the third signed by the two governors 
since they took office in early 1987. In June of that year they had 
signed a border economic development compact and in December 
an agreement for universities in the two states to exchange research 
on shrimp culture. 
Governor Clements welcomed two of his counterparts to 
Austin in April 1988, and signed cooperative agreements with each. 
The first, signed with Governor Baeza Melendez of Chihuahua on 
the 19th, singled out the Ciudad Juarez-El Paso area as "the most 
significant maquiladora center along the Texas-Mexico border" 
but acknowledged that development of this industry had been more 
rapid than the development of its infrastructure. The agreement 
established a Chihuahua-Texas Commission to prepare recommen­
dations for joint economic development opportunities, stressed the 
need for greater awareness of maqu.ilad.oras and other production 
sharing venture benefits through conferences and seminars. I he 
agreement also called for meetings between directors of the Mexi­
can Secretariat of Communications and Transportation, Mexico's 
telephone company, Southwestern Bell, and AT&T "to analyze and 
find solutions to telecommunication problems."24 In a supplemen­
tary document the two governors agreed to "strongly support the 
construction and effective operation of a new Zaragoza International 
Bridge" at El Paso to handle the thirty percent increase over the last three 
years in daily commercial vehicle traffic across the area bridges.'5 
Along with the Rector of the Autonomous University of 
Chihuahua and the President of the University of Jexas at El Paso 
(UTEP), the two governors also signed a "Memorandum of Under­
standing in Higher Education." This document requested that the 
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two university heads chair a conference and subsequent meetings of 
Texas/Chihuahua educational and technical institutions. These 
activities were to develop an action plan that would address the 
educational needs of the rapidly expanding industrial region of 
Texas and Chihuahua. They were also encouraged to investigate the 
feasibility of establishing satellite linkage between UTEP and 
institutions of higher education in Chihuahua "for the purpose of cultural 
and educational programming as well as economic development."26 
On April 27 Clements signed three agreements with Gover­
nor Mendoza Berrueto of Coahuila. The first, which the Director of 
the Coahuila State Commission for Border Development, Prof. 
Gustavo Villarreal, and Edward O. Vettcr, Texas Department of 
Commerce, also signed, stressed the need to promote a greater 
awareness of the value of maquiladoras. The agreement further 
endorsed the establishment of a Coahuila state office in Austin, 
urged closer ties between Texas and Coahuila state offices in 
Mexico City, encouraged greater cooperation between chambers of 
commerce as well as joint tourism promotion, and supported devel­
opment of a similarly protected ecological area adjoining the Big 
Bend National Park and the Coahuila area known as Boquillas del 
Carmen so as to develop the touristic attraction of the area.27 
A second agreement recognized the historical importance of 
the San Juan Bautista mission complex as an important stop on the 
road to Texas during the colonial period. The agreement also 
recognized that Monclova had been a capital of Texas at one 
time,and thus called for an action plan to "research, restore, and 
interpret" the mission complex for the visitor and to create a 
museum of Texas and Coahuila history at Monclova.28 The third 
agreement called for greater scientific and technical support in 
criminal investigations affecting both states, greater coordination of 
activities to identify and recover stolen property, the sharing of 
information in the campaign against drug addiction, and support for 
drug prevention programs in both states.29 
Governor Clements most aggressive actions were in the 
area of economic development, particularly in identifying and 
pursuing further opportunities for the expanding maquilaclora in­
dustry. In cooperation with the Mexican governors, he established 
four Texas/Mexico regional commissions (one for each border 
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state) to operate under the auspices of the Texas/Mexico Authority 
in the Texas Department of Commerce. The Authority, whose 
members were initially appointed by the Board of Directors of the 
Texas Department of Commerce and served at the pleasure of the 
Board, was created by the 70th Legislature in 1987. It was to be an 
advisory body charged with assisting the development of commer­
cial and industrial opportunities along the Texas-Mexico border. 
Currently the board serves as a clearing house for the collection and 
dissemination of information on border economic development; 
develops ties between private and public sector representatives in 
Texas and Mexico; prepares policy recommendations for local, state, and 
federal officials on both sides of the border, and addresses specific 
challenges relating to border economic and industrial development.30 
The Texas/Mexico Authority also serves as an umbrella 
organization for the four bi-state regional commissions (Tamaulipas-
Texas Regional Commission, etc.). Each bi-state commission has 
15 members from Texas and approximately the same number from 
the corresponding Mexican state. The Texans were originally 
appointed by the Board of Directors of the Texas Department of 
Commerce, while the Mexicans were appointed by the governor of 
their respective state. These commissions were established to focus 
on industrial development, trade, tourism, education, environment 
and social infrastructure, and agriculture. Decisions taken at their 
o I 
meetings serve to guide policy making and project implementation/ 
While opportunities for economic growth exist along the 
Texas-Mexico border, there are also obstacles. Although they vary 
in different localities, they generally include an inadequate indus­
trial infrastructure, especially the lack of wastewater treatment 
facilities, roads, bridges, and ports of entry; educational systems 
that have produced a poorly trained work force, especially in the 
areas of vocational and higher education; a shortage of housing and 
basic social services, particularly in maternal and child health care; 
a shortage of capital to finance business ventures and infrastructure 
development, and, perhaps the most important of all, lack oi 
cooperation between private and public sector representatives at all 
governmental levels in Texas and the Mexican border states.32 
Steps taken by Governor Clements and his administration 
undoubtedly added momentum to the dramatic increase ol 
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maquiladoras along the Texas-Mexico border. First established in 
the mid 1960s, by 1983 there were some 720 in operation along the 
entire U.S.-Mexico border, but in just two years (1987-1989) the 
number along the Texas border alone rose from 490 to 712, a 45 
percent increase. These 712 plants employ more than 65 percent of 
the total maquiladora workers along the U.S.-Mexico border.33 
Over the past three years the Texas Department of Com­
merce, acting on the advice of the Texas/Mexico Authority, has 
worked intensively to focus interest on maquiladoras as a market 
for Texas products. In June 3988 the Department sponsored, with 
the Texas Association of Business and the state of Nuevo Leon, a 
"Governors' Conference on Maquiladoras" in Dallas. This confer­
ence sought to inform the participants of the economic benefits and 
opportunities that existed for vendors to the maquiladora plants in 
the border region. This was followed by a second "Governors' 
Conference on Maquiladoras" held in Houston in September and 
co-sponsored with the State of Tamaulipas. Its purpose was to 
"introduce Texas businesses to the multi-billion dollar potential 
market for Texas products and services that the maquiladoras 
represent.1 Nearly a f ifth of the possible vendors who attended this 
conference entered into sales agreements with maquiladora plants 
and by December 1989 some four hundred Texas companies had 
expressed interest in selling automotive manufacturing and electronic 
assembly items, toy manufacturing pans, textile and apparel goods, 
furniture assembly parts, and food processing items to maquiladoras 
The Department also sponsored on November 3-4, 1988 an 
"Infrastructure Finance Summit" to enable U.S. and Mexican 
representatives to evaluate the current status of infrastructure needs 
and improvements that would benefit Texas—Mexico trade and 
industrial growth, identify potential development projects, and 
devise ways of making investment in Mexican infrastructure projects 
attractive to foreign investors. Participants in this conference 
included U.S. and Mexican government representatives, U.S. and 
Mexican developers, U.S. engineering and construction firms, 
banking and investment representatives from both countries, and 
even representatives from the states of California and New Mexico. 
Keeping up the pace set in 1988, the Texas Department of 
Commerce sponsored a Second Annual Finance Summit in San 
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Diego, California, November 9-10, 1989. The meeting was at­
tended by some 75 prominent bankers, developers and government 
officials from the United States and Mexico. Its purpose was to 
make recommendations to federal authorities of both countries for 
the improvement of the investment climate along the border and to 
further facilitate trade between the two nations. A third finance 
meeting was held in Tijuana, Baja California in 1990.35 Finally, on 
November 12-13 the Department sponsored a meeting of the four 
bi-state regional commissions (Texas-Tamaulipas Commission, 
etc.) for the purpose of discussing issues and recommending poli­
cies for the border governors to consider at their 1990 meeting. Held 
in Austin and attended by some 100 persons from the public and 
private sectors in both Texas and Mexico, it produced status reports 
from each of the five border states on pending infrastructure projects 
and legislative policy initiatives. Panel discussions on tourism, 
agriculture, housing, education, environment, and industrial devel­
opment followed the presentation of these reports. 
Other activities that Governor Clements undertook during 
his second term may be briefly summarized as follows: 1) repeating 
his initiatives of ten years earlier, Clements traveled to Mexico City 
in February, 1989 to meet with recently inaugurated President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the first U.S. governor in office to do so; 
2) on April 26, 1989 he signed an agreement with Governor Baeza 
of Chihuahua that encouraged U.S.-Mexico educational institu­
tions to enhance the industrial and social development of the Texas-
Chihuahua border region; 3) in November 1988 and in the same 
month of 1989 he brought together key participants from both sides 
of the border in seminars aimed at improving trans-border telecom­
munications, the latter meeting being held in San Diego, California; 
4) he initiated a meeting on border infrastructure needs and financ­
ing mechanisms that brought together the Texas Department of 
Commerce, U.S. banks and investment companies, contractors, and 
U.S. and Mexican state and federal government officials; 5) during 
the separate border state governors' meetings held during the first 
half of 1988, Clements agreed to cooperate with the governors in 
research and technical assistance beneficial to agricultural produc­
tion on both sides of the border, the result of which has been to 
exchange information on subjects ranging from pest management to 
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arid farming practices; and 6) he sponsored collaborative efforts 
between Texas and the governors of the bordering Mexican states 
to strengthen law enforcement training and to share data that can 
make law enforcement along the border more effective.36 
Finally, it should be noted that Governor Clements actively 
sought to strengthen ties with Mexico in the field of education. He 
supported legislation that would permit Mexican students to enroll 
in Texas public colleges and universities in counties along the 
border without paying out-of-state tuition. The measure became 
law in 1987. By the end of 1990, more than 15 percent of all 
Mexican students attending institutions of higher learning in the 
United States were enrolled in Texas schools.3'* 
The Border Governors' Conferences, a fresh and long 
overdue development in U.S.-Mexico border state relations, have 
changed forever the official reticence that has characterized these 
relations through the years. Although the Good Neighbor Commis­
sion of Texas had invited the Mexican border state governors to a 
three-day meeting in Fort Worth in 1949, where they met with 
I exas' Governor Allan Shivers, and Governor Connally had made 
his historic visit to the capitals of each of the Mexican border states 
in 1964, it was not until June, 1980 that the Border Governors' 
Conference (BGC) was held in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua, the first 
meeting ever of the governors of the states along both sides of the 
U.S.—Mexico border. 1 he conference was an outgrowth of the 1979 
meeting of the Southwest Border Regional Commission (S WBRC), 
a regional planning commission chartered in 1977 for the purpose 
of promoting economic growth in economically depressed border 
counties in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California. That such 
a meeting should also include the Mexican border state governors 
had first been proposed by Governor Bruce Babbitt of Arizona, then 
SWBRC State Co-chairman. It was enthusiastically endorsed by 
Governor Clements who is generally considered to have been the prime 
mover in promoting and organizing the Ciudad Juarez conference.38 
Over the next 10 years, the chief executives of the 10 U.S.­
Mexico border states met seven more times. At each meeting the 
Texas governor played a leading role (Clements attended six, Mark 
W hite only Os le) in discussions with his peers of issues and problems 
of mutual concern, trade and investment, industrial development, 
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tourism, agriculture and livestock, health and environment, ports of 
entry and infrastructure, and education.39 Eventually these confer­
ences were criticized for lack of substantive achievements, a weak 
follow-up on resolutions approved, a failure to provide staff for 
continuing contact and on-going coordination, and the limitations 
imposed by the federal systems of both the United States and 
Mexico (especially Mexico, which is more centralistic in practice 
than the U nited States). In spite of these flaws, the conferences have 
established communication between U.S. and Mexican border 
governors that did not previously exist. They have created an 
atmosphere of good will and cooperation in the resolution of border 
issues which replaced customary unilateral action or none at all. 
Also by virtue of publicity surrounding them, the conferences have 
increased public awareness of problems common to both sides of 
the border.'11' 
The Eighth Conference, co-chaired by Governors Clements 
and Villarreal (Tamaulipas) and held in Austin, March 29-31,1990, 
was productive and perhaps the most gala of all. Since it was 
Clements' final appearance in these meetings, he was determined to 
put on a good show, and he did. Although no money had been 
appropriated by the Texas Legislature, and funds in the general 
appropriation for the Office of Governor were insufficient to meet 
the anticipated cost, a Border Governors' Conference Steering 
Committee, staffed by the Texas Association of Business (TAB), 
was created to solicit private donations. TAB raised over $170,000 
from 50 business firms and individuals. 
During their two days in Austin the 10 governors and their 
entourages kept up a dizzy schedule of activities that included 
keynote speeches by U .S. Secretary of Commerce Robert Mossbacher 
and Mexican Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development, 
Jaime Sierra Puche; speeches on U.S.-Mexico border cooperative 
ventures by U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, John Negroponte, and 
Mexican Ambassador to the United States, Gustavo Petricioli, 
followed by the governors' discussion of these talks; round table 
meetings of Mexican and U.S. business leaders cosponsored by the 
Texas Department of Commerce and the Texas/Mexico Authority; 
a press conference; and a report presented by Don Michie, Univer­
sity of Texas at El Paso, on the Border Trade Alliance. 
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Nor were social activities lacking. These included a private 
reception for the governors and their spouses at the Governor's 
Mansion; a seated state dinner with entertainment and dancing; 
separate breakfasts for U.S. and Mexican governors; a luncheon for 
all the governors; a luncheon for the governors' wives at the 
Governor's Mansion hosted by Rita Clements; a tour for the wives 
of the University of Texas and the Texas State Capitol; and last but 
not least, a Texas-style barbecue at a local ranch with country-and-
western music. This latest conference was both a tribute and a good­
bye to the vigorous Clements who during both his terms had been 
such an enthusiastic supporter of these conferences. At the state 
dinner held on March 29, Clements stated in his prepared remarks: 
"Like family members who share their thoughts over the 
dinner table, we have dealt with shared concerns and oppor­
tunities at our conferences. Which is how it should be. After 
all, we are linked not only by common land, but by common 
goals and by people whose roots in both our nations bind and 
strengthen us. We are united by history and by a vision of 
hope for our families. Truly, we are more than neighbors; 
we are not only friends; we are family, thriving in a vast 
region that many years ago bore no boundary at all. In that 
spirit, let us renew our commitment to the mission that 
unites us. As we prepare to enter a new century, let us remain 
determined to pursue new avenues of economic growth, to 
enhance job creation, and to strive for better lives for 
all...our partnership must build on that foundation of progress 
for both sides of our border. As President Salinas said in 
Washington last October, 'one's own well-being is more lasting 
when it is accompanied by the well-being of others.'"42 
Without doubt all the governors shared these sentiments. And 
Clements could look back on his achievements during eight years in 
oil ice with satisfaction knowing that he had begun a new era in 
Texas' relations with its Mexican neighbors. 
While iexas governors were busy building new bridges to 
Mexico, the Texas Department of Agriculture under Commissioner 
Jim High tower was developing programs in agricultural coopera­
tion with the Mexicans. On July 29, 1985 Hightower signed a 
historic and unprecedented memorandum of understanding in Mexico 
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City with Mexican Secretary of Agriculture Eduardo Pesqueira that 
provided for the improvement and expansion of commercial pro­
grams regarding beef cattle for breeding, fattening, and final pro­
cessing; dairy cattle, sheep and goat stock; stock for rodeos; and 
grain for animal consumption. The memorandum also provided for 
the exchange of commercial information on animals and agricul­
tural products; the development of joint technical projects through 
courses, seminars, and the exchange of personnel on scholarships; 
and the participation by both parties in fairs and expositions.43 
In accordance with the agreement, a Mexico-Texas Ex­
change Commission (M-TEC) was created, co-chaired by the 
Undersecretary for Livestock of the Mexican Secretariat of Agri­
culture and Hydraulic Resources, and the Commissioner of Agri­
culture of Texas. The commission consists of 19 members from 
Texas producer organizations and schools of agriculture as well as 
19 members from similar organizations and schools in Mexico. 
This agreement is the first bilateral accord ever reached between the 
Mexican government and a U.S. state. By March 1990, three 
meetings of M-TEC had been held and it had generated more that 
$130 million in livestock and $40 million in grain sorghum sales to 
Mexico.44 This successful commercial venture has been stimulated 
by the move toward a market orientation of the Mexican economy 
that has accelerated since President Salinas de Gortari took office. 
Previously Mexican governmental protocol and import limitations 
had made it difficult for Texas producers to deal directly with 
Mexican buyers. "In 1983 you couldn't make a grain sale to a 
tortilla manufacturer because the Mexican government bought all 
grain and distributed it to manufacturers, but now you can make 
those direct sales," Hightower is reported to have said in early 1990 45 
Another Hightower project was the Texas-Mexico Live­
stock Export Finance Program drafted by M-TEC and approved by 
agricultural leaders in Texas and Mexico at a special ceremony held 
in Austin on July 30, 1987. The three-year program enabled 
individual Texas ranchers to sell registered breeding stock to 
individual Mexican ranchers, receiving one-third of the sales price 
upon delivery of the stock, the balance to be paid in annual 
installments over a three-year period at ten percent annual interest. 
The note was to be guaranteed by the statewide livestock association 
92-Texas Discovers 
of the home state of the buyer, i.e., Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo 
Leon, or Tamaulipas. These associations have a combined total 
membership of approximately 33,000 ranchers.46 
This program did not prosper because of the reluctance of 
Mexican ranchers to contract debts in dollars. As the decade ended, 
however, exports of cattle to Mexico for both breeding and slaugh­
ter increased dramatically. Whereas only 300,000 head of Texas 
cattle were exported to Mexico in 1989, this figure had doubled by 
the end of 1990, and as of September, 1991 over a million head had 
been shipped.47 It remains to be seen if the present Commissioner 
of Agriculture, Rick Perry, will continue the work of his predeces­
sor, although Department officials recognize its merits and the need 
to include Mexico in departmental programs. 
Although Governor Ann Richards has been in office for a 
year and a half, it appears that Mexico is high on her agenda. Her 
first visit to Mexico as Texas' top official was for the Ninth Mexico-
United States Border Governors' Conference held in Hermosillo, 
Sonora on February 21 and 22,1991. There she endorsed a number 
of her predecessor's programs, including support of maquiladoras, 
the two-nation vacation" concept, educational exchange, the "his­
toric corridor with Coahuila, infrastructure development and the 
construction of more bridges across the Rio Grande, and a common 
effort against crime on both sides of the border as well as the 
peivasive problem ol auto theft. She shows great interest in the 
pending free trade agreement between Canada, the United States 
and Mexico but wishes to protect Texas' interests and reduce the 
danger or damage to the environment. She would also like to 
develop additional water and waste water projects along the Texas-
Mexico border 48 
In late October, 1991, Richards met with President Salinas 
de Gortari and members or his Cabinet and business leaders in 
Mexico City, then flew to Guadalajara to meet with the Governor of 
Jalisco and finally to Monterrey where she met with the Governor 
of Nuevo Leon. With each official visited she sought to strengthen 
commercial ties between lexas and Mexico and expressed her 
concern that greater industrialization in northern Mexico resulting 
from the free-trade agreement will cause more air, water and other 
pollution along the border 49 In contrast to the blunt Clements, 
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Richards' charisma and her "next door neighbor" personality go 
over well with the Mexicans. 
The unprecedented wave of governmental activity involv­
ing Texas and its Mexican neighbors that began following the 
inauguration of William Clements as Governor of Texas in 1979 has 
marked a turning point in the history of the border area. Long 
standing disinterest and lack of communication across the Rio 
Grande have given way to visits, cooperation and displays of sincere 
friendship between state officials. The effect upon the border region 
and its people has been profound. As the governors of Texas, 
Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas have shown 
that they can overcome political and cultural differences, they have 
forged their own regional good neighbor policy. The challenge now 
is for effective leadership on their part and that of their successors 
to maintain the momentum, to obtain the cooperation of the public 
and private sectors on both sides of the border in working for the 
general welfare of the people of the border region. The Rio Grande 
(Rio Bravo) should no longer be considered the dividing line 
between Texas and Mexico but a 1200-mile monument to what 
good will and joint effort can achieve when Texans and Mexicans 
work together. 
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Niemcyer-95 
economic and social problems, and was then asked whether his 
platform was addressing the needs of Mexican Americans, Clements 
had retorted "I'm not running for governor of Mexico" The Daily 
Texan 4 September 1979. 
4 Dallas Morning News 16 January 1991; "He avoided 
political games and called shots the way he saw them. The 
Mexicans respected him." Interview with Jorge Garces, Director, 
Office of Texas-Mexico Relations, Texas Department of Com­
merce, October 1, 1991. Clements claimed that when he served in 
the Department of Defense, his record on promotion of minorities 
was "the best in Washington." Austin American Statesman, 12Nov. 1978. 
5 John Kincaid, "The American Governors in International 
Affairs," Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Fall, 
1984), 96. Clements' special assistant forrelations with Mexico and 
Latin America is reported to have exuberantly exclaimed in June, 
1980 that "we don't have to ask permission of Washington in order 
to talk to the Mexican government. We are a sovereign state." 
Kincaid. See also Dan Pilcher, "The States and Mexico: An 
Experiment in Cooperation," State Legislatures, Vol. 7 (March, 
1981), 18-22. 
6 Clements and those who would work with him in forging 
the new Texas-Mexico relationship would have a formidable task 
in overcoming the gap in mutual understanding that separates 
Mexican from American. The following is a resume of the problem 
involved: "Too little has been done to encourage Americans and 
Mexicans to come to grips with the fact that in a number of critical 
ways their views of the world differ radically and that these 
differences raise important barriers to effective communication and 
mutually satisfactory working relationships. Each assumes that 
what he knows about the other is enough. But it isn't. More is 
needed." John C. Condon. Good Neighbors: Communicating with 
the Mexicans (Yarmouth, Maine: Intercultural Press, 1985), xvii. 
7 The plan was criticized as being little more than a revised 
Bracero Program, although there were differences between the two. 
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The Mexican Crisis and the Segmented 
Labor Market of the Lower Rio Grande 
Valley of Texas 
Joseph Spielberg Benitez* 
Resumen 
Este ensayo se ubica dentro de la problematica de la 
segmentacion de la fuerza laboral y el rol de trabajadores 
trasnacionales mexicanos en la division social del trabajo en "el 
Valle." Se propone que la segmentacion de la fuerza laboral sea 
basada en una division social del trabajo, entre trabajadores 
domesticos residentes y trabajadores transnacionales con residencia 
permanente en Mexico. Despues de trazar los cambios economicos 
y el desarrollo de la fuerza de trabajo, el ensayo sigue con un analisis 
empfrico, el cual sugiere que dentro del mercado de trabajadores 
manuales, los mexicanos transnacionales son los trabajadores 
preferidos en empresas locales de tipo agrfcola, semi-industrial y 
servicios al consumidor. Finalmente, se sostiene que una gran parte 
del costo de la reproduccion de la fuerza del trabajo sea externalizada 
hacia la economfa mexicana, mientras tanto se desarrolla la 
proletarizacion de la clase trabajadora mexico-americana de esta region. 
*Joseph Spielberg Benitez is a professor in the Department of 
Anthropology, Michigan State University. 
Introduction 
While the general contours of the Mexican crisis, its origins 
and its impact on the livelihood of the Mexican working class are 
generally known, especially for the urban working class, the eiiects 
of the crisis within the regional economies of the nation or among 
different types of producers are not particularly well known. Fur­
thermore, it is safe to assume that the relative impact ol the ci^sis-
both regionally and intra-regionally-will vary with the characteris­
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tics of the particular economies and the roles played by different 
classes of producers within them. Cook (1988), for example, found 
some significant variations with respect to the impact and the 
perception of Mexico's crisis among the different classes of rural 
producers in the Valley of Oaxaea. Continuing research on this 
question in other parts of Mexico will, no doubt, reveal similar variations. 
This paper describes the major changes in the regional 
economy of the border region of South Texas, with particular 
emphasis on the role of Mexican labor in the social organization of 
production. It is my contention that to understand the economic, 
social and political impact of the Mexican crisis in this border region 
of Mexico, as well as local level perceptions of the crisis, its causes 
and solutions, it is necessary that the linkages across this porous 
boundary beexamined-especially the labor connection. A regional 
perspective is further justified in that the manner in which the 
national economies of Mexico and the United States are joined or 
integrated is not necessarily the same from region to region or with 
respect to the flow of capital, goods and labor. Recently, various 
scholars have pointed to the particular conditions that prevail in the 
border regions (Irontiers) or at the point where the two economies 
interface physically (Fernandez 1977; House 1982; and Cockcroft 
1986). In addition, the manner in which these two economies 
articulate within these regions has varied over time—especially in 
the disposition and useoi labor due not only to changing conditions 
in Mexico, but also to changes within the regional U.S. economy. 
I hese temporal changes also have an impact on the perceptions and 
strategies of Mexican workers with respect to their economic 
prospects and their manipulation of U.S. labor markets as they 
attempt to cope with the crisis in their own country. In my view, the 
key aspect in this regionally specific articulation of the border 
economies is the pattern of labor market segmentation on the 
American side and its changes over time. With this in mind, I offer 
here some tentative observations and thoughts concerning the use of 
Mexican immigrant labor (especially the pool of Mexican com­
muter workers) in the regional economy of the Lower Rio Grande 
Valley of South I ex as -a region commonly referred to as "El Valle." 
This three-county region (i.e., Willacy, Cameron and Hidalgo 
counties) borders the northeastern tip of the state of Tamaulipas that 
Benitcz-105 
contains three international crossings from Mexico at Matamoros, 
N. Progeso/Rio Bravo and Reynosa. 
A brief history of the economic development of the Valley, 
with special reference to the ethnic division of labor it created, and 
a description of the post-World War II changes in the economy of 
the region and how they have affected the relationship between 
Mexican immigrant labor and locally resident Chicano workers 
provide the background. This is followed by a brief examination of 
the ideological matrix associated with the current pattern of labor 
market segmentation. Finally, I attempt to draw out some of the 
implications of this pattern for the impact of the Mexican crisis on 
Mexican Immigrant workers, especially with respect to immigra­
tion patterns and domestic division of labor. 
The observations offered here are based primarily on field 
research conducted in the Valley in early 1980s. The focus of this 
field work, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor, was the 
relative impact of health versus other human capital characteristics 
on the labor market performance of farm and non-fann, blue collar 
workers (Spielberg B. 1983). I collected basic demographic and 
health data, including detailed work histories, by interviews with 
approximately 100 migrant farmworker households and 100 non-
farmworker households. The sample of non-farm, blue collar 
workers was selected from 10 firms located throughout the Valley, 
including producers of durable goods, food and beverage proces­
sors and bottlers, a clothing manufacturer, a hospital, and a local 
school district. In addition, extensive interviews were conducted 
with the personnel managers of at least 15 firms to obtain informa­
tion on their labor recruitment practices, wages, worker character­
istics and labor deployment practices. Interviews with several farm 
labor contractors, truckers and Texas Employment Commission 
administrators contributed additional data. 
Pre-War Mexican Immigration and Labor in the Valley 
To understand the relationship between Mexican immigrant 
labor and the domestic, resident labor force in the Valley, it is 
important to understand Valley history and its economic changes. 
For clarity, the history can be divided into a pre-W w'JI and a post-
WW II phase. 
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Prior to WW II, the predominant economic base of the 
Valley was agriculture. Agricultural development began with the 
coming of the railroad in 1904 and the platting of farming commu­
nities for anticipated Anglo colonization. During the first decade or 
so after 1904 however, the development of commercial agriculture 
was slow. Problems arose such as the lack of marketable product 
and difficulties in clearing the monte and creating a suitable irriga­
tion system. Theprincipal demands for cheap labor during this early 
period were for clearing land, construction of rail lines and irriga­
tion canals (Foscue 1932; 1934:3). By some accounts, this limited 
demand for labor was easily met by the local, Spanish-speaking 
ranchero population in the immediate area on both sides of the river 
(Allhands 1960: passim). At any rate, it was not until the introduc­
tion of partially mechanized cotton production, beginning around 
WW I, and, later, the establishment of winter citrus and vegetable 
crops, that agricultural development of the Lower Rio Grande 
Valley took off, bringing with it a significant increase in the demand 
for cheap, seasonal labor, principally for cotton harvesting (Coalson 
1977:5-7). This requisite reservoir of cheap labor was provided by 
Mexican nationals whose displacement and movement northward 
began at the height of the Porfirian era and was greatly accelerated 
by the nearly two decades of political turmoil beginning with the 
Mexican Revolution of 1910 (Cardoso 1980:1-54). 
It is important to note that this Mexican immigration to the 
United States was not a seasonal or transitory move in search of 
work but one characterized by permanent resettlement in the United 
States. Official estimates are that between 1900 and 1930, the 
number of United States residents of Mexican origin rose from 
71,062 to 226,046, an increase of approximately 266%. The actual 
increase was probably significantly higher (Coalson 1977:13). The 
overwhelming majority of these immigrants resettled permanently 
in populated border regions such as the Valley. These resettled 
Mexican immigrants and their labor became the principal source of profit 
for agriculture during this relatively capital-poor period of development. 
Furthermore, actions that threatened to diminish this source 
of profit to South Texas agriculture were resisted at the national, 
state and local levels (Montejano 1979). In the Valley itself, the 
principal mechanisms lor maintaining this reservoir of labor were 
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labor market discrimination, anti-labor union activity and more 
importantly, institutionalized deprivation of economic opportuni­
ties for these resettled Mexican workers and their offspring. All 
three of these mechanisms operated in a colonial-like social division 
of labor and differentiation between the Anglos and Mexican 
Americans. In the ethnically dichotomized communities of the 
Valley, this system of colonial relations and practices was rational­
ized by an Anglo myth that the Spanish speaking residents across 
the tracks were an undifferentiated mass of peones whose physical 
abilities (but not their particular talents) were necessary for the 
agricultural and economic development of the Valley. Many of 
these Anglos thought of the Mexican side of town as being nothing 
more than an urban farm labor camp. 
In this pre-war period, the Valley very neatly conformed to 
the dual labor market model. Aside from a small merchant class and 
some skilled workers employed by Anglo firms, the vast majority 
of the Spanish-speaking workers were employed in seasonal agri­
cultural tasks, in hourly wage work in the processing and canning 
plants, and in low paid domestic services. Anglos, on the other 
hand, were employed In professional and managerial occupations 
and higher paid skilled craftsmen. As stated earlier, partially 
mechanized cotton production was the crown jewel in the Valley's 
agricultural economy, as it was in the upper coastal regions of 
Texas, in western Arkansas, and in west Texas and eastern New 
Mexico. The "existence of this reservoir of poorly paid, underem­
ployed Mexican resident labor in the border regions, then, was the 
important factor in the development of the migratory farm labor 
system of Texas" (Coalson 1977:13) dedicated primarily to cotton 
harvesting. Prior to the war, this migratory circuit was restricted to 
the regions just named, beginning from the Valley in late June or 
early July and returning around November. 
Finally, and more to the point, seasonal temporary labor 
migration from Mexico itself did not play a significant role in the 
organization and deployment of labor during this period, especially 
from the late twenties to the start of WW II and the Bracero program. 
In large part, this was due to: 1) restrictions placed on Mexican 
immigration to the U.S. in the late twenties; and, 2) the relatively 
progressive agrarian policies of the Lazaro Cardenas presidency in 
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Mexico. Thus, in the period prior to WW II, temporary labor 
migrants from Mexico did not represent significant competition for 
resident Mexican-American workers. More importantly, during 
this period, the degree to which the Valley economy externalized or 
transferred the costs of labor reproduction to Mexico was minimal. 
That is, both the maintenance and labor renewal costs of this labor 
were borne principally by the local Valley and the Texas economies. 
The Post-WW II Period 
The immediate post-war period signaled the beginning of 
some fundamental changes in the Valley's economy that would 
affect the social structure of the Valley, the organization and 
deployment of its resident Mexican-American labor force and more 
importantly, the role played by seasonal, temporary Mexican labor 
migration. This is especially true beginning in the 1960's after the 
end of the Bracero program and the surge of undocumented workers 
it engendered. Prior to the war, the Valley economy rested on 
highly competitive agricultural and agriculture-related firms and on 
small locally owned and managed non-agricultural firms manufac­
turing light, non-durable goods and services. Around WW II 
however, the Valley economy began to lose its earlier competitive 
quality and began to take on the characteristics of a more heavily 
capitalized, monopolistic economy; the change began in the agri­
culture sector and later extended into the manufacturing and ser­
vices industries. 
The first major step in this transformation was the total 
mechanization of cotton production, in large measure a response to 
the competition from midwestern and western states for the cheap, 
Mexican-American labor of border regions like the Valley. This 
competition increased with the intensification of fruit and vegetable 
production in the Midwest and the labor shortages occasioned by 
W W II. An immediate resolution to this competition, especially 
during the war and shortly thereafter was, of course, the Bracero 
program and the increase in illegal immigration it brought about. 
The ultimate resolution, however, was the nearly total mechaniza-
ti°n of cotton production made possible by the invention of hybrids 
amenable to mechanized harvesting. From then on, the peak labor 
demand periods in the southwestern and midwestern agricultural 
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labor markets became complementary, rather than competitive, 
despite the relatively higher wages paid in the Midwest. At this 
point, the old cotton circuit of seasonal migratory agricultural labor 
disappeared and was replaced by the now more familiar midwestern 
stream. Similar trends in other areas of agricultural production 
ultimately resulted in significant changes in land ownership and 
tenure patterns, as well as in the organization of production itself. 
For example, today a significant portion of productive Valley land 
is under the effective control of large scale, transnational corporations or 
their subsidiaries producing hybrid grain and other seed products. 
These developments ultimately resulted in an increase in the 
capital/labor ratio in agricultural production and a concomitant 
decrease in the demand for agricultural workers. The decrease in the 
demand for agricultural labor resulted in an even larger reservoir of 
surplus farm and non-farm labor. Furthermore, this surplus labor 
pool was greatly augmented by post-war Mexican agricultural 
development policies and the effects of the Bracero program, which 
spurred the movement of displaced and underemployed campesinos 
and pequehos propietarios to the border region in search of sea­
sonal, temporary work in the United States. It was from this pool of 
Mexican workers, resettled in the border communities of Reynosa 
and Matamoros, for example, that the core of commuter workers 
would ultimately be derived. 
Coincident with this increase in the surplus labor pool, if not 
actually a direct result of it, began a particular process of industri­
alization in non-agricultural production and services in the border 
regions and in the Valley in particular. The essential feature of this 
process is encompassed in W. R. Thompson's filtering down theory 
of industrial location: 
"In national perspective, industries filter down through 
the system of cities, from places of greater to lesser 
industrial sophistication...as the industry slides down 
the learning curve, the high wage rates of the more 
industrially sophisticated innovating areas become 
superfluous [thus seeking] out industrial backwaters 
where the cheaper labor is now up to the lesser [skill] 
demands of the simplified process [of production], 
(1969:80) 
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In the Valley, this filtering down process is manifested in the 
form of branch plants producing light, durable and non-durable 
goods, as well as a similar proliferation of branches and franchises 
representing national service firms, especially in retail food, hotel 
and domestic services. Two additional characteristics of the V alley' s 
non-agricultural development through this filtering down process 
must be mentioned here. First, as indicated by Thompson, the 
production processes and assembly operations in most of these new, 
relocated firms have been so simplified and routinized that rela­
tively unskilled, low-wage labor can be profitably exploited with a 
minimum of investment in on-the-job training and other human 
capital assets. Today, in most of these firms not even a modicum of 
English is required for employment in the hourly wage, production sectors. 
Secondly, even though a greater number or percentages of 
poor, underemployed and unemployed unskilled workers are being 
hired by these firms than would otherwise be the case, a relatively 
small proportion of these workers apparently rise above poverty 
level earnings, despite the area's relatively greater increase in non-
agricultural employment (Brook and Peach, 1981). This paradox is 
due to extremely high labor turnover rates and the low wage structure. 
Mexican Immigrant Labor and Labor Market Segmentation 
Today 
As a result of the post-war changes in the economy of the 
Valley, the dual labor market segmentation based on ethnicity has 
all but disappeared. Since the war, Valley Chicanos have been 
increasing their proportion of employment in the white collar 
occupations, especially the professional, managerial and clerical 
groups, such that today they have at least achieved parity with 
Anglos, if not dominating these occupations. The occupations in 
which there have been relative declines in Chicano employment are 
laborers and farm labor. 1 his change can be attributed to a number 
ol tactors resulting from the post-war pattern of economic develop­
ment, not the least ol which has been the dramatic exodus of young 
Anglos from the region. 
Some scholars attribute this distributional shift largely to a 
movement of Chicanos uom the laborer and farm labor group into 
the white collar group (Briggs 1977:75). At best, this is only a 
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partial answer. At worst, it fails to account for the continued high 
rates of unemployment and underemployment among Chicanos, as 
well as increases in the proportion of workers earning poverty level 
or lower wages. Other interrelated factors that must be taken into 
account in explaining not only the shifts in the occupational struc­
ture but also the persistence of unemployment and underemploy­
ment and the working poor, are: 1) the incorporation of lower skilled 
laborers and farm workers into the labor force of non-agricultural, 
industrial firms; 2) the resettlement of migratory farm workers in the 
Midwest; 3) movement out of the labor force by ex-laborers and ex-
farmworkers; and 4) the role played by Mexican commuter workers 
in the Valley's labor force. 
The latter is my central interest here. The blue collar labor 
force of the Lower Rio Grande Valley today is composed primarily 
of resident, Chicano workers and Mexican commuter workers who 
reside with their families in the adjacent Mexican border towns and 
their environs. It appears, furthermore, that a significant proportion, 
if not the majority, of the latter are legal, resident aliens (i.e. green 
carders) or persons with daily visitor permits. (The proportion of 
temporary, undocumented workers in the Valley's labor force, 
incidentally, is hard to document. Nevertheless, there are indica­
tions that it is not significantly large. Most seem to pass over the 
Valley in search of work in the more urban centers in the interior of 
the state and elsewhere.) While this, in and of itself, is not new or 
surprising, what is interesting are the patterns in the distribution of 
both types of workers in the work force of the Valley. 
First, both types of workers (residents and commuters) are 
found in all the types of firms and occupations in the Valley. I hus, 
in the Valley there is no labor market segmentation between types 
of industries based on national residence in blue collar occupations. 
On the other hand, the data indicates a strong tendency for the higher 
wage firms to have a greater proportion of commuter workers than 
the lower wage, more seasonal ones. In addition, and in part the 
result of this last tendency, my data also demonstrated a noticeably 
higher labor turnover rate among the resident workers than the 
Mexican commuters within the firms surveyed. Both of these 
tendencies were corroborated by the personnel managers and some 
workers in these firms'. 
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For example, based on information provided by the person­
nel managers, the average hourly wage rate in the firms surveyed 
ranged from $4.15 an hour in the service firms to approximately 
$7.15 an hour in the manufacturing fimis, for an overall average of 
$5.70 an hour. In the two firms with the highest hourly wage rates, 
both of which manufactured durable goods, the percentage of 
workers with permanent residence in Mexico (almost all "green 
carders") was approximately 70%. In the two lowest paying service 
firms, the percentage of workers resident in Mexico ranged from 20 
to 25%. Similarly, the average, annual labor turnover rates in the 
two relatively high wage firms noted above were 20 and 25%, 
respectively. In the lower wage, service and processing firms, the 
average annual labor turnover rates ranged from around 50% to as 
high as 103%. The pattern in agricultural employment is similar to 
that in non-agricultural work. The agricultural labor force of the 
Valley is characterized by two types of employment, with different 
patterns of organization. The largest segment consists of migrant 
farmworkers. From April through October, this segment of the 
labor force is organized in domestic units that migrate to cultivate 
and harvest the fruit and vegetable crops principally in the Midwest. 
During the winter months, these domestic units return to the Valley 
region, where the heads of household and other able-bodied adults 
seek employment in agriculture and odd jobs. In Valley agricultural 
work, they find employment not as domestic units but as individu­
als, usually on a daily basis, two or three days cultivating or 
harvesting winter vegetables, followed by periods of two or three 
weeks with little or no employment. What is most important here 
is that the vast majority (by my survey estimates, nearly 90%) of 
these migrant workers are permanent residents of one or another of 
the many towns that make up the Rio Grande Valley. 
The second segment of the agriculture labor force consists 
Os permanent, year-round workers, usually, but not always, working 
directly for the firm or its management. These are workers who are 
employed year-round by the same firm (or patron) or, alternately, 
can pUi together year around work through various patrones or labor 
contractors within the Valley itself without having to resort to 
seasonal migration to the Midwest in search of work. More 
importantly, the consensus among my informants (i.e., migrant 
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farmworkers, luboi uontractors and employment agency officials^ 
is that the majority of this year-round agricultural labor force are 
permanent residents of Mexico, mostly residents of Mexican border 
towns who commute daily to work on the U.S. side. This labor force 
is organized in one of two ways. Some workers have direct contracts 
with agribusiness enterprises. These tend to be workers with some 
technical skills in specialized tasks such as irrigation, mechanized 
planting or cultivation, and pesticide application. Other workers are 
recruited daily or weekly at one of the three international border 
crossings by labor contractors who transport them to the workplace 
and supervise their work. These workers tend to toil in the more 
labor intensive phases of cultivation or harvesting. Unlike the 
migrant workers, these workers are not organized in domestic units, 
but rather work as individual laborers, or, in some cases, as experi­
enced teams of male workers. At most, one might find a married 
couple or a man with one or two grown sons working together. 
The Ideological Matrix of Labor Market Segmentation 
Statements made by informants make it clear that they are 
acutely aware of this labor market segmentation based on residence; 
they can also provide some justifications for its existence. Person­
nel managers and farm labor contractors, for example, almost to a 
person expressed a preference for the non-resident, commuter 
worker. According to them, these Mexican workers worked harder 
and more efficiently than resident workers. In addition, they were 
said to be more adaptable or flexible (i.e., willing to do anything 
asked of them to get the work done) and less complaining. Con­
versely, resident workers were viewed by management as being less 
willing to work, sloppier in their work, unable to take criticism or 
direction, and in general less dependable workers. When asked why 
these differences between resident and Mexican commuter workers 
might occur, the consensus among these managers and contractors 
was that native, resident workers really do not have to work, or work 
as often and as hard, since they can always resort to such things as 
food stamps, ADC, and other welfare and worker compensation programs. 
Resident worker informants were also well aware of this 
preference among employers for workers from Mexico and were 
often able to parrot the opinions held by management. Further mote, 
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they themselves often acknowledged that the Mexican commuter 
worker was a productive worker. They did not, however, agree that 
the Mexican workers were more productive because they worked 
harder or were more efficient workers. Their view was that Mexican 
commuter workers were given more opportunities to be more 
productive by management and labor contractors, i^armworkers, 
for example, frequently pointed out that the best fields were more 
often assigned to the Mexican workers so that at the end of the day 
they would wind up with more pay than the U.S. workers, even if 
both were being paid at the same piece-rate. They also said that 
Mexican commuter farmworkers were more often assigned to 
crews using more productive harvesting techniques; or to higher 
paying farm operations and tasks. Resident workers in the service 
and manufacturing firms cited similar management practices in 
their places of work. Interestingly, resident workers rarely ex­
pressed animosity toward Mexican commuter workers or character­
ized them as competitors for jobs. On the contrary, they often cited 
thedesperate situation or conditions in Mexico as leaving these non­
resident workers with no alternative but to seek work in the United 
States. The U.S. residents said that, were they in the place of the 
Mexico resident, they would do the same thing; and, indeed, many 
of them had done so in the past before taking up permanent 
residence in the United States. 
Finally, resident workers acknowledged their dependence 
on welfare benefits and the advantages that these gave them over the 
Mexican workers. They did not, however, see these benefits as 
alternatives to work, but rather as supplements to the low wages 
earned and the sporadic employment opportunities or slack periods 
that characterize the Valley economy. 
Perceptions of commuter Mexican workers as to their role 
in the labor market of the Valley are harder to gauge from the range 
of ideological statements made by informants. Many made state­
ments that indicate a perception of a labor shortage in the Valley 
(i.e., "necesitan gente pa' los trabajos") which in turn would explain 
the demand for their labor. Still others made statements that 
indicated qualitative differences between themselves and workers 
that reside in Texas as the reason for the demand for their labor. As 
one such worker put it, Nosotros somos mas mensos, no sabemos 
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otra cosa mas que el trabajo, por eso los patrones nos tienen mas 
confianza". ["We are more stupid. We don't know how to do 
anything else but work. That is why the bosses trust us more."] 
Another Mexican commuter worker expressed the difference this 
way: "El Tejano es mas like, tiene mas oportunidades...no se deja 
del patron". ["The Texas Mexican is freer. He has more opportu­
nities. He doesn't let the boss take advantage of him."] 
Among the oportunidades these Mexican workers attrib­
uted to the resident Texas worker were welfare benefits. Interest­
ingly enough, they did not begrudge Texas resident workers these 
benefits, nor did they see the situation as unfair to themselves. On 
the contrary, as one informant put it, "Ellos tienen derecho a esos 
beneficios porque son Americanos. Nosotros no." ["They have a 
right to those benefits because they are Americans. We are not."] 
Or, as another said," Y por que no? A1 fin de cuentas, es su pais..que 
no?" ["And why not. After all, it is their country, is it not?"] On 
the other hand, these commuter Mexican workers acknowledged 
that they had advantages over the resident workers by virtue of 
residing in Mexico but working in the United States. These 
perceived advantages revolved around the notion that the cost of 
living in Mexico was cheaper than in the United States. Statements 
such as "En Mexico se vive mas comodo" ["In Mexico one can live 
more comfortably."] or "En Mexico el Dolar rinde mas" ["In 
Mexico the dollar goes farther."] were commonplace. 
Conclusions and Implications 
I have tried to show that since WW II the blue collar labor 
force of the Lower Rio Grande Valley has increasingly been 
composed of permanent residents of the area and daily or seasonal 
commuter workers whose permanent residence is on the Mexican 
side of the border. Furthermore, I have tried to show that both types 
of workers are to be found in all of the major labor markets of the 
area-from agriculture to manufacturing. This is not particularly 
new or surprising, but the particular way in which the types of 
workers are combined in the various industries, and its conse­
quence!, k this region is somewhat unexpected and significant. In 
short, commuter Mexican immigrant workers seem to be dispropor-
tionately represented in the higher wage firms, are the more stable 
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workers in these firms, and are relatively more capable of finding 
year-round employment in agriculture than are the resident, Mexi­
can-American workers. In other words, the blue-collar labor force 
of the Valley is divisible into two segments based on residence, with 
the resident segment being relatively less productive or more 
marginal than the non-resident, commuter segment. 
This pattern of labor market segmentation has, of course, 
been beneficial to Valley employers. In addition to keeping wages 
low and maintaining the pliability of the most productive sector of 
the respective work force, this internal segmentation pattern also 
serves to tie these commuter workers to the firm and, perhaps, 
heighten their loyalty to the "patron." More importantly, asBuroway 
(1976) has pointed out, it has enabled the local economy to external­
ize a good portion of the costs of renewal of this labor force to the 
Mexican economy. In addition, living in Mexico on wages earned 
in the U.S. serves to minimize the family maintenance costs and 
other non-public labor renewal services, at least in perception of 
these Mexican commuter workers. 
Assuming all this to be true, what can we anticipate as some 
of the major consequences of the current Mexican crisis on the 
Mexican border commuter workers and their families? One very 
possible consequence could be the acceleration of permanent, 
household migration to the United States. As various studies have 
indicated (Reichert and Massey 1980; Flores 1984), since the late 
1970's, household immigration to the United States has been 
increasing significantly. Elizabeth Briody's (1987) study of house­
holds in the Valley that had immigrated permanently from Mexico, 
mostly from the Mexican border towns adjacent to the Valley, 
indicates that a considerable portion of these households, if not the 
majority, had been households with commuter workers (usually the 
heads of household) prior to the permanent move of the household 
to the Valley. My own data on Valley workers confirms this 
transitional pattern of household migration as well. In her interpre­
tation, this increase in household immigration has been due princi­
pally to agricultural labor demands and growing employment 
opportunities in the non-agricultural sector in the Valley. If her 
interpretation is correct, the rampant inflation, decreased supple­
mentary employment opportunities, and the deterioration of ser­
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vices and government support programs in Mexico as a result of the 
crisis can only increase the motivation of commuter worker house­
holds to immigrate their families permanently to the United States. 
In other words, as the economic advantages of living in Mexico and 
working regularly in the Valley diminish, more commuters will 
become Valley residents. 
Another related and potential scenario involves changes in 
the domestic division of labor among these commuter worker 
families. As Briody's and my data indicate, commuter worker 
families tend to be relatively young and in the process of raising a 
family in Mexico. As a result, they tend to be single worker units 
dependent on the earnings of the head of household working in the 
United States, and very often they have no savings at all. The 
economic effects of the crisis on their purchasing power can only put 
pressure on these families to increase the worker/dependent ratio in 
their households, which essentially means finding employment for 
the female head of household. This would put added pressure on 
households to migrate permanently to the United States, where the 
employment opportunities are better or, at the least, to find com­
muter type employment in the Valley for the adult women. In either 
case, a significant portion of household earnings would have to be 
spent in securing legal documentation for the spouse and, in the case 
of those seeking permanent immigration, for other family members. 
Given that savings or savings accounts are rare among commuter 
workers, such expenditures would decrease the amount of money 
available for the maintenance costs of the family in Mexico. In 
addition, the need for more employment among women (as com­
muters or within Mexico) would increase the demand for child care 
and other labor renewal services on the Mexican economy. 
On a broader level, the particular pattern of industrial 
development of the Valley, especially since the 1960 s, along with 
the pattern of internal labor market segmentation based ortreildence 
described here, has permitted a creaming of the labor supply of 
Mexican border towns thereby gaining a somewhat higher quality 
of agricultural and non-agricultural worker than would other wise be 
the case. Coupled with the increasing tendency tor experienced 
commuter worker household immigration to the United States, as a 
result of the crisis, the implications for Mexico s economy and for 
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its recovery, at least in this part of Mexico, are clear. To quote 
Cockcroft, "...it may be inferred that [this] migration out of Mexico 
represents a transfer to the United States of a significant investment 
by Mexico in the form of human capital" (1987:91). Whatever other 
investments may be required by Mexico for its recovery from the 
crisis, this investment in human capital and labor renewal is one it 
can ill-afford to lose or transfer to the United States. 
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Medicalization of the U.S.-Mexico 
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Res urn en 
Cuando hay que hacer deeisiones importantes acerca de la 
salud, siempre deben ser acondicionadas por el estado funcional del 
paciente. Esa decision muchas veces se determina por lo que los 
profesionales perciben como la condicion del paciente y no 
necesariamente en lo que el paciente necesita. Cuando el paciente 
vive en la frontera entre EEUU y Mexico, los que desean hacer 
deeisiones en su nombre tienen que reconocer que los pacientes en 
ambos lados de la frontera tienen problemas de salud que son 
similares. Tambien se debe reconocer que esfuerzos biomedicales 
no deben ser el centro de atencion. Si tenemos interes en resolver 
problemas de salud en la frontera debemos tener enfoque sobre 
variables sociales tal como la falta de nutricion adecuada, alojamiento 
inadecuado, falta de agua potable, la pobreza, falta de drenaje y falta 
de educacion. No hay medicina que pueda corregir estos problemas. 
La solucion queda en hacer un ataque multidisciplinario usando el 
cuidado de salud primaria como modelo. 
This paper was presented at the United States-Mexico Border 
Health Association 50th Annual Meeting on June 7-10, 1992, in 
Tampico, Tamaulipas, Mexico 
*Paul Villas, Ed.D., is an Assistant Professor at the Health Science 
Department, New Mexico State University. Erin Frew, is a graduate 
student, Health Science Department New Mexico State University. 
Introduction 
The recent attention the U.S.-Mexico border has attracted 
because of the Free Trade Agreement and a changing political 
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climate in Mexico has had different groups discussing the coming 
demographic changes along the border. Of particular interest has 
been the issue of health care and how the health needs of a growing 
population will be met. To some, health care is the treatment of 
disease or illness by a second or third party. Many times the 
prescribed treatment is medication by and attention from a physi­
cian. Although the prescription may be correct for the symptoms, 
medicine often fails to identify the reason behind the problem. In 
addition, when health needs have been identified, there has been too 
much temptation to create a physician-centered, medicine only 
solution which makes the recipient of medical care the centerpiece 
of attention (Conrad and Kern, 1990). This control and dominance 
by medicine on society is referred to as medicalization. 
Health care has also been described by the World Health 
Assembly's (WHA) definition reached at the Alma-Ata conference 
in 1978 which set global goals of achieving "Health for All by the 
Y ear 2000." The WHA proposed the concept of primary health ctire 
in order to improve health around the world. Although public health 
care is defined differently between locations, there is some agree­
ment regarding which types of health problems should be addressed 
when using this model. As stated in the recommendations of the 
Alma-Ata conference, primary health care is defined and should 
include at least: 
1. Health education 
2. Environmental sanitation of food and water 
3. The employment of community health workers 
4. Maternal and child health programs, including 
immunization and family planning 
5. Prevention of local endemic diseases 
6. Appropriate treatment of common diseases and injuries 
7. Provision of essential drugs 
8. Promotion of nutrition 
9. Traditional medicine (Basch, 1990) 
Disease and Illness 
It is understood that disease is not evenly distributed through­
out any population. Certain groups of people get sick more often 
and die at higher rates than others. Epidemiologists study the 
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distribution and determinants of states of health in human popula­
tions in order to determine which groups of people get sick and with 
which diseases. Answers are determined by using the traditional 
biomedical model which focuses on organic pathology in individual 
patients, rarely considering societal factors (Zola, 1990). Needed 
are ways to identify characteristics of groups and individuals and the 
social conditions that make them more or less vulnerable to disease. 
It is paramount for the successful provision of improved 
health along the border shared with Mexico to consider the social 
conditions of the people who inhabit the area (Conrad et al, 1990; 
Dubos, 1959). (For the purposes of this paper, the U.S.-Mexico 
border is defined as including all the U.S. counties that share their 
boundaries with Mexico.) Some of the most noteworthy health 
problems are social and environmental in nature. They include high 
fertility rates, a disparity in infant mortality rates and the lack of 
potable water (Warner, 1991). Much can be learned from the 
shortcomings of well intentioned programs such as India's Univer­
sal Immunization Program which failed to recognize that effective 
intervention requires working within the culture of the people 
(Franke&Chasin, 1992). Success hinges on the involvement of the 
targeted population. This 2,000 mile zone is geographically and 
ethnically diverse; any attempts to improve the health of border 
citizens in this area must consider the contrasting cultures and their 
respective needs for care. Individual and community health will not 
improve by a biomedically driven initiative along the U.S.-Mexico 
border alone, but by the inclusion of changing, understanding and 
improvement of social and environmental conditions. 
According to Rene Dubos, "To ward off disease or recover 
health, men as a rule find it easier to depend on the healers than to 
attempt the more difficult task of living wisely." (Dubos, 1959). 
Dependency on healers for better health has happened in the larger 
U.S. society, and this mentality wants to encroach upon the U.S.­
Mexico border. Living wisely to recover or to keep health requires 
education and the means to change the social conditions that entrap 
the more susceptible. To improve the health of those living on the 
border will necessitate that medicine become one of the many 
players and not the whole team. It also necessitates an understand­
ing of the inner workings of cultures such as the fact that all societies 
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have some systematized manner in which to deal with illness 
(Chesney, Chavira, Hall, and Gary, 1982). Alongtheborderitcould 
well be the utilization of curanderos or folk medicine practitioners. 
Medicine, Physicians, and Health 
Life, whether in Mexico, the United States, or on the U.S.­
Mexico border, would be so simple if we could rely on physicians 
to keep us healthy, but the fact is that we can't. In spite of potent 
drugs, high-tech procedures, and sophisticated treatments, the ac­
complishments of medicine in the last century are often exaggerated 
in people's minds. The dependence on medicine as cure-all is 
frequently misplaced. It is true that in the United States, health has 
improved tremendously in the last 100 years when measured by how 
long we live. Since 1900, life expectancy has increased from an 
average of 47 to the current 75 years. The statistically short life 
expectancy in 1900 was due mainly to the large number of infant 
deaths caused by pneumonia, diarrhea, premature birth, and to a 
lesser degree, infectious diseases such as whooping cough, measles, 
and tuberculosis (Vickery, 1978). However, the truth was that 
people who survived childhood had nearly the same life expectancy 
that we have now-about 70 years (Sagan, 1987). For decades, the 
medical community has assumed responsibility for the implied 
improvement in health status and in increased life expectancy of the 
population when, in fact, the largest gains in reducing mortality and 
morbidity have been the result of public health efforts. Figure 1 
illustrates how infant mortality rates from communicable disease 
had already declined dramatically even before antibiotics became 
widely available. 
From the late 1800s through the 1940s, the survival rates 
from infectious diseases and infant deaths steadily improved as 
beneficial changes took place in hygiene, sanitation, crowded 
housing conditions, water quality, nutrition, and other public health 
initiatives. Our increased life expectancy is often attributed to 
advances in medicine, but Figure 2 illustrates that antibiotics, the 
wonder drugs, only appeared on the scene in the 1940s and 1950s 
after rates of infectious disease had been steadily decreasing for 
nearly 100 years (Sagan, 1987) 
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By 1950, with major environmental improvements accom­
plished and infectious diseases largely controlled, the formerly 
decreasing death rates came to a standstill-even though at the same 
time many medical advances were introduced: hospital intensive-
care units, coronary-care units, open-heart surgery, organ trans­
plants, and other high-technology modes of treatment. Life expect­
ancy and death rates, however, improved very little for the next 25 
years in spite of the availability of the new medical treatments 
(Vickery, 1990). 
After the 1950s, lifestyle became the next crucial factor in 
preventing disease. With more people surviving into adulthood, 
rates of the chronic, degenerative diseases increased-heart disease, 
cancer, diabetes, and stroke. These are the diseases medicine has 
had little success in treating and are most likely to develop when 
lifestyle habits are unhealthy. These are also border diseases whose 
rates can decrease with proper health education and health promo­
tion which result in behavioral changes. Figure 3 illustrates how 
death rates in the United States declined as a result of environmental 
improvements before medical intervention and how positive lifestyle 
changes will continue to improve health. 
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If the biomedical philosophy of health care is allowed to 
embrace the U.S.-Mexico border, a scenario similar to last year's 
Persian Gulf War is possible. Much of the great technologically 
advanced equipment the United States possessed was ineffective 
because the desert terrain was inhospitable. It was a case of having 
the right equipment at the right time in the wrong place. If 
improving health along the U.S.-Mexico border is a worthy goal, 
then it will not be a medically driven agenda that will accomplish the 
task but a primary health care philosophy that is right for the area. 
Health promotion experts report it is difficult for people to 
accept the reality that environment, nutritional conditions, and 
lifestyle have had a greater effect on disease rates than medical 
treatment. Although treatment and management were available for 
many infirmities, a medical cure existed for relatively few. The last 
50 years of medical research have produced an enormous number of 
drugs that aid many disorders, but few inroads have been made in 
curing the most common ailments and diseases such as heart disease, 
stroke, cancer, diabetes, and the common cold (Harley, Schlaadt, 1992). 
For example, in spite of new surgical treatments and drugs, 
death rates for breast cancer have remained unchanged for the last 
75 years. In the case of minorities, poverty and low education are 
better predictors of high cancer rates and cancer deaths (Rover, 
1991). Nevertheless, according to a study conducted by the Univer­
sity of Chicago, most adults believe that modern medicine has cures 
for nearly all diseases or will within their lifetimes. It seems evident 
too much is expected from medicine-a relationship that medicine 
enjoys and society encourages. Considering the prevalence in our 
society of alcohol, cigarette, and drug use; unbalanced, high-fat 
diets; and lack of exercise-all habits that contribute to disease risk-
it does not seem reasonable nor possible that medicine can do for 
people what they can do for themselves (McKinlay, McKinlay, and 
Beaglehole, 1989). It is unconscionable that any group or organi­
zation would want to make health dependents of anyone and ignore 
the emphasis on teaching self-responsibility. For decades the 
medical community has assumed responsibility for the implied 
improvement in health status and in increased life expectancy of the 
population, when in fact, the largest gains in reducing mortality and 
morbidity have been the result of public health efforts. 
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Border Health Profile 
The U.S.-Mexico border region has a higher birth rate and 
a lower death rate than the United States in general. Hispanics 
account for about 75 percent of the population, although those who 
claim that there are errors in the census believe it to be higher. The 
leading causes of death in both the border area and the U nited States 
are heart disease, cancer, stroke, accidents, chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease, pneumonia, and influenza. Communicable 
diseases that occur at higher rates on the border than in the rest of the 
United States include hepatitis, tuberculosis, gastrointestinal dis­
eases, and syphilis. Other health conditions common to the border 
area are diabetes mellitus, gallbladder disease, and obesity. The 
population, considered to present a challenge to researchers, is 
difficult to reach for identification purposes, to retain in programs, 
and to study if migratory and binational variables are not considered 
along with cultural or ethnic issues (Ortega and Ramos, 1991) 
Discussion and Recommendations 
It has been considered that good health was the consequence 
of medical care. In many circles, and by many who practice 
medicine, that idea is still maintained. This notion is believed by 
certain state medical associations who have identified the U.S.­
Mexico border area in need of health care. Others have suggested 
the U.S. and Mexico border to be an ideal region to establish new 
guidelines for improving the health of interdependent nations 
(Falck, 1989). Although the betterment of health along the border 
is needed, it will be accomplished by an already recognized primary 
health care philosophy and community empowerment. 
Health is a social idea with psychological, cultural, eco­
nomic, political, and biological aspects. When a community (the 
U.S.-Mexico border area qualifies) perceives health in holistic 
terms and seeks to enhance its role using community resources 
which are nonpaternalistic, the results are a respect for the lay 
experience and an empowerment that takes place at a very prag­
matic level. There is evidence the public wants to gain control of 
their health destinies (Carlson and Newman, 1987). t he task before 
all of us who wish the very best for those living on the U.S.-Mexico 
border is to insure equity in access to the necessary knowledge, tools 
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of control and accurate information. This is particularly true for 
those who are highly vulnerable to professional dependency for 
their health-the poor, minorities, elderly, uneducated, and women 
(McKinlay, McKinlay, and Beaglehole, 1989). A first step in 
expressing the needed concern to improve health and the quality of 
life along the border is a healthy respect for the population and the 
elimination of the we-they dichotomy. Adhering to the ideology of 
using primary health care to positively impact the health status of 
the people living along the U.S.-Mexico border, the following 
recommendations are offered. 
1. Considering the poverty level and the high fertility rates, 
it is recommended that midwives be employed. Midwives tend to 
relate to their patients in a nonauthoritarian manner and emphasize 
education, support and patient satisfaction (Rooks, 1990). Mid-
wives can provide services for large numbers of the poor border 
population in an effective manner. 
2. Teaching and encouraging self responsibility are impor­
tant steps in improving health. The barrier to the assumptions of 
individual responsibility for one's own health is lack of knowledge 
(implicating the inadequacies of formal education's lack of suffi­
cient interest in, and knowledge about, what is health prevention) 
(Rover, 1991). Strategies for improving health along the U.S.­
Mexico border must include the incorporation of preventive mea­
sures into personal health services and the environment as well as 
individual and mass educational efforts. A direct relationship 
between a mother's educational level and immunization compli­
ance in border communities has already been established (Perez, 
Fernandez, and Apodaca, 1990). Individuals along the border must 
be educated to know they have the power and moral responsibility 
to maintain their own health by the observance of simple, prudent 
styles of behavior. Social policy to improve education, employ­
ment, civil rights and economic levels must join forces with efforts 
to develop accessible health services. 
3. Social sponsorship of a self-care development movement 
can contribute to a healthier community life along the border. The 
self-care (individuals ministering to their own needs) concept could 
be introduced to the neighborhoods or colonias as a community-
wide proposition. Establishing a model of self-care education that 
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truly empowers the community and its values, its style of problem 
solving and its economic diversity provided by lay people to 
themselves will contribute to community life. 
4. It is through decentralization of services and through 
grass-roots leadership that primary health care functions to reduce 
inequities in access to care. The great accomplishment of providing 
much health care with few resources was exemplified by China. 
China's fundamental strategy was the decentralization of govern­
mental policies and the initiation of mass health education cam­
paigns (Villas, Lile, and Perez-Coronado, 1991). A decentraliza­
tion policy that encourages local active responsibility and evalua­
tion is encouraged. 
5. Since the lack of education is directly linked to many 
problems, one of them being poor health, it is recommended that 
efforts be made to encourage students to stay in school. High levels 
of school dropouts should never be accepted as normal. There 
should be a constant campaign for parental involvement with the schools. 
6. Work already begun in this area should be recognized and 
supported. Private funders such as the Kellogg, Ford, and Robert 
Wood Johnson foundations and the Pew Charitable Trusts are 
backing projects in public interest law, water management, and 
economic empowerment. The Pan-American Health Organization 
has begun promoting cross-border cooperation among health care 
agencies with activities such as immunization campaigns, mosquito 
and rabies control, and AIDS prevention, along with environmental, 
educational, and emergency services. Also currently developed by 
the World Health Organization (WHO) is a project to test whether 
academic research institutions can assist communities in analyzing 
and planning how to develop health care by the Primary Health Care 
Review (PHCR) model. The PHCR is, among other things, a 
technique for empowering local communities to participate in 
solving their health problems in a constructive manner (Ortega, 1991). 
7. At a recent Texas Medical Association (1 MA) confer­
ence, it was recommended that there be created a U.b-Mexico 
border health commission. The TMA was considering asking the 
larger American Medical Association to draft legislation for Con­
gress to create a two-nation panel in order to solve environmental 
and health problems along the U.S. border with Mexico {tJ Paso 
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Times, 1991). It is strongly recommended that no more legislation, 
panels, or organizations be formed in order to improve the health 
problems along the border. Instead, those concerned about the 
health issues should adhere to the recommendations already made 
during the Alma-Ata conference of 1978 (Basch, 1990). Regions 
such as those found along the U.S.-Mexico border would best 
benefit by employing the Primary Health Care strategies already 
proven all over the world. 
Conclusion 
As the multidisciplinary examination of the Free Trade 
Agreement and its impact on the U.S.-Mexico border continues, we 
must keep in mind the past attempts to control disease and improve 
health by medical efforts alone have met with limited success. 
Instead, the influence of environmental control has been far more 
effective. In fact, only 3.5 percent of the decline in infectious 
diseases in the twentieth century can be attributed to medical 
intervention (Dubos, 1959; Rover, 1991). Unfortunately, as mis­
conceptions regarding the role of the biomedical model persist, the 
rationalization for and validation of increased spending on curative 
care instead of health education and health promotionalso endures. 
This shortcoming in investment in public health measures becomes 
exacerbated in a period marked by rising health care costs. In 1985, 
it was conservatively estimated that efficacious preventive mea­
sures could produce an annual saving of750,000 lives and $6 billion 
in medical expenses (McKinlay, McKinlay, and Beaglehole). The 
chronically poor economic conditions that exist along the border 
demand comprehensive implementation of public health measures 
that consider the indigenous social milieu. 
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The Unionization of the Maquiladora Industry: The Tamaulipan 
Case in National Context. By Edward J. Williams and John T. 
Passe-Smith. San Diego: Institute for Regional Studies of the 
Californias, San Diego State University, CA 92182-0435, 1992. 
xv +134 pp. 
Shortly after Williams and Passe-Smith finished their book, 
Mexican federal agents arrested Agapito Gonzalez Cavazos, the 
seventy-seven year old head of the Matamoros Union of Journey­
men and Industrial Workers, and whisked him off to Mexico City 
(see James Pinkerton, "Labor Don Under Siege." HoustonChronicle 
3.29.92, p. 21 A). Williams and Passe-Smith explain some of the 
stakes in the spectacular investigation of the main Matamoros labor 
union launched in January 1992. The action continues President 
Salinas de Gortari 's clamp down on major unions, a famous episode 
of which was the arrest of "La Quina," the oil workers' union leader, 
and is widely seen as an effort to demonstrate to potential investors 
that the Mexican government is prepared to break with its long-time 
political allies in order to insure a climate favorable to business in 
the border industrialization zone. 
The question that arises is why the Mexican government 
was led to take action against the Matamoros union in particular, 
rather than against any of the other border town unions. The official 
reason, that a long-standing charge of fiscal fraud finally had to be 
investigated, is not sufficient: there are obviously many other cases 
of alleged tax evasion and the federal bureaucracy is not known for 
the rapidity of its procedures. Passe-Smith and Williams oiler some 
statistics that suggest the Matamoros union was different from its 
sister unions in other Tamaulipan border cities. 
Starting from overall figures of unionization along the 
Mexican side of the border, the two sociologists are led to distin­
guish apparently similar union situations by finer criteria describing 
the varying relations between the unions, their membership, indus­
try and the government. They establish these distinctions through 
interviews with maquiladora workers and a review of the recent 
history of city politics. 
The state of Tamaulipas first attracted their attention be­
cause its three major maquiladora concentrations (Nuevo Laredo, 
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Reynosa and Matamoros) all displayed very high rates of union 
membership (close to 100% organized), compared to states further 
west (Coahuila to Baja California Norte). Although their initial 
hypothesis was that the three Tamaulipan unions shared the features 
of a strong labor movement, their investigation led them to separate 
the Matamoros union from the other two. In Matamoros, the union 
appeared closer to its membership and more militant in the face of 
new demands by the employers. By contrast, the Nuevo Laredo 
union was "slavish" and the Reynosa union caving in to the employers. 
The authors frame their case study of Tamaulipas with an 
extensive overview of recent trends in the Mexican government's 
policy towards labor in general and maquiladora unions in particu­
lar, The many types of relations between unions and management 
are described and the conclusion examines the somewhat gloomy 
prospects for labor in the border area. 
The authors surveyed two hundred and twenty-one workers. 
The statistics they construct from this sample are successful in 
bringing out the general feelings of the workers and establishing the 
distinction between Matamoros and the other two Tamaulipan 
towns. Some of the questions asked, however, may have been very 
sensitive and additional material describing the exact context in 
which they were asked could shed more light on their significance: 
were the interviewees chosen through firm employee lists, through 
the union or through neighborhood networks; how effectively were 
they protected from retaliation by union leaders and employers; at 
what stage of contract negotiations were they questioned? More­
over, the reader thirsts for a more complete history of the local labor 
and neighborhood movements that shaped the social climate in 
which the survey was conducted. The situation in Matamoros has 
already changed in many ways since this book was finished. For 
instance, one wonders, in light of the above-mentioned arrest of 
"Agapito," whether the Matamoros interviewees would answer in 
the same fashion today the questions asked them last year about 
their confidence in the Mexican government. 
The book is valuable as an update on industrial relations in 
the northern border area. The existence of trade unions with the 
avowed mission of defending the wages and working conditions of 
maquiladora workers is toooften forgotten in discussionsof Mexico's 
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industrialization program and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement. Williams and Passe-Smith remind us that these unions 
encompass a wide range of situations and are subject to significant 
change over time. Their work confirms once again that the real state 
of labor relations cannot be deducted from overall unionization 
statistics but requires, to be truly understood, both sociological 
surveys and a careful study of the historical past and social context. 
As a detailed picture of the recent situation in Tamaulipas, it is therefore a 
welcome contribution to a broader study of labor along the border. 
John Barzman 
The University of Texas-Pan American 
Entre Yerba, Polvo y Plomo: Lo Fronterizo Visto Por El Cine 
Mexicano, Volumen I & Volumen II. By Norma Iglesias. Tijuana, 
Baja California: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, 1991.156 pp. (vol. 
1), 224 pp. (vol.2). 
As interest in the border increases in both the United States 
and Mexico, so does the realization that the region encompasses a 
distinct reality that is as much cultural as geographical. Norma 
Iglesias' two-volume cinematic history focuses on how the border 
has been perceived and interpreted in the history of the Mexican 
cinema. Ms. Iglesias, whose previous books have tocused on a 
range of border issues, shows how thtfrontera or border has played 
a part in Mexican cinema practically since the latter's inception. 
The title of both volumes is taken from a movie with thS 
same name (albeit slightly different spelling) and higlights a popu­
lar theme in current border films-drug trafficking, with its attendant 
emphasis on marijuana (yerha), heroin and/or cocaine (polvo) and 
melodrama riddled with bullets (plomo). T his is just one of several 
cinematic scenarios of the border, and the author s first volume 
documents the different eras that have attempted to por tray—although 
at times stereotype seems more accurate-the border experience on 
celluloid. 
In addition to a historical introduction to the topic, the first 
volume aims for a more complex appreciation ot the circumstances 
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that surround any cinematic enterprise. Indeed, an overall perspec­
tive on frontera films requires interdisciplinary investigation, and 
this first volume assumes the task quite well. One chapter examines 
the psychology of the Mexicans and Chicanos who comprise its 
audience, with special attention to how border films fulfill identity 
needs. Although the open-ended interviews with moviegoers could 
have been edited more stringently, the material is rewarding in both 
anecdote and insight. 
Along with the consumer end of the border "dream indus­
try", the author examines the other end of its spectrum, explaining 
how production considerations, including strategies for targeting 
the audience market, determine the final product. Similarly, she 
reveals how the monopoly on distribution and theater exhibition has 
as its ultimate consequence inferior filmmaking. 
These chapters are not without their minor faults. For 
instance, the analysis of the production process includes tables-a 
typical example cites the number of tickets sold in given years 
throughout selected theaters in Tijuana-that only the most meticu­
lous (or masochistic) cineast would care to ponder. On the whole, 
however, Ms. Iglesias' observations on matters of production 
provide necessary insights for understanding the finished product. 
The static stereotypes and the sameness that plague most of the 
genre, she argues, can be explained by the fact that production lies 
in the hands of a very small number of families whose narrowness 
of vision makes that of American studios seem limitless by compari­
son. Moreover their familiarity with the border experience, particu­
larly on the U.S. side, is negligible. Thus, when one respondent 
holds up La Bamba as the artistic yardstick by which to measure his 
industry's own output, one almost wishes that the statement were 
motivated more by sarcasm than sincerity. One could well argue 
that Chicanos, after being subjected to years of distorted portrayals 
at the hands of Anglo directors now have to turn the other cheek and 
endure stereotypes perpetuated by Mexican directors in films such 
as Johnny Chicano, El chicano justiciero, and El chicano karateca. 
The author rightfully criticizes these misrepresentations 
which at times reach surreal proportions, for while one hardly 
expects a Buhiiel in the bunch, the directors' lack of integrity or 
artistry is dismal by almost any standards. In all fairness Ms. Iglesias 
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acknowledges the cooperation of these same producers and direc­
tors with her project; as one producer pointed out, he did not expect 
her to shower his work with flowers and accolades. 
If one strength of the first volume lies in its informative 
value, an equally valid element can be found in its engaging 
readability. Its blend of academic insight and genuine enthusiasm 
for its topic resembles the style of one of its primary sources-Garcia 
Riera's exhaustive filmography of the Mexican cinema. Garcia 
Riera analyzes his material with an intellectual humor that makes its 
reading at once pleasurable and enlightening, and Ms. Iglesias 
provides her own variation with great effect. As with any serious 
critic of popular film, she understands the dilemma of interpreting 
lowbrow cultural artifacts-movies for a mass audience-within 
academic parameters, for nothing ruins an intellectual analysis of 
banal art like holding the work to the same standards that one applies 
to more profound works of creativity. One does a disservice both 
to inferior art and superior efforts. Ms. Iglesias understands that 
academic interest in borderline art may exist for reasons other than 
esthetic ones, and what make this book on border films is so readable 
is her ability to maintain that distinction: that popular art which has 
little to tell us artistically can still say much to social scientists; 
conversely, one can discuss the social or cultural context of such art 
without necessarily taking its esthetic content seriously. 
Although the author has introduced an innovative and 
valuable area of study, there exists a major problem with one of the 
criteria used to designate a given film as fronteriza: that the film 
"refer to the Mexican-origin population living in the United States". 
In essence, any film that touches on Chicanes could be included, and 
while Chicanos constitute a major segment of U.S. border culture, 
we must also recognize that the vast majority of the Mexican-origin 
population iri the U.S. does not reside along the border. Indeed some 
of the film settings are in places such as Los Angeles or Chicago, 
areas which may have a sizeable Mexican-origin population but 
which would not fall within border boundaries by any stretch of the 
imagination. It is true that some of the concerns faced by Mexicans 
and Chicanos throughout the U.S. may be similar; moreover, the 
collective cognitive map of Mexicans may make little distinction 
between the border region of the U.S. and the rest of its territory. 
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Still, the construct of the border as a cultural and political phenom­
enon must be defined with greater restraint and rigor for it to have 
meaningful utility. For instance, if we take her same Mexican-origin 
population criterion but now apply it to populations south of the Rio Bravo 
(i.e., all of Mexico) the term is so all-inclusive as to be impractical. 
Similarly, making the border population synonymous with 
Mexican-origin population perpetuates yet another stereotype on an 
ethnic group which has already endured more than its share. 
Because of generational, geographical and historical realities, the 
variety of cultural experiences within Chicano communities is 
considerable. Although border films may gloss over these differ­
ences due to ignorance or to a profit motive that imposes an artificial 
common denominator on its audience, it is up to the academic 
community to point out these misperceptions rather than perpetuate 
them. I he fact that this book is a pioneering work makes the task 
doubly important, since all too often the thesis of original sources-
along with their shortcomings-aie subsequently cited without criticism. 
Aside from her sympathetic albeit sporadic treatment of 
Chicanos, the author alludes to a number of other subthemes 
throughout her work, including the role of women in border films. 
Her observations on the portrayal of Chicanos and women, though, 
are interspersed throughout the work, whereas a distinct chapter on 
each might have proved more satisfactory. Better still, one would 
suggest a separate book for each theme; certainly her present 
insights on the issues impacting both groups would support a more 
formal development of those ideas. 
Regardless of how one views the artistic merit of these 
works, there is little doubt but that they help contribute to the 
cognitive world oi many U.S. Hispanics and Mexicans. To the 
extent that such films attempt to reflect border reality they serve as 
ready-made cognitive maps of the region, and it would appear that 
technological transformations in the medium will help underscore 
their impact. One example: in years past, undocumented Mexicans 
living in the U.S. might think twice about attending theaters catering 
to such interests. That fear has been erased by the proliferation of 
video stores which allow home viewing of such material. Similarly, those 
who live in communities where theater screenings of Mexican films are not 
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feasible now have access. In short, populations which were heretofore 
culturally isolated have now been incorporated into the audience. 
Ms. Iglesias argues that while these films tend to be pro­
duced at least partially in Mexico, their cultural impact is especially 
significant in the U.S., where their major audience is found. For this 
group the popularity of such films, aside from the entertainment 
element, may serve a dual function in identity: an attempt to reaffirm 
cultural ties to a mother country-ties that may in fact be more 
mythical than actual-as well as an attempt to redefine their new 
surroundings into a distinct synthesis. 
As with any work that critically examines a portion of 
popular culture, the book is capable of satisfying a strata of audi­
ences. A reader who simply wants academic affirmation of border 
culture's existence will be pleased, for Ms. Iglesias' authentic and 
intimate interest in the field should serve to legitimize it. Yet the 
author carries her comments farther still, to the arena of social 
criticism, for she points out the responsibility that directors must 
assume for the impact of their films, which are both shapers of 
culture and esthetic products of the same. She observes that films 
on la frontera typically exploit timely social issues such as 
undocumented immigration yet ultimately defuse and dismiss their 
relevance by turning them into fodder for comedy or melodrama. 
Urging for a greater artistic commitment among the directors and 
producers of such films, she ends her first volume with a quote from 
Fellini, who although sometimes accused of an extremely personal 
surrealism, nonetheless expresses the ultimate challenge for film­
makers: the creation of fantasies which confront that includible 
reality that sustains the imagination. 
The second volume of Entre yerba, polvo y plomo, a 
directory of Mexican border films, consists of a more detailed 
annotation of the movies mentioned directly or indirectly in the first 
volume. Limiting herself to a selection and compilation of these 
works, the author also limits the breadth of her own remarks and 
observations to the film at hand rather than to the overall genre. A 
significant part of the volume consists of earlier texts either com­
piled or composed by Garcia Riera or Ayala Blanco in their 
respective histories of the Mexican cinema. For those films which 
the author herself summarizes and comments on, one must often be 
140-Reviews/Rcscnas 
satisfied with a cursory synopsis and a publicity blurb from the 
studio; the latter, instead of clarifying the plot, usually adds to its 
surrealism. Occasionally, though, the information transcends that 
of trivial pursuit, for instance, anyone who has viewed as bizarre the 
cinematic tastes of the French for American cinema will be further 
mystified to learn that Mojadopower received an award from a film 
festival in France. 
For the cineast or anyone else interested in a more detailed 
description of a particular picture, the filmography by Ms. Iglesias 
certainly saves the time of poring through Garcia Riera's tomes to 
sort out border cinema from other Mexican productions. In the 
sense that the volume delineates the genre, her excerpts are useful, 
yet the lack of even a basic index severely limits its utility. The films 
are catalogued chronologically, but even films within a given year 
are not listed alphabetically by title, so tracking down a given movie 
can prove exasperating. Moreover, this volume lacks the theoretical 
and thematic interest-to say nothing of the sense of future research 
potential-that the first volume generates. Comparing it to the first 
volume, it can only serve to complement or accompany the former 
but cannot properly stand on its own. 
Genaro Gonzalez 
The University of Texas-Pan American 
Entre la Magia y la Historia: Tradiciones, Mitos y Leyendas de 
laFrontera. Compilado por Jose Manuel ValenzuelaArce. Mexico, 
D.F: Grafica, Creatividad y Diseno. 1992. 259 paginas; cinco 
capitulos. 
Estos ensayos abarcan las ponencias presentadas en el Foro 
De Analisis de! VII Festival Internacional de la Raza de 1990, 
reunidopor el Colegio de la Frontera Norte y publicadas en 1992 por 
el Programa Cultural de Las Fronteras del Consejo Nacional para La 
Cultura y Las Artes. 
La coleccion de ensayos representa un estudfo que enlaza 
varias disciplinas. A1 mismo tiempo, es de interes para todo lector. 
La gran sensibilidad con la cual se relatan estos ensayos denotan el 
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respeto de cada autor, as como al pueblo sobreel cual se escribe-el pueblo 
foonterizo Mexicano y Chicano. Esta cultura fronteriza, poco 
entendida por las dos naciones que les da su dinamismo, sigue 
arraigada en la tradicion, con su propia identidad y su propia 
historia. 
Entre laMagiay laHistoria forma una estructurabasandose 
en el mito, la historia, la literatura y las leyendas. El mensaje o tema 
sobresaliente de este libro es la dinamica de las culturas en la region 
geograficadelafrontera,dondeseentrecruzan tradiciones, leyendas 
e historia. Aquf, en este ambiente "magico" se reunen las corrientes 
del mito y la leyenda y se organiza una historia propia del pueblo. 
Esta historia no es una historia despegada de la otra, sino que va 
mano a mano con la ya reconocida oficialmente y aceptada. Olga 
Vicenta Diaz Castro (Sor Abeja) lo dice bien en "LaTia Juana"del 
capi'tulo titulado "Los Mitos Fundadores": "no siempre lo que se 
escribe es cierto, y a veces la verdad nunca se escribe". Esta es la 
clave de Entre la Magia y la Historia. 
La riqueza cultural de esta region, bastante bien ilustradaen 
esta coleccion, es tan abundante que solo suele presentarse para 
comprenderla. Y asf lo hacen los autores de este libro. Los 
sfmbolos, mitos y leyendas aquf presentados son las realidades de 
un pueblo poco comprendido. Esta coleccion, representa una 
cronica de las tradiciones, valores y suehos-la historia-de un 
pueblo no reconocido u apreciado. 
Por su mayor parte, los personajes presentados en estas 
paginas reflejan un pueblo aislado y marginal, en peligro de 
desaparicion. Pero,al mismotiempo, revelan unespfritu indomable, 
valiente, luchando ante la dominacion y la injusticia, manteniendo 
su identidad, sus tradiciones y su cultura. Surgen tambien valores 
de principios humanitarios, una ideotogfa propia y una vision del mundo. 
Esta coleccion abre paso para tener un mejor entendimiento 
de la frontera y su dinamica; enlaza argumentos persuasivos para 
un entendimiento mas sofisticado de la historia segiin las perspectivas 
etnicas; y propone un contexto internacional para estudios m£s 
profundos en esta region. 
Juanita Elizondo -Garza, 
The University of Texas-Pan American 
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